In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...) on one of the most common metaphysical interpretations of the explanatory distinction, talk of a distinction between personal and subpersonal states simply makes no sense. When people insist on applying the personal/subpersonal terminology to psychological states, I allow that they are often making a genuine distinction, but one that it is best understood in terms of Stich's (1978) distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. I end the paper by considering some other common misinterpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, such as those involving consciousness, normativity, or autonomy. (shrink)

Fictionalists propose that some apparently fact-stating discourses do not aim to convey factual information about the world, but rather allow us to engage in a fiction or pretense without incurring ontological commitments. Some philosophers have suggested that using mathematical, modal, or moral discourse, for example, need not commit us to the existence of mathematical objects, possible worlds, or moral facts. The mental fictionalist applies this reasoning to our mental discourse, suggesting that we can use ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ talk without committing (...) to the existence of beliefs and desires as mental entities. Most arguments for mental fictionalism are based on two key suppositions: first, that there are ontological concerns about mental entities; and second, that these ontological concerns justify a fictionalist interpretation of mental discourse. This paper challenges both suppositions and argues that the standard arguments for mental fictionalism are substantially weaker than arguments for other forms of fictionalism in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is (...) what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy. (shrink)

Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories. Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and (...) moral knowledge should include not only an examination of cognition but also of perception. (shrink)

L'interdiction du meurtre a un sens même en l'absence de toute référence à un Dieu transcendant et à l'idée selon laquelle la vie humaine serait sacrée. Bien plus, la justification de cette norme par des valeurs morales et l'effort pour la fonder rationnellement l'affaiblissent. Malgré l'apport majeur de Kant à la morale, son analyse consistant à rapprocher les devoirs envers soi-même des devoirs envers autrui passe à côté de la violence propre au meurtre et criminalise le suicide. Au contraire, en (...) faisant de l'expérience de mon rapport à l'autre la source de l'éthique, la description du meurtre, qui renvoie à la volonté d'anéantir l'autre comme tel, permet de dégager l'essence de la violence qui est un faire taire. Il y a donc dans le "tu ne tueras point" plus qu'une prohibition de l'homicide volontaire. Affirmer l'actualité de cet interdit, c'est rappeler le sens des crimes imprescriptibles tout en invitant à prendre la mesure de ce qu'impliquent les guerres qui ne sont pas des génocides. C'est aussi préconiser des solutions adaptées aux problèmes qui se posent au début et à la fin de la vie, comme on le voit avec l'avortement, le suicide assisté et l'euthanasie. Enfin, c'est reconnaître que le droit absolu que nous nous octroyons sur les animaux relève d'une transgression. (shrink)

Two very different forms of externalism about mental states appear prima facie unrelated: Williamson’s (1995, 2000) claim that knowledge is a mental state, and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind hypothesis. I demonstrate, however, that the two approaches justify their radically externalist by appealing to the same argument from explanatory generality. I argue that if one accepts either Williamson’s claims or Clark & Chalmers’ claims on considerations of explanatory generality then, ceteris paribus, one should accept the other. This conclusion has (...) implications for philosophy of mind, epistemology, and cognitive science. (shrink)

L’idée selon laquelle le temps, son organisation, sa discipline est un facteur discriminant permettant de séparer nettement la période industrielle de celle qui la précède a longtemps prévalu chez les historiens. Cet article s’inscrit en faux contre cette thèse : les conflits autour du temps de travail doivent être inscrits dans la longue durée des rapports sociaux de production. Nous dressons ici une esquisse large des conflits où le temps est un élément de la mobilisation des travailleurs, du XIVe au (...) premier XIXe siècle. Alors qu’au Moyen-Âge, certains conflits portent clairement sur la remise en cause de la définition du temps de travail, à partir du XVIIe siècle, le thème semble s’estomper. Mais apparaissent alors des conflits qui portent sur le contenu du travail effectué dans un temps donné. La première industrialisation ne change pas véritablement la nature des revendications. Elles proviennent encore majoritairement d’ouvriers engagés dans des activités traditionnelles. Les ouvriers d’usine, quant à eux, ne sortent globalement pas de leur mutisme avant les décennies 1860/1870. (shrink)

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? (...) Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a (...) way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. (shrink)

A novel problem or task may seem difficult at first, but with enough practice, it can become easy and routine. Practice and the process of learning is often accompanied by some mild cognitive uneas...

Emmanuel Levinas a renouvelé en profondeur la philosophie, qu'il s'agisse de la définition de la subjectivité par la responsabilité, des implications politiques de cette conception du sujet ou de son insistance sur la corporéité, pensée comme vulnérabilité ou associée à une phénoménologie du « vivre de » et des nourritures. Dans un séminaire qui s'adressait à des étudiants en philosophie et à des soignants, Corine Pelluchon donne les clefs pour comprendre cette œuvre exigeante et communique une expérience de pensée liée (...) à la manière dont la réflexion et le style de Levinas l'ont bouleversée. Elle montre en quel sens il a inspiré ses propres travaux, qui prolongent et parfois discutent ses thèses, soulignant aussi l'actualité de Levinas, y compris lorsqu'on s'intéresse à des sujets sur lesquels il ne s'est pas exprimé, comme la médecine, l'écologie et le rapport aux animaux."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

A unique concept: 40 extraordinary people give answers to 10 searching questions about their beliefs. In our current age of uncertainty and turmoil, this is a book to give insight for life's journey and to encourage readers to confront the same questions themselves. "My suggestion or advice is very simple; that is, to have a sincere heart." - The Dalai Lama What Has Life Taught You? features the answers given by 40 outstanding people to 10 profound questions about life, the (...) mind and the spirit. Author Zoë Sallis has a passion for stirring up debate on philosophical and ethical questions and journeyed all over the globe to ask well-known figures of widely varying beliefs the same 10 questions. Interviewees include: Nelson Mandela His Holiness the Dalai Lama Neale Donald Walsch Anjelica Huston Jack Nicholson Sophia Loren Teale Swan Richard Dawkins David Lynch Gore Vidal And more... The questions range from "What is your concept of God?" and "Do you think this life is all there is, or do you believe in an afterlife?" to "What has life taught you so far?" and "How do you find peace within yourself?" Socrates thought the unexamined life was not worth living, and perhaps that is why he roamed the streets of Athens accosting people and asking them their thoughts and beliefs. By sharing the wisdom of these truly inspiring people, the book hopes to provoke debate and encourage readers to examine what they have learned on their life journey so far and share their own insights with others. (shrink)

Our perceptual systems are not stagnant but can learn from experience. Why is this so? That is, what is the function of perceptual learning? I consider two answers to this question: The Offloading View, which says that the function of perceptual learning is to offload tasks from cognition onto perception, thereby freeing up cognitive resources (Connolly, 2019) and the Perceptual View, which says that the function of perceptual learning is to improve the functioning of perception. I argue that the Perceptual (...) View better explains data from infants and animals, and better accounts for learned tasks that only perception could perform. (shrink)

In Paul’s argument against dissensions, Paul is said to have tried to regain his authority before the Corinthians. The first rhetorical unit is thus seen as an apologia. In his argument, he seemingly uses the concept of paterfamilias known to have evoked power and control. However, such a proposal neglects the fact that Paul’s argument is against exactly such type of discourse in which one seeks to elevate one teacher against another. Rather, in the use of the concept of paterfamilias (...) we should see Paul redefining the concept and filling it with affection. (shrink)

Comment défendre les Lumières aujourd'hui? Leur idéal d'émancipation a-t-il encore un sens? On ne saurait se borner à invoquer un esprit des Lumières immuable dans un contexte marqué par le réveil du nationalisme, les crises environnementales et sanitaires et l'augmentation des inégalités. Faire face au danger d'effondrement de notre civilisation sans renoncer à la rationalité philosophico-scientifique, mais en tenant compte de notre dépendance à l'égard de la nature et des autres vivants: telle est la démarche qui fonde ce livre. Pour (...) combattre les anti-Lumières qui souhaitent rétablir une société hiérarchique ou théocratique et répondre aux accusations des postmodernes qui suspectent tout universalisme d'être hégémonique, il faut donc proposer de nouvelles Lumières. Celles-ci supposent de revisiter l'histoire des Lumières, mais aussi de lutter contre l'amputation de la raison qui a été réduite à un instrument de calcul et d'exploitation. L'objectif des Lumières à l'âge du vivant et de leur projet d'une société démocratique et écologique est bien de destituer le principe de la domination--une domination des autres et de la nature à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de soi qui traduit un mépris du corps et de la vulnérabilité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

What kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons? The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal Marimba Illusion (Schutz & Kubovy 2009). The subject’s auditory experience of musical tone (...) duration is based on the reason provided by her visual representation of the length of the musician’s gesture and other stored perceptual principles. (shrink)

Do epistemic and aesthetic values ever conflict? The answer might appear to be no, given that background knowledge generally enhances aesthetic experience, and aesthetic experience in turn generates new knowledge. As Keats writes, ‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty’ (Keats, 1996). Contra this line of thought, I argue that epistemic and aesthetic values can conflict when we over-rely on aesthetically enhancing background beliefs. The true and the beautiful can pull in different directions, forcing us to choose between flavours of normativity.

The concept of ecofascism describes the distortion of ecology for the purpose of gaining greater and wider audience, popularising ideologies and fulfilling xenophobic and nationalistic goals by regimes such as the far-right agenda and the radical ecological groups. This study investigates the issue of ecofascism in Europe, using the example of Greece, by examining the views of the citizens of Greece on the links between the political parties and ecology and environment. A survey of 600 people was conducted in Greece, (...) using questionnaires on ecofascism, politics and ecological issues. The survey showed that the sample has, in general, humanistic, democratic and quite left-wing ideals. However, some of the respondents indicated nationalistic, even fascist, trends. Because the current socio-economic and political conditions in Europe can fuel an outbreak of fascism, we should be very cautious about these findings, due to the growing impact of far-right ideas on society. Some aspects of the ecofascist rhetoric still continue to mislead, revealing the sly and worrying penetration of fascism in Greek society on the pretext of the protection of the Greek environment. (shrink)

Language provides rich social information about its speakers. For instance, adults and children make inferences about a speaker's social identity, geographic origins, and group membership based on her language and accent. Although infants prefer speakers of familiar languages, little is known about the developmental origins of humans’ sensitivity to language as marker of social identity. We investigated whether 9-month-olds use the language a person speaks as an indicator of that person's likely social relationships. Infants were familiarized with videos of two (...) people who spoke the same or different languages, and then viewed test videos of those two individuals affiliating or disengaging. Results suggest that infants expected two people who spoke the same language to be more likely to affiliate than two people who spoke different languages. Thus, infants view language as a meaningful social marker and use language to make inferences about third-party social relationships. (shrink)

Is there a parallel between climate change and our body’s temperature or non-compliance and failure to act on global warming? This paper proposes a model which describes the human body as part of N...

Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...) distinction has been presumed to be equivalent to Stephen Stich's distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. Both these interpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, and also Dennett's own philosophical views of the mind, go beyond the personal/subpersonal distinction itself. They each involve supplementing the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations with metaphysical claims about the relationship between the two kinds of explanation and the entities they posit. (shrink)

Recognizing and aligning individuals’ unique adaptive beliefs or “priors” through cooperative communication is critical to establishing a therapeutic relationship and alliance. Using active inference, we present an empirical integrative account of the biobehavioral mechanisms that underwrite therapeutic relationships. A significant mode of establishing cooperative alliances—and potential synchrony relationships—is through ostensive cues generated by repetitive coupling during dynamic touch. Established models speak to the unique role of affectionate touch in developing communication, interpersonal interactions, and a wide variety of therapeutic benefits for (...) patients of all ages; both neurophysiologically and behaviorally. The purpose of this article is to argue for the importance of therapeutic touch in establishing a therapeutic alliance and, ultimately, synchrony between practitioner and patient. We briefly overview the importance and role of therapeutic alliance in prosocial and clinical interactions. We then discuss how cooperative communication and mental state alignment—in intentional communication—are accomplished using active inference. We argue that alignment through active inference facilitates synchrony and communication. The ensuing account is extended to include the role of tactile afferents in realizing the beneficial effect of therapeutic synchrony. We conclude by proposing a method for synchronizing the effects of touch using the concept of active inference. (shrink)

We provide a novel articulation of the epistemic peril of p-hacking using three resources from philosophy: predictivism, Bayesian confirmation theory, and model selection theory. We defend a nuanced position on p-hacking: p-hacking is sometimes, but not always, epistemically pernicious. Our argument requires a novel understanding of Bayesianism, since a standard criticism of Bayesian confirmation theory is that it cannot represent the influence of biased methods. We then turn to pre-analysis plans, a methodological device used to mitigate p-hacking. Some say that (...) pre-analysis plans are epistemically meritorious while others deny this, and in practice pre-analysis plans are often violated. We resolve this debate with a modest defence of pre-analysis plans. Further, we argue that pre-analysis plans can be epistemically relevant even if the plan is not strictly followed—and suggest that allowing for flexible pre-analysis plans may be the best available policy option. (shrink)

Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.

The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...) which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the “received wisdom” alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology. (shrink)

Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the processes of using (...) diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the 'grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. (shrink)

A controversial claim in recent dual process accounts of reasoning is that intuitive processes not only lead to bias but are also sensitive to the logical status of an argument. The intuitive logic hypothesis draws upon evidence that reasoners take longer and are less confident on belief–logic conflict problems, irrespective of whether they give the correct logical response. In this paper, we examine conflict detection under conditions in which participants are asked to either judge the logical validity or believability of (...) a presented conclusion, accompanied by measures of eye movement and pupil dilation. The findings show an effect of conflict, under both types of instruction, on accuracy, latency, gaze shifts, and pupil dilation. Importantly, these effects extend to conflict trials in which participants give a belief‐based response (incorrectly under logic instructions or correctly under belief instructions) demonstrating both behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the logical intuition hypothesis. (shrink)

Christopher Hill's book Perceptual experience argues for a representational theory of mind that is grounded in empirical psychology. I focus here on three aspects of Hill's picture: The objects of visual awareness, the perception/cognition border, and the epistemic role of perceptual experience. I introduce challenges to Hill's account and consider ways these challenges may be overcome.

This paper investigates the relationship between economic theory and theories of justice in the design of public policy. In particular, it focuses on the role of mechanism design in policy contexts beset with issues of social, racial and distributive justice. Economists’ involvement in redesigning Boston’s algorithm for allocating K-12 students to public schools serves as an instructive case study. The paper draws on the distinction betweenideal theoryandnon-ideal theoryin political philosophy and the concept ofperformativityin economic sociology to argue that mechanism design (...) can enact elaborate ideal theories of justice. Anormative gapthus emerges between the goals of the policymakers and the objectives of economic designs. As a result, mechanism design may obstruct stakeholders’ avenues for normative criticism of public policies, and serve as a technology of depoliticization. (shrink)

As many studies around the theme of ‘too much medicine’ attest, investigations are being ordered with increasing frequency; similarly the threshold for providing treatment has lowered. Our contention is that trust is a significant factor in influencing this, and that understanding the relationship between trust and investigations and treatments will help clinicians and policymakers ensure ethical decisions are more consistently made. Drawing on the philosophical literature, we investigate the nature of trust in the patient–doctor relationship, arguing that at its core (...) it involves a transfer of discretion. We show that there is substantial empirical support for the idea that more trust will reduce the problem of too much medicine. We then investigate ways in which trust can be built, concentrating on issues of questioning, of acknowledging uncertainty and of shouldering responsibility for it. We argue that offering investigations or treatments as a way of generating trust may itself be an untrustworthy way of proceeding, and that healthcare systems should provide the institutional support for facilitating continuity, questioning and the entrusting of uncertainty. (shrink)

To practise ‘fairly and justly’ a clinician must balance the needs of both the many and the few: the individual patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, and how their actions will impact on future patients. The good medical practice guidance ‘Make the care of your patient your first concern’ provides no guidance on how doctors should act (...) when they care for multiple patients with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs extend far past simply those between different patients. At an organisational level, financial obligations must be balanced with clinical ones; the system must support those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the demands of current and future generations must be balanced.The central problem, we propose, is that there is no shared philosophical framework on which the provision of care or the development of health policy is based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have grappled with constructing a set of principles which would lead to a ‘good’ society which is just to different users; prominent among them is Rawls.Four important principles can be derived using a Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, sustainability and openness. However, Rawls’ approach is sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for how individuals working within existing institutions can enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in a way which cannot be ‘reasonably rejected’ by different stakeholders, we ensure that conflicting needs are considered robustly.We demonstrate how embedding this framework would ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate this by using examples of how it would help prevent injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such as COVID-19.Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this framework would equip the workforce and population to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare system whose practice and policies—at their core—were just. (shrink)

Chapter 8 argues against the view that the moral rightness of an act is not a reason to perform it, and our reasons are instead the features that make the act right. Philosophers typically defend this view by noting that it seems redundant to take rightness to be an additional reason, once it has been acknowledged that the right-making features are already reasons. The author shows that this argument dramatically overgeneralizes, ruling out all cases in which two or more reasons (...) are arranged in relationships of metaphysical constitution. She then proposes an alternative way of thinking about these metaphysical hierarchies: Rather than assuming that at most one of the facts in each hierarchy is the “real” reason, bearing all the normative weight, it should be accepted that these facts can all be genuine reasons, whose normative weight is shared in virtue of the metaphysical relationships between them. Some tests are offered that can be used to determine which facts occur in metaphysical hierarchies with shared weight, and it is argued that the fact that an act is morally right passes the tests. The author then explains what she takes to be some kernels of truth underlying the redundancy argument, arguing that these phenomena are pragmatic, not metaphysical. (shrink)

It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...) future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence. (shrink)

This paper goes beyond critiques of western philosophical notions of space as passive, feminine, and unintelligent by reconfiguring containment as an active process. The author draws on work in the history of technology, on a cybernetic epistemology that emphasizes the interdependence of organism and environment, and on intersubjectivist psychoanalytic theories of the maternal provision. A more unexpected ally is found in Heidegger, whose writings on holding and supply are read in ways that contribute to the development of an urgently required (...) philosophy of container technologies. (shrink)

Pourquoi avons-nous tant de mal à changer nos styles de vie alors que plus personne ne peut nier que notre modèle de développement a un impact destructeur sur le plan écologique et social ni douter de l'intensité des violences infligées aux animaux? Relever ce défi implique de combler l'écart entre la théorie et la pratique en développant une éthique des vertus. Au lieu de se focaliser sur les principes ou sur les conséquences de nos actes, celle-ci s'intéresse à nos motivations (...) concrètes, c'est-à-dire aux représentations et aux affects qui nous poussent à agir. Quels traits moraux peuvent nous conduire à être sobres et à avoir du plaisir à faire le bien, au lieu d'être constamment déchirés entre le bonheur et le devoir? L'éthique de la considération prend sa source dans les morales antiques, mais elle rejette leur essentialisme et s'appuie sur l'humilité et sur la vulnérabilité. Alors que Bernard de Clairvaux fait reposer la considération sur une expérience de l'incommensurable supposant la foi, Corine Pelluchon la définit par la transdescendance. Celle-ci désigne un mouvement d'approfondissement de soi-même permettant au sujet d'éprouver le lien l'unissant aux autres vivants et de transformer la conscience de son appartenance au monde commun en savoir vécu et en engagement. La considération est l'attitude globale sur laquelle les vertus se fondent au cours d'un processus d'individuation dont l'auteur décrit les étapes. (shrink)

This critical review of the literature examines recovery from borderline personality disorder to inform a deeper understanding, identifying supports and barriers to recovery, through the exploration of historical and socio-political influences. It critically evaluates research literature for the effectiveness of recovery concept implementation. This review presents the strengths of current evidence and suggestions for future considerations to better support the recovery of whaiora (people seeking wellness) by taking concepts of connection, empowerment, hope, identity and meaning-making, and interweaving them with aspects (...) of established therapies, such as Dialectal Behaviour Therapy, focussing on interpersonal effectiveness, distress tolerance, creating a life worth living, the reconstruction of stable self-image and the use of mindfulness practice. The focus is on developing interventions and responses that support self-management. (shrink)

This paper concerns connection between knowing or accepting a logical principle such as Modus Ponens and actions of reasoning involving it. Discussions of this connection typically mention the so-called ‘Lewis Carroll Regress’ and there is near consensus that the regress shows something important about it. Also, although the regress explicitly concerns logic, many philosophers think that it establishes a more general truth, about the structurally similar connection between epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. This paper’s first aim is (...) to address key interpretations Carroll’s regress as clearly as possible so as to show precisely how it might be relevant to questions concerning the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, and, more broadly, to discussions of how epistemic or practical principles may be action-guiding. Its second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, or any other structurally similar relation, unless substantive, contentious and typically undefended assumptions are made. The consensus is thus on shaky ground. (shrink)

This commentary considers Audi’s treatment of four fundamental topics in the epistemology of perception: inference, the basing relation, the metaphysics of reasons and grounds, and the relationship between knowledge and justification.

There is a growing interest in aggregating more biomedical and patient data into large health data sets for research and public benefits. However, collecting and processing patient data raises new ethical issues regarding patient’s rights, social justice and trust in public institutions. The aim of this empirical study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the awareness of possible ethical risks and corresponding obligations among those who are involved in projects using patient data, i.e. healthcare professionals, regulators and policy makers. (...) We used a qualitative design to examine Swiss healthcare stakeholders’ experiences and perceptions of ethical challenges with regard to patient data in real-life settings where clinical registries are sponsored, created and/or used. A semi-structured interview was carried out with 22 participants between July 2014 and January 2015. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, coded and analysed using a thematic method derived from Grounded Theory. All interviewees were concerned as a matter of priority with the needs of legal and operating norms for the collection and use of data, whereas less interest was shown in issues regarding patient agency, the need for reciprocity, and shared governance in the management and use of clinical registries’ patient data. This observed asymmetry highlights a possible tension between public and research interests on the one hand, and the recognition of patients’ rights and citizens’ involvement on the other. The advocation of further health-related data sharing on the grounds of research and public interest, without due regard for the perspective of patients and donors, could run the risk of fostering distrust towards healthcare data collections. Ultimately, this could diminish the expected social benefits. However, rather than setting patient rights against public interest, new ethical approaches could strengthen both concurrently. On a normative level, this study thus provides material from which to develop further ethical reflection towards a more cooperative approach involving patients and citizens in the governance of their health-related big data. (shrink)

Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not (...) clear how any part of the predictive architecture could be functionally independent, given that each level of the hierarchy is influenced by the level above. Both the assumption of continuity across the predictive architecture and the seeming non-isolability of parts of the predictive architecture seem to be at odds with the modular approach. I explore and ultimately reject the predictive approach’s apparent commitments to continuity and non-isolation. I argue that predictive architectures can be modular architectures, and that we should in fact expect predictive architectures to exhibit some form of modularity. (shrink)

Safe-by-design aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD approaches can deal with uncertainty, in particular with indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that the actual safety of a technology depends on the behavior of actors in the value chain like users and operators. We argue that while (...) indeterminacy may be approached by designing out users as much as possible in attaining safety, this is often not a good strategy. It will not only make it more difficult to deal with unexpected risks; it also misses out on the resources that users can bring for achieving safety, and it is undemocratic. We argue that rather than directly designing for safety, it is better to design for the responsibility for safety, i.e., designers should think where the responsibility for safety is best situated and design technologies accordingly. We propose some heuristics that can be used in deciding how to share and distribute responsibility for safety through design. (shrink)