Recent social policy discourses in Aotearoa New Zealand focus on vulnerable children’s well-being and the detrimental, long-term and costly impacts of child poverty. The discourse pervading much of the policy labels children and young people as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at risk’ or ‘in crisis’, a view, which we argue, is both disempowering and marginalising. We propose a shift in focus which views children and young people as agentic, capable and competent. Drawing on several small-scale research projects and reports we demonstrate how, (...) when asked, children and young people can participate effectively in discussions about policy matters that concern them. We have much to learn from the insights children share with us when asked, but very often existing structures, at both government and community level, do not include adequate processes to hear their voices, let alone act on what has been communicated. (shrink)

This important volume looks back to 1890 and -- 100 years later -- asks some of the same questions William James was asking in his Principles of Psychology. In so doing, it reviews our progress toward their solutions. Among the contemporary concerns of 1990 that the editors consider are: the nature of the self and the will, conscious experience, associationism, the basic acts of cognition, and the nature of perception. Their findings: Although the developments in each of these areas during (...) the last 100 years have been monumental, James' views as presented in the Principles still remain viable and provocative. To provide a context for understanding James, some chapters are devoted primarily to recent scholarship about James himself -- focusing on the time the Principles was written, relevant intellectual influences, and considerations of his understanding of this "new" science of psychology. The balance of this volume is devoted to specific topics of particular interest to James. One critical theme woven into almost every chapter is the tension between the role of experience (or phenomenological data) within a scientific psychology, and the viability of a materialistic (or biologically reductive) account of mental life. Written for professionals, practitioners, and students of psychology -- in all disciplines. (shrink)

Addiction is widely taken to involve a profound loss of self-control. Addictive motivation is extremely forceful, and it is remarkably hard to abstain from addictive behaviors. Theories of addiction have sought to explain how self-control is undermined in addiction. However, an important explanatory factor in addictive motivation and behaviors has so far been underexamined: emotion. This paper examines the link between emotion and loss of control in addiction. I use the concept of affective scaffolding to argue that drug use functions (...) as a form of emotion regulation that, especially in certain psycho-socioeconomic conditions, can escalate into what I term addictive affective dependence. Addictive affective dependence is extremely motivating of drug use, and in this way contributes to the agent losing control. An upshot of the paper is that it predicts something that is known to be true about addiction treatment and recovery: strategies that address psycho-socioeconomic conditions are particularly successful in bolstering agency in addiction. Furthermore, my view explains why these strategies work. Thus, the view provides a conceptual framework for existing effective methods of addressing addiction. (shrink)

Research in the philosophy of addiction commonly explores how agency is impacted in addiction by focusing on moments of apparent loss of control over addictive behavior and seeking to explain how such moments result from the effects of psychoactive substance use on cognition and volition. Recently, Glackin et al. (2021) have suggested that agency in addiction can be helpfully analyzed using the concept of affordances. They argue that addicted agents experience addiction-related affordances, such as action possibilities relating to drugs, drug (...) paraphernalia, and drug-related activities, as aberrantly salient motivations for action. Building on this approach, we present a novel two-tiered affordance model of addiction. In doing so, we suggest that what is significant about the addicted person’s world is not simply what affordances are experienced as salient, but also the way in which the addicted person’s world is shaped by a dominant concern. It is not only that addiction-related affordances become more prominent as addiction progresses but that one’s plurality of concerns become monopolized by and funneled through addiction. Our model endorses Glackin et al.’s idea that addiction-related affordances become aberrantly salient, while proposing why they become and remain so. This way of viewing agency in addiction also brings to light important implications for recovery and treatment. For, if an addicted person adopts a new, even “socially approved”, dominant concern, there is a risk that the shape of addiction is preserved, even though the content changes, leaving an individual at the risk of addiction substitution or relapse. (shrink)

If a list were compiled of all substance and process addictions, we would find ourselves with a long catalog, including heroin, methamphetamines, marijuana, fentanyl, exercise, pornography, gambling, cocaine, and video games, just to name a handful. Addiction is diverse. And in severe cases, addiction can have devastating consequences in the lives of addicted individuals. There is currently no widely accepted definition of addiction that crosses social, philosophical, scientific and medical discourse. In fact, there is no uncontested definition within any one (...) of these domains. However, across fields of study, the phenomenon of craving is widely taken to be an important, if not central, feature of addiction. Craving... (shrink)

I would like to thank Owen Flanagan and Douglas Porter for their interesting and insightful commentaries, both of which inspired me to think more deeply about aspects of addictive craving. In this response, I will make some clarifying points, particularly regarding my views on the relationship between neuroscience and phenomenology, and I will expand on my thesis, focusing especially on addiction treatment and the role of testimony.I will start with two central concerns that Flanagan raises, then I will address three (...) of his additional criticisms. First, Flanagan takes issue with my claim that the dominant neurobiological view of craving does not capture the phenomenology of craving. The worry is that I am asking... (shrink)

Natural forms, often characterized by irregularity and roughness, have a unique complexity that exhibit self-similarity across different spatial scales or levels of magnification. Our visual system is remarkably efficient in the processing of natural scenes and tuned to the multi-scale, fractal-like properties they possess. The fractal-like scaling characteristics are ubiquitous in many physical and biological domains, with recent research also highlighting their importance in aesthetic perception, particularly in the visual and, to some extent, auditory modalities. Given the multitude of fractal-like (...) scaling manifestations, we explore potential commonalities in the way they might affect aesthetic preference within and across different physical and sensory domains. We use a range of visual and tactile stimuli to explore the equivalence of fractal-scaling effects on aesthetic preferences within and across visual and tactile modalities. Our results suggest that, despite some superficial differences, the underlying dimensional structure mediating the preference across the two domains is remarkably similar. The qualitative nature of this dimensional structure as well as suggestions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

In “What’s Wrong with the (Female) Nude?” A. W. Eaton argues that the female nude in Western art promotes sexually objectifying, heteronormative erotic taste, and thereby has insidious effects on gender equality. In this response, I reject the claim that sexual objectification is a phenomenon that can be generalized across the experiences of women. In particular, I argue that Eaton’s thesis is based on the experiences of women who are white, and does not pay adequate attention to the lives of (...) racialized women. This act of exclusion undermines the generality of Eaton’s thesis, and exposes a more general bias in discussions of the representation of women in art. Different kinds of gendered bodies have been subjected to different kinds of objectifying construal, and the ethics of nudity in art must be extended to take such variation into account. (shrink)

Responds to the comments by F. Paniagua on the current author's original article, "Meehl revisited: A look at paradigms in psychology" , in which the current author reviewed Paul Meehl's famous article "Theroetical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl; Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology." According to the current author, Paniagua takes exception to two casual remarks made in the current author's paper, one about Kuhn and the other about Skinner, but neither remark is related to the (...) actual thesis. Paniagua's comments do not carry the substantive aspects of the article forward, which is unfortunate asserts the current author, because the theory discussed therein may prove useful in understanding the nature and evolution of psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept of universal human rights. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement, and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an (...) otherwise divided world. (shrink)

This book offers information about what constitutes dishonesty or lying and why it occurs. Based on the author's professional experiences as an attorney and a psychologist, he explains reasons why lying is a human frailty and offers guidance on how a person can detect lies, nip them in the bud, and maintain personal defenses against being treated in a harmful manner. The book is wrapped up with comments about how the control and elimination of influence from dishonest people enhances self-fulfillment, (...) and how this will lead to personal health, happiness, and positive social relationships. (shrink)

The principles of equality and equity, respectively in the Bill of Rights and the white paper on health, provide the moral and legal foundations for future health care for children in South Africa. However, given extreme health care need and scarce resources, the government faces formidable obstacles if it hopes to achieve a just allocation of public health care resources, especially among children in need of highly specialised health care. In this regard, there is a dearth of moral analysis which (...) is practically useful in the South African situation. We offer a set of moral considerations to guide the macro-allocation of highly specialised public health care services among South Africa's children. We also mention moral considerations which should inform micro-allocation. (shrink)

The new South African constitution commits the government to guarantee "basic health services" for every child under 18. Primary health care for pregnant women and children under six and elements of essential primary health care have received priority. At present, there is little analysis of the moral considerations involved in making choices about more advanced or costly health care which may, arguably, also be "basic". This paper illustrates some of the tensions in setting priorities for a just macro-allocation of children's (...) health care, given the realities of need and scarce resources, and the commitment to equality of basic opportunities. (shrink)

This paper begins with a brief description and analysis of Harcum's "Behavioral Paradigm for a Psychological Resolution of the Free Will Issue" focusing on issues concerning first-person and third-person perspectives in psychological research and theory. This consideration is expanded to cover a variety of related issues including "unconscious processes" and philosophical discussions of free will. Two studies, similar to Harcum's original study, but analyzed from a first-person perspective, are reported and contrasted with Harcum's work. Results of these studies reveal that (...) different individuals provide different meanings for the same actions, e.g., sitting in one or another seat in a college classroom. The significance of these findings for psychological research concerning the experience and concept of free will are discussed in light of an alternative, existential-phenomenological approach to psychology. (shrink)

The dream-lag effect refers to there being, after the frequent incorporation of memory elements from the previous day into dreams , a lower incorporation of memory elements from 2 to 4 days before the dream, but then an increased incorporation of memory elements from 5 to 7 days before the dream. Participants kept a daily diary and a dream diary for 14 days and then rated the level of matching between every dream report and every daily diary record. Baseline matching (...) was assessed by comparing all dream reports to all diary records for days that occurred after the dream. A significant dream-lag effect for the 5–7 day period, compared to baseline and compared to the 2–4 day period, was found. This may indicate a memory processing function for sleep, which the dream content may reflect. Participants’ and three independent judges’ mean ratings also confirmed a significant day-residue effect. (shrink)

Many parents and child-rearing experts prefer that children exhibit gender-normative behavior, a preference that is linked to the belief that children are, or should be, heterosexual. But how do LGBTQ parents—who may not hold these preferences—approach the gender socialization of their children? Drawing on in-depth interviews with both members in 18 LGBTQ couples, I find that these parents attempt to provide their children with a variety of gendered options for clothing, toys, and activities—a strategy that I call the “gender buffet.” (...) However, the social location of the parents influences the degree to which they feel they can pursue this strategy of resistance. Factors such as race, social class, gender of parents and children, and level of support of family and community members contribute to the degree to which LGBTQ parents feel they can allow or encourage their children to disrupt gender norms. (shrink)

Our online interaction with information-systems may well provide the largest arena of formal logical reasoning in the world today. Presented here is a critique of the foundations of Logic, in which the metaphysical assumptions of such 'closed world' reasoning are contrasted with those of traditional logic. Closed worlds mostly employ a syntactic alternative to formal language namely, recording data in files. Whilst this may be unfamiliar as logical syntax, it is argued here that propositions are expressed by data stored in (...) files which are essentially non-linguistic and so cannot be expressed by simple formulae F(a), with the inference-rules normally used in Logic. Hence, the syntax of data may be said to define a fundamentally new kind of logical form for simple propositions. In this way, the logic of closed systems is shown to be non-classical, differing from traditional logic in its truth-conditions, inferences and metaphysics. This paper will be concerned mainly with how the reference and certain inferences in such a closed system differ metaphysically from classical logic. (shrink)

Feminist theorists have long looked to motherhood and mothering behaviour as an important site at which to examine women’s lives, gender inequality and the social construction of gendered institutions. One important line of theorisation has concerned itself with the de-essentialisation of motherhood, a project that I argue remains incomplete, as feminist theorisation of motherhood naturalises biological sex and therefore essentialises mothering as behaviour performed by ‘female bodies’ and fathering behaviour as performed by ‘male bodies’. Using two cases from a larger (...) qualitative interview project with LGBTQ parents, I show that current theories of motherhood fail to have explanatory power in cases – such as gay and transgender parents – when gendered embodiment and mothering (and/or fathering) fail to align as expected. I suggest that research related to queer parenting – particularly research on gay male co-parenting, on the experiences of transgender parents and their children, on non-white LGBTQ parents and on mothering from outside the nuclear family – will be especially fruitful in moving the de-essentialisation of mothering in new directions that will further contest heteronormative, cisnormative and nuclear assumptions about the family. (shrink)

Göbekli Tepe is an archaeological site that has challenged much prior thought on human history with respect to our Neolithic revolution from animistic, egalitarian, hunter-gatherers to settled, socially stratified, and religious peoples. In the present paper we review the structures and possible purposes of Göbekli Tepe, summarize past considerations of the connection between psychological concepts and matters found thereat, and then introduce social identity theory as an apt theoretical perspective from which to best understand the peoples who constructed and utilized (...) the site. Throughout we show that social-cognitive processes and concepts have merit in interpreting the advent and utility of Göbekli Tepe, suggesting then a greater use for psychology within the framework of cognitive archaeology. (shrink)

In this article, two dance educators offer a definition of rhythm from both educational and performance perspectives and discuss pedagogical practices that waken students’ awareness to rhythm as a lived-experience over which they have creative control. For the dancer, in the midst of the dance, rhythms are, in the words of Margaret H’Doubler, recurring patterns of measured energy. These patterns are nested in scales from the moment-to-moment shifts in muscular contraction and release to the rise and fall of dramatic tension (...) in a performed dance. This approach to rhythm runs counter to many dance students’ studio-based training in which rhythm is equated to synchronizing accents to a specific meter. The authors describe pedagogical practices in the studio that foster engagement with rhythm as lived-experience. Drawing attention to their kinesthetic experience while moving, students are encouraged to modulate levels of exertion embedded in the qualities of movement they are experiencing. As varying levels of exertion are attended to across temporal durations, students notice patterns as they emerge and recur. This attention to recurring patterns of measured exertion is, the authors claim, the lived-experience of rhythm in dance. (shrink)

Within an ethics framework, this article explores mental health practitioners' use of credentials that lack acceptable accreditation or authority. Increased competition among mental health care providers has elevated the importance of credentials for marketing professional services. Practitioners worried about economic survival, along with certain personality characteristics (e.g., sheer ego), are tempted to rely on credentials that lack proof of quality, thereby potentially jeopardizing professionalism. Specific assertions and recommendations are set forth in the interest of safe-guarding consumers and promoting professionalism.

Attorneys increasingly rely on the services of mental health practitioners. Although some practitioners lack training, the promise of professional rewards lead some to accept opportunities with resulting ethical quandaries. Due to significant differences between the objectives of traditional mental health services and expert testimony, problems occur when clinicians venture into forensic services. Attorneys and judges, unfamiliar with mental health specialties, may seek to press a mental health practitioner into multiple roles. Although not all multiple roles are ethically inappropriate, caution demands (...) careful parsing of particular roles: (a) academic/behavioral science expert; (b) fact witness as a treating therapist; (c) expert witness based on a clinically oriented assessment; (d) pretrial and/or trial consultant; and (e) professional critic of other experts. Possible ethical issues and risks associated with accepting multiple roles are identified and strategies for avoiding or minimizing harm or exploitation are discussed. (shrink)

The first words in the inaugural version of the American Psychological Association Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1953) declared, ?Psychology is a science? (p. v). Professional ethics for all of the mental health disciplines support science (and objectivity) for knowledge and practice. Using school psychology as an example, consideration is given to the presence of science and research in the scientist-practitioner, professional practitioner, and psychoeducational training and practice models. Although none of the three models truly ignores a commitment to science, the (...) potential Achilles heel comes from the individual practitioner who fails to rely on science in planning, implementing, and evaluating interventions. Similarly, idiosyncratic preferences within training programs could lead to a diminution of science in the curriculum. (shrink)

Shanon provides us with a well reasoned and careful consideration of the nature of consciousness. Shanon argues from this understanding of consciousness that machines could not be conscious. A reconsideration of Shanon's discussion of consciousness is undertaken to determine what it is that computers are missing so as to prevent them from being conscious. The conclusion is that under scrutiny it is hard to establish a priori that machines could not be conscious.