To grasp the truth in traditional Chinese classics, we need to uncover the long obscured "xiang" 象 (image) thinking, which has long been overshadowed by Occidentalism, "xiang thinking" is the most fundamental thought of human beings. The logic of linguistics all comes from "xiang thinking". Through conceptual thinking, people can understand Western classics on metaphysics, yet they may not completely understand the various schools of Chinese classics. The difference between Chinese and Western ways of thinking originated in the difference of (...) the basic views developed in the "Axial period". Since Aristotle, Western metaphysical ideas have all been manifested in substantiality, objectivity, and being ready-made, whereas Chinese Taiji, Dao, Xin-xing, and Zen were manifested in the non-substantiality, non-objectivity, and non-ready-made-ness of a dynamic whole. To grasp substance, rational and logical thinking such as definition, judgment, and reasoning is necessary. On the other hand, to grasp Taiji, Dao, etc., which is a dynamic whole or non-substances, "xiang thinking", which is related to perception and rich in poetic association, is essential. History has taught us a lesson, i.e., when we opened the window to logical thought, we closed that of "xiang thinking". We should remember the words of Xu Guangqi, i.e., "To mingle harmoniously and understand thoroughly so as to excel". /// 重新打开被西方中心论长期遮蔽的 "象思维" 是把握中国传统经典本真的 需要。"象思维" 是人类最本原的思维。语言逻辑部经过 "象思维" 孕育而产生。 用概念思维可以透彻解读西方形上学经典，却未必能透彻解读中国诸家经典。中西 两种思维的不同，源于在 "轴心时期" 产生的基本理念的不同。西方形上学理念从 亚里士多德以降均为不同实体，显示为实体性、对象性、现成性。而中国的太极、 道、心性、禅则显示为动态整体的非实体性、非对象性、非现成性。把握实体，需 要用理性的、逻辑的概念思维，如定义、判断、推理等。而把握动态整体或非实体 的太极、道等，则需要用悟性的、诗意联想的 "象思维"。历史的经验教训是:在我 们打开逻辑概念思维这扇窗户时，却错误地关闭了 "象思维" 这扇窗户。我们应记 住徐光启的箴言 "会通以超胜"。. (shrink)

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle's theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept (...) of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular. /// "正确"是隐含于亚里士多德的德性学说中的一个重要而未充分展开的，在 后来的西方伦理学中却变成极为重要的关于行为或实践的概念。"正确"与感情和 行为都相关。"正确"并不是对所有人同样的。它是两端间的那个中间，但井不始 终与两端距离相等。对适度或正确的这种说明基本上是从数量、关系与性质范畴引 出，而不是从实体范畴引出的述说。所以，德性似乎始终是在一种有连续性的存在 中相对于恶或错误而言的。感情与行为的正确如果是环境的、具体的，它是否是多 而不是一?亚里士多德在两个层面上回答这个问题。在相对于具体实践者的层面， 对我而言的适度或正确很可能不同于对你而言的，实践的正确不是一而是多:在相 对于两端或错误唯有一个正确的选择而言，实践的正确始终只是一。. (shrink)

In this paper, the West, "Mao Zedong study" some scholars exaggerate the impact of traditional culture of Mao Zedong, Marxist Philosophy in China as "Confucianism" point of view, by focusing on traditional Chinese philosophy of Mao Zedong and the creative transformation of the absorption of specific analysis, reveals the philosophy of Mao Zedong's cultural identity. On this basis, that: exaggerate the impact of traditional culture of Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong's philosophy of originality exaggerated and its Marxist philosophy dissimilarity between, in (...) fact, is a fragmented Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought, to the historical development, see also Marxism is not a continuous open system, which also reduces Marxism in China's cultural significance, does not help us to correctly understand and grasp the philosophy of Mao Zedong's cultural identity. In response to some western Maoist scholars who overstate the role of traditional Chinese cultural ingredients in the ideology of Mao and attribute the development of Marxism in China totally to the process of "Confucianization", the essay aims at revealing the cultural characteristics of Mao's philosophy by way of a detailed analysis of Mao's indebtedness to and innovation of traditional Chinese philosophy. Furthermore, the essay holds that various overstatements of the role that traditional Chinese culture has played in Mao Ze-dong's idea and of the discrepancy between Maoist philosophy and Marxist philosophy mean to cut off the connection between Marx-Leninism and Mao's thought. In consequence they overlook the openness of Marxism, and degrade the significance of the development of Marxism in China and also prevent us from understanding the dual influence of Mao's philosophy. (shrink)

Early in Aristotle's terminology, and ever since, "essence" has been conceived as having two meanings, namely "universality" and "individuality". According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, "essence" unequivocally refers to "universality". As a matter of fact, however, "universality" cannot cover Aristotle's definition and formulation of "essence": Essence is what makes a thing "happen to be this thing." "Individuality" should be the deep meaning of "essence". By means of an analysis of some relevant (...) Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author's contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is "harmonious yet not identical", on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. /// "本质" 最早在亚里士多德的用语中包含有两重含义: 是指 "普遍的东 西" ("共相")，一是指 "个体的东西" ("这个")。在西方哲学史上民期占统治 地位的思想片面地认为: "本质" 就是指 "普遍的东西"。但实际上"普遍的东 西" 并不能涵盖亚里士多德对 "本质" 的界定和表述t 本质是使一事物 "恰恰地是 这个事物"的东西。"本质" 的深层含义应是 "个体性"。通过对西方一些相关思 想观点的分析和文化现实的考察，可以得出结论z 自然科学与人文科学对待事物的 态度的区别在于z 前者重普遍性规律的追求，后者重个体性的人生价值意义的追求。 从自然物到文化物是一个由以普遍性为本质到以个体性为本质的转化过程。在人文 社会领域应该强调的是z 在尊重和发扬个人的独特性和差异性的基础上，建立 "和而 不同"的理想社会。. (shrink)

This essay reveals five points in which Heidegger misreads Hegel in "Hegel's Concept of Experience": (1) By forcedly introducing the concept of "will", he interprets Hegel's phenomenology of spirit into Metaphysics of Presence; (2) interprets concepts such as "statement" and "the road of skeptics" as the process of phenomenological reduction; (3) reduces Hegel's Sein to Seiende; (4) replaces "Contradiction" with "Ambiguity" so the active Dialectics become passive; (5) exaggerates conscious experience and puts it into a real ontology, regardless of the (...) significance of Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophy. By an analysis of this misreading we can find the internal connection between Heidegger's thought and that of his philosophical forerunner, Hegel. /// 在"黑格尔的经验概念"一文中，海德格尔对黑格尔有五个方面的有意误读: (1)用强行引入的"意志"概念将黑格尔的精神现象学解释为在场的形而上学;(2) 将黑格尔的"陈述"、"怀疑之路"等概念解释为现象学还原的程序(3) 将黑格 尔的"存在(Sein) "贬为仅仅是指"存在者(4) 将"矛盾"置换为"模棱两 可使黑格尔的辩证运动从主动变为被动(5) 将意识的经验夸大为真正的本体 论，无视《逻辑学》和《哲学百科全书》的意义。通过分析这样的误i卖，有助于我 们了解海德格尔和黑格尔思想之间的内在联系。. (shrink)

Levinas subverts the traditional "ontology-epistemology," and creates a "realm of difference," the realm of "value," "ethic," and "religion," maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that "being" contains the "other" but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny "ontology" completely, but reversed the relationship between "ontology (theory of truth)" and "ethics (axiology)," placing the former under the (...) "constraint" of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have "objects," though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into "propositions"; nevertheless, it absolutely has its "theme." As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes "being" as its "theme" and "object" of thinking. The point is that this "being" should not be understood as an "object" completely. Rather, it is still a "theme-subject." In addition to an "object," "being" also manifests itself in an "attribute" and a kind of "meaning" as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free "being" rather than "various beings" that is the "theme-subject" of philosophy. /// 列维纳斯颠覆了传统的 "存在论一知识论" 开创了一个 "异域", 即 "价 值"、"伦理" 和 "宗教" 的领域，强调伦理学才是形而上学。不是 "存在" 包容 了 "他者" 而是 "他者" 包容了"存在"。伦理学问题得到了哲学上大幅度的提 升。他不是完全否定 "存在论" 而是把 "存在论一真理论" 和 "价值论→仓理学" 的关系颠倒了过来，将前者置于后者的 "制约" 之下。哲学作为一门学科，仍以 "存 在" 为研究主题与思考 "对象", 只是这个 "存在" 作为 "对象" 并非完全在 "客 体" 意义上来理解，而仍是一个 "主题一主体", 该存在不仅展示为一物，展示为 一 "属性", 而且展示为一种 "意义"。作为哲学 "主题一对象" 的不是 "诸存在 者", 而是 "时间性的一历史性的一自由的" "存在"。. (shrink)