The main aim of this paper is to examine the practice of describing intellectual pursuits in aesthetic terms, and to investigate whether this practice can be accounted for in the framework of a standard conception of aestheticexperience. Following a discussion of some historical approaches, the paper proposes a way of conceiving of aestheticexperience as both epistemically motivating and epistemically inventive. It is argued that the aesthetics of intellectual pursuits should be considered as central (...) rather than marginal to our philosophical accounts of aestheticexperience, and that our views about the relation between the aesthetic and cognitive domains should be reconfigured accordingly. (shrink)
“George Hagman looks anew at psychoanalytic ideas about art and beauty through the lens of current developmental psychology that recognizes the importance of attachment and affiliative motivational systems. In dialogue with theorists such as Freud, Ehrenzweig, Kris, Rank, Winnicott, Kohut, and many others, Hagman brings the psychoanalytic understanding of aestheticexperience into the 21st century. He amends and extends old concepts and offers a wealth of stimulating new ideas regarding the creative process, the ideal, beauty, ugliness, and –perhaps (...) his most original contribution–the sublime. Especially welcome is his grounding of aestheticexperience in intersubjectivity and health rather than individualism and pathology. His emphasis on form rather than the content of an individual's aestheticexperience is a stimulating new direction for psychoanalytic theory of art. With this work Hagman stands in the company of his predecessors with this deeply-learned, sensitively conceived, and provocative general theory of human aestheticexperience.”Ellen Dissanayake, author of Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began and Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why. (shrink)
Some of our aesthetic experiences are of artworks. Some others are of everyday scenes. The question I examine in this paper is about the relation between these two different kinds of aestheticexperience. I argue that the experience of artworks can dispose us to experience everyday scenes in an aesthetic manner both short-term and long-term. Finally, I examine what constraints this phenomenon puts on different accounts of aestheticexperience.
Aestheticexperience has been relativized and marginalized by recent social and cultural theory. As less attention has been paid to understanding the nature of aestheticexperience than mapping the distributed social correlates of tastes, its transformative potential and capacity to animate actors’ imaginations and actions goes unexplored. In this paper we draw upon a large number of in-depth interviews with performing arts audiences around Australia to investigate the language and discourse used to describe aesthetic experiences. (...) In particular, we begin with theorizations of the subject-object nexus within object-relations theory to consider the transformative potential of aestheticexperience. Using these literatures, and extending them to others within sociology of the arts and materiality, our focus is on the way aestheticexperience can fuse human subjects with aesthetic objects. We examine how viewers take an aesthetic object into themselves and in turn project themselves into the aesthetic object by various visual and imaginative techniques. Our theoretical and empirical analysis bears out the constructive and productive capacity of aestheticexperience. (shrink)
Our love for art is a compound byproduct of four different evolutionary events which attached reward to conscious experience itself, to the direction of attention to significant items in consciousness, to representations of scenarios in the brain's default mode network, and to the experience of novel stimuli. Aesthetic experiences contain varying amounts of these rewards, which helps to explain their diversity.
Kendall Walton’s “Categories of Art” seeks to situate aesthetic properties contextually. As such, certain knowledge is required to fully appreciate the aesthetic properties of a work, and without that knowledge the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ aesthetic properties of a work cannot be appreciated. The aim of this paper is to show that the way Walton conceives of his categories and art categorization is difficult to square with certain kinds of aestheticexperience—kinds of experience that seems (...) to defy this claim of category-dependence for aesthetic properties. The argument will be advanced for category-free aestheticexperience by considering Barry C. Smith’s account of wine-tasting and his description of his wine drinking ‘epiphany’. (shrink)
On several current views, including those of Matthew Kieran, Gary Iseminger, Jerrold Levinson, and Noël Carroll, aesthetic appreciation or experience involves second-order awareness of one’s own mental processes. But what if it turns out that we don’t have introspective access to the processes by which our aesthetic responses are produced? I summarize several problems for introspective accounts that emerge from the psychological literature: aesthetic responses are affected by irrelevant conditions; they fail to be affected by relevant (...) conditions; we are ignorant of their causes and thus confabulate in explaining them; our attempts to offer explanations change our preferences; and the preferences we form after explanation are lower in quality. I suggest that by distinguishing introspective awareness of mental processes from introspective awareness of mental states, we can safeguard a worthwhile concept of aestheticexperience. In addition, we should recognize that theoretical, rather than introspective, understanding of our mental processes may play a valuable role in aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)
In this article I divide theories of aestheticexperience into three sorts: the affectoriented approach, the axiologically oriented approach, and the content-oriented approach. I then go on to defend a version of the content-oriented approach.
In his attack on the notion of immediate experience, Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that aestheticexperience should be absorbed into hermeneutics because alone it cannot account for the historical nature of experience ; predicated on an ontological theory of art, the unfathomable, therefore, is the sense we have of these infinite hermeneutic depths. I argue that this account is methodologically and existentially unacceptable: methodologically because it is overly speculative, and existentially because it betrays authentic existence. I critique (...) Gadamer from the perspective of William James’ Pragmatism and argue, inverting Gadamer’s main thesis, that hermeneutics should be reduced to aestheticexperience. The meaning that emerges in aestheticexperience does not ‘rise up’ from the depths but is immanent in what James calls ‘pure experience’. The unfathomable, therefore, is not a glimpse into the metaphysical abyss but a phenomenological insight into the immanent structure of experience. (shrink)
This paper offers a critical analysis of Robert Stecker’s account of aestheticexperience and its relation to aesthetic and artistic values. The analysis will demonstrate that Stecker’s formulation of aestheticexperience as it stands is incompatible with his arguments for nonaesthetic artistic values. Rather than multiplying the values associated with aestheticexperience, a deeper understanding of that experience will best serve to clarify problems at the core of the discipline.
What possesses aesthetic value? According to a broad view, it can be found almost anywhere. According to a narrower view, it is found primarily in art and is applied to other items by courtesy of sharing some of the properties that make artworks aesthetically valuable. In this paper I will defend the broad view in answering the question: how should we characterize aesthetic value and other aesthetic concepts? I will also criticize some alternative answers.
Can indistinguishable objects differ aesthetically? Manifestationism answers ‘no’ on the grounds that (i) aesthetically significant features of an object must show up in our experience of it; and (ii) a feature—aesthetic or not—figures in our experience only if we can discriminate its presence. Goodman’s response to Manifestationism has been much discussed, but little understood. I explain and reject it. I then explore an alternative. Doubles can differ aesthetically provided, first, it is possible to experience them differently; (...) and, second, those experiences reflect differences in the objects’ themselves. A range of objections to this position is considered, but all are found wanting. (shrink)
The purpose here is to give a thorough phenomenological account of the aestheticexperience. The difference between cognitive perception of a real object and the aestheticexperience of an esthetic object is discussed at length. Elements and phases of an esthetic experience are delineated; illustrations of a preliminary emotion of esthetic experience are given, All of which suggest a fundamental change of attitude. From normal perceiving to esthetic perceiving there is a change from categorical (...) structures to qualitative harmony structures, Producing pleasure in the presence of an esthetic object. (staff). (shrink)
This paper joins recent attempts to defend a notion of aestheticexperience. It argues that phenomenological facts and facts about aesthetic value support the Kantian notion that aestheticexperience lies between, but differs from, pleasures of the agreeable and pleasures stemming from cognitions. It then shows that accounts by Beardsley, Levinson, and Savile fail to resolve clear tensions that surface in attempting to characterize such an experience. An account of aestheticexperience—as involving (...) experienced cognitions that are the bearers of value—is presented. The paper ends on a sceptical note as to whether aestheticexperience can be clearly delimited. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue that norms of artistic and aesthetic authenticity that prioritize material origins foreclose on broader opportunities for aestheticexperience: particularly, for the aestheticexperience of history. I focus on Carolyn Korsmeyer’s recent articles in defense of the aesthetic value of genuineness and argue that her rejection of the aesthetic significance of historical value is mistaken. Rather, I argue that recognizing the aesthetic significance of historical value points the way (...) towards rethinking the dominance of the very norms of authenticity that Korsmeyer endeavors to defend and explain. (shrink)
A theory of the neural bases of aestheticexperience across the arts, which draws on the tools of both cognitive neuroscience and traditional humanist inquiry.
The French phenomenologist Michel Henry sees a similarity between the primordial experience of what he calls ‘Life’ and the aestheticexperience occasioned by Wassily Kandinsky’s abstract art. The triple aim of this essay is to explain and assess how Henry interprets Kandinsky’s abstract art and theory; what the consequences of his interpretation mean for the theory of the experience of abstract art; and what doubts and questions emerge from Henry’s interpretations of Kandinsky’s theory and practice. Despite (...) its containing many interesting ideas, Henry’s phenomenological approach is insufficient to describe the aestheticexperience of Kandinsky’s abstract art. For Henry, aestheticexperience is corporeal, primordial, non-intentional, and independent of knowledge and culture.By contrast, I believe that it is possible and more suitable to connect the direct, corporeal, and affective character of the aestheticexperience of abstract art with intentionality and embeddedness in culture and knowledge. (shrink)
The aim of the paper is to examine the possible relationships between the different dimensions of aesthetics on the one hand, and medical practice and medical ethics on the other hand. Firstly, I consider whether the aesthetic perception of the human body is relevant for medical practice. Secondly, a possible analogy between the artistic process and medical action is examined. The third section concerns the comparison between medical ethical judgements and aesthetic judgement of taste. It is concluded that (...) the mutual relevance between the aesthetic sphere, moral judgement and medical practice can be understood only if we recognize these spheres as distinct. (shrink)
Despite a prevalence of articles exploring links between sport and art in the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers in the new millennium pay relatively little explicit attention to issues related to aesthetics generally. After providing a synopsis of earlier debates over the questions ?is sport art?? and ?are aesthetics implicit to sport??, a pragmatically informed conception of aestheticexperience will be developed. Aestheticexperience, it will be argued, vitally informs sport ethics, game logic, and participant meaning. Finally, (...) I will argue that embodying pragmatic conceptions of art as its ideal metaphor re-opens space to best realize the deep potential of sport as a meaningful human practice. (shrink)
What is beautiful or ugly vary from one person another, from time to time and from culture to culture. However, at the same time, people are certain that there are aesthetic properties in the nature, artworks and other persons and, furthermore, they can be perceived by the naked eye. This article argues that experience does not reveal the aesthetic properties of the objects.
[Richard Glauser] Shaftesbury's theory of aestheticexperience is based on his conception of a natural disposition to apprehend beauty, a real 'form' of things. I examine the implications of the disposition's naturalness. I argue that the disposition is not an extra faculty or a sixth sense, and attempt to situate Shaftesbury's position on this issue between those of Locke and Hutcheson. I argue that the natural disposition is to be perfected in many different ways in order to be (...) exercised in the perception of the different degrees of beauty within Shaftesbury's hierarchy. This leads to the conclusion that the exercise of the disposition depends, from case to case, on many different cognitive and affective conditions, that are realised by the collaborative functionings of our ordinary faculties. Essential to Shaftesbury's conception of aestheticexperience is a disinterested, contemplative love, that causes (or contains) what we may call a 'disinterested pleasure', but also an interested pleasure. I argue that, within any given aestheticexperience, the role of the disinterested pleasure is secondary to that of the disinterested love. However, an important function of the disinterested pleasure is that, in combination with the interested pleasure, it leads one to aspire to pass from the aestheticexperience of lower degrees of beauty to the experience of higher ones in the hierarchy. /// [Anthony Savile] (1) If Shaftesbury is to be seen as the doyen of modern aesthetics, his most valuable legacy to us may not so much be his viewing aesthetic response as a sui generis disinterested delight as his insistence on its turning 'wholly on [experience of] what is exterior and foreign to ourselves'. Not that we cannot experience ourselves, or what is our own, as a source of such admiration. Rather our responses, favourable or no, are improperly grounded in any essentially reflexive, or first-personal, ways of taking what engages us. The suggestion is tested against the case of Narcissus. (2) Glauser interestingly emphasizes Shaftesbury's neo-Platonic conception of a hierarchy of aestheticexperience that culminates in the joyful contemplation of God. That hierarchy must be something that is less unitary and systematic than Shaftesbury himself had supposed, even when his emphasis on the tie between aesthetic pleasure and contemplative experience is allowed to extend beyond perception and to encompass episodes of thought itself. (shrink)
In this article, I relate the demand that Paul Ricoeur suggests mimesis places on the way we think about truth to the idea that the work of art is a model for thinking about testimony. By attributing a work’s epoché of reality to the work of imagination, I resolve the impasse that arises from attributing music, literature, and art’s distance from the real to their social emancipation. Examining the conjunction, in aestheticexperience, of the communicability and the exemplarity (...) of a work reveals how Ricoeur’s definition of mimesis as refiguration relates to the “rule” that the work summons. This “rule” constitutes the solution to a problem or question for which the work is the answer. In conclusion, as a model for thinking about testimony, the claims that works make have a counterpart in the injunctions that issue from exemplary moral and political acts.  . (shrink)
This article takes as its starting point the recent work of Frank Ankersmit on subjective historical experience. Such an experience, which Ankersmit describes as a ‘sudden obliteration of the rift between present and past’ is connected strongly with the Deweyan theory of art as experiential, which contains an account of aestheticexperience as affording a similar breakdown in the polarization of the subject and object of experience. The article shows how other ideas deriving from the (...) phenomenological tradition and the philosophy of perception can fruitfully be applied to the same terrain, and an account of aestheticexperience is built up that stresses embodied, differential and virtual aspects in the perception of aesthetic objects. The disruption and/or enhancement of these aisthetic aspects of perception, coupled with the self-conscious reflection thereby occasioned, is put forward as an account of aestheticexperience that links Ankersmit’s ideas with those of others, and a critical reading is made of a section of Ankersmit’s Sublime Historical Experience that centers on his experience of a painting by Francesco Guardi. The fijinal section aims at strengthening aspects of Ankersmit’s ideas and renews his critique of the radical constructivism of Oakeshott. (shrink)
consist (in part) in our taking pleasure in the awe or wonder we feel towards them.'' But although forms of awe and wonder are feelings that at least some ...
The brain constructs within itself an understanding of its surround which constitutes its own world. This is described as its Double in the frame of the dissipative quantum model of brain, where the perception-action arc in the Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception finds its formal description. In the dialog with the Double, the continuous attempt to reach the equilibrium shows that the real goal pursued by the brain activity is the aesthetical experience, the most harmonious “to-be-in-the-world” reached through reciprocal actions, (...) the aesthetical dimension characterized by the “pleasure” of the perception. Aesthetical pleasure unavoidably implies disclosure, to manifest “signs”, artistic communication. An interpersonal, collective level of consciousness then arises, a larger stage where the actors are mutually dependent. The coherent structure of the brain background state manifests itself in the auto-similarity properties of fractal structures. These are observed to occur also in a large number of natural phenomena and systems. The conception of Nature divided in separated domains is replaced by the vision of Nature unified by laws of form implied by the underlying quantum dynamics of the coherent vacuum, an integrated ecological vision. (shrink)
Preview: Beyond Baumgarten, the modern field of aesthetics can be seen as an attempt to go beyond the limits of older philosophies of beauty, sublimity, and taste in order to engage a much wider domain of qualities and judgments relating to our pleasurable and meaningful experiences of art and nature. The defining strategy of Hegelian aesthetics is to take the essence of aesthetics beyond the limits of nonconceptual sensuous experience and to celebrate instead the idea of art as purveying (...) the very highest spiritual truths, albeit in a somewhat sensuous form. The progressive revolutions of artistic forms and styles that define twentieth-century art similarly reflect the same play of dynamic movement in which art and aesthetics advance by challenging and overcoming the determination of established boundaries posited by prior aesthetic theory and practice. The limit-defying trend in aesthetics is evident in the continuing unsuccessful attempts by analytic philosophy to provide a satisfactory definition of art that will perfectly define its extensional limits by either providing its core essence or some formula that will select all and only those objects that are genuine works of art. Like other Wittgensteinian and pragmatist-inspired philosophers, I have criticized such compartmentalizing definitions of art, not simply for their failures to provide perfect extensional coverage of all the diverse works of art, but also for these theories’ explanatory poverty in explaining art’s meanings, purposes, functions, and values. One of the problems with traditional definitions of art is that they attempt to define something that is not a natural kind but a historically constructed field composed of rather diverse practices. These diverse practices employ a variety of different media and issue in a variety of different works of art that appear to belong to different ontological categories. (shrink)
This essay collection explores the crucial connections between aestheticexperience and the interdisciplinary field of somaesthetics. After examining philosophical accounts of embodiment and aestheticexperience, the essays apply somaesthetic theory to the diverse fine arts and the art of living.
In this volume, a team of internationally respected contributors theorize the concept of aestheticexperience and its value. Exposing and expanding our restricted cultural and intellectual presuppositions of what constitutes aestheticexperience, the book aims to re-explore and affirm the place of aestheticexperience--in its evaluative, phenomenological and transformational sense--not only in relation to art and artists but to our inner and spiritual lives.
ABSTRACTThis paper argues that the Husserlian notion of “passive synthesis” can make a substantial contribution to the understanding of aestheticexperience. The argument is based on two empirical cases of qualitative interview material obtained from museum visitors and a world-renowned string quartet, which show that aestheticexperience contains an irreducible dimension of passive undergoing and surprise. Analyzing this material through the lens of passive syntheses helps explain these experiences, as well as the sense of subject–object fusion (...) that occurs in some of the most intense forms of aestheticexperience. These analyses are then contrasted with a potentially contradicting take on aestheticexperience from a recent trend in cognitive science, namely enactive aesthetics, which insists on the active subjective construction and sense-making of aestheticexperience. Finally we show that the two positions are in fact compatible. (shrink)
The question of whether or not beauty exists in nature is a philosophical problem. In particular, there is the question of whether artworks, persons, or nature has aesthetic qualities. Most people say that they care about their own beauty. Moreover, they judge another person's appearance from an aesthetic point of view using aesthetic concepts. However, aesthetic judgements are not objective in the sense that the experience justifies their objectivity. By analysing Monroe C. Beardsley's theory of (...) the objectivity of aesthetic qualities, I examine whether there are really beautiful and ugly persons in the world. I will criticize the way analytic philosophers judge people and art from an aesthetic perspective. If there are no aesthetic qualities in the world, nobody can judge someone beautiful or ugly without oppression. Aesthetic judgement is exercise of power. (shrink)
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the influential concept of aestheticexperience has been strongly criticized by powerful voices both in analytic philosophy and in continental theory, sometimes to the point of rejecting its significance for art or even to denying its very existence. Nonetheless, it stubbornly reasserts itself as central to understanding art's meaning and value. Philosophical critique of aestheticexperience takes multiple forms. Theorists seeking a definition of art generally reject aesthetic (...)experience as inadequate for this task because it is both too wide and too narrow. Aestheticexperience surely occurs beyond the limits of art, as in our encounter with natural beauty, but it... (shrink)
The problem of evil is not only a logical problem about God's goodness but also an existential problem about the sense of God's presence, which the Biblical book of Job conceives as a problem of aestheticexperience. Thus, just as theism can be grounded in religious experience, atheism can be grounded in experience of evil. This phenomenon is illustrated by two contrasting literary descriptions of aestheticexperience by Jean-Paul Sartre and Annie Dillard. I illuminate (...) both of these literary texts with a discussion of the 18th Century philosopher Lord Shaftesbury's concept of ‘enthusiasm’. (shrink)