Ethically sound analyses of embryo genetic editing require more than simple assessments of safety considerations. After all, we as humans care deeply not only about our health, but also care profoundly about the kinds of societies we construct, the injustices that our actions produce, the responsibilities that we have toward others and ourselves, our self-understanding, the characters that we develop, our family relationships, and the world that we leave to our children and grandchildren.

Hospital systems commonly face the challenge of determining just ways to allocate scarce drugs during national shortages. There is no standardised approach of how this should be instituted, but principles of distributive justice are commonly used so that patients who are most likely to benefit from the drug receive it. As a result, clinical indications, in which the evidence for the drug is assumed to be established, are often prioritised over research use. In this manuscript, we present a case of (...) a phase II investigational trial of intravenous thiamine for delirium prevention in patients undergoing haematopoietic stem cell transplantation to emphasise several shortcomings in the overarching prioritisation of clinical over research uses of scarce drugs. Specifically, we present the following considerations: clinical use may not have stronger evidence than research use; a strong scientific rationale for research use may outweigh the claim for clinical indications in which there is weak evidence; treatment within the context of a clinical trial may be the standard of care; and research use may not only benefit patients receiving the treatment but also offers the prospect of improving future clinical care. In summary, we argue against allocation schemes that prohibit all research uses of scarce drugs and instead recommend that allocation schemes include a balanced approach that weighs risks and benefits of access to scarce drugs irrespective of the research versus clinical use designation. (shrink)

There is no evidence to suggest that even as late as January 1672, when Newton was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society, anyone had any inkling of his new theory of colours. His name exploded on the scientific scene as the inventor and constructor of a new kind of telescope—what later became known as the reflector . Had the erudition of the London virtuosi been a little broader, they would have known that in fact he was not the inventor (...) of the telescope, even though the precise form he gave it was his. Not only was the idea a hundred years old, during which period it was repeatedly suggested by various writers, but also Newton himself took the idea straight from the most recent of these suggestions, namely that included in James Gregory's Optica promota of 1663. The situation becomes even more ironic when we realize that the new instrument was admired for wrong reasons and on merits that were far from Newton's intentions. Nevertheless, admired it was, and there was a good reason for this: Newton's instrument was in fact the first reflector actually to be constructed and, moreover, for a few weeks it performed quite well. Several astonomers became interested because of the high magnifying power relative to its dimensions. (shrink)

The secrets from the inner meaning of Torah form the soul of the Chasidic movement's thought. They inspire, revive, and inflame Jewish souls with a passion to constantly increase observance and devotion. For more than two centuries it has inoculated millions against the ravages of secularism and preserved the spiritual life of the Jewish nation. Chasidus emerged as a protection from the storm winds of modernity. Today's Jewish community might benefit from a new look at the Chasidic movement's beginnings and (...) reflections. Even those Jews who fulfill their religious obligations frequently perform rituals in a lifeless and superficial way. Were we to discover the depth and soulful vitality that fill Chasidic literature, a renewed passion might flame our faltering Jewish experience with the warmth of Torah. Unfortunately, for many of my contemporary American Jews, access to the gem-stones of the Chasidim has been denied. Chasidic works are overwhelmingly in Hebrew, and few good translations exist. This book provides an introduction to the basic terms and ideas of Chasidic texts. It is written for the interested lay reader who may be new to Torah study, as well as the yeshiva student who is knowledgeable about Biblical narratives and Talmudic law but may be new to the world of Chasidus. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe inclusion of an item within a theory may be essential or accidental, and if the former then the explanation of its meaning and of its inclusion in the theory cannot be by accidental events and circumstances. Since all events and circumstances – be they social, political, religious, psychological, etc. – are accidental vis-à-vis the ideas they occasion, they cannot serve as explanation of these ideas. The only way to explain the ideas is by showing their essentiality to the (...) theory rather than their importance to the people. Thus, the place of spirits and souls within seventeenth-century science is explained by Platonic ideology.This demands a concept of nature which is thoroughly efficient causative, and a concept of explanation which is thoroughly informative. This means that theories must explain any given effect by a cause which is separable from it and is conceptually heterogeneous to it. Such a nature and such an explanation are inherently paradoxical and irrational, which explains the preponderance of these traits in seventeenth-century science as created by Kepler, through Galileo and Descartes to Newton.The primary efficient-causal and explanatory agency is force, which is ontically distinct from matter and from the motion it causes in matter. Soul, spirit and active principle are mere variants of force. Thus, their presence in seventeenth-century science is explained only by their being conceptually essential to any Platonic philosophy of nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Good Neighbors Make Good Fences: Frost’s “Mending Wall”Zev TrachtenbergDefenders of the institution of private property have considered at length its benefits to individuals: for Aristotle it allows for the practice of certain virtues; for Hegel it allows for the expression of free human personality. 1 Property is also, of course, seen as the foundation of political society: for Locke men form government to enforce their property rights; for Jefferson (...) property enables citizens to participate in their institutions of self-government. 2But there is a level of human experience between simple individuality and the formal rules and rights articulated and enforced by society. I have in mind the more immediate form of human association evoked by the word community. Let me offer a rough-and-ready distinction. The social contract tradition prompts us to think of society in terms of the cooperative human enterprise of protecting individuals’ interests; the concept of society calls to mind formal voluntary agreements and associations, contracts, the economy, ultimately laws and rights. 3 We can think of community, by contrast, in affective terms; it calls to mind the direct human relations of people who share a place and mode of living. 4 A society has laws and a government; a community has customs and a culture.In this essay, then, I want to explore the relationship between property and community. It is, I think, an ambiguous one: property can be accused of corroding the human connections that constitute community life, but the maintenance of a property regime can also be seen as itself a communal enterprise. 5 This ambiguity is displayed vividly in Robert Frost’s “Mending Wall.” 6 Reading the poem can help us see the complex ways in which property and community are intertwined. [End Page 114]I“Mending Wall” has two characters: its narrator and his neighbor, owners of adjacent farms, who meet each Spring to repair the stone wall that stands between their properties. The narrator, at first glance, seems to take a somewhat skeptical attitude toward property. (We shall see that his attitude is in fact more complicated.) The poem opens with his words “Something there is that doesn’t love a wall”—a phrase he repeats later, making it a kind of slogan for the position on property he personifies. That position seems to reject human attempts to inscribe the arbitrary divisions of property holdings on the land. The narrator sees in natural processes an attempt to cast off this artificial imposition: that which doesn’t love a wall “sends the frozen-ground-swell under it, /And spills the upper boulders in the sun.” He recognizes that asserting a separation between the two parcels of property by erecting a wall is futile. For, he recognizes, the two parcels are one, connected underneath the wall by natural forces that work unconsciously but actively against human efforts to divide them.The neighbor, by contrast, speaks for an individualistic belief in the value of marking property holdings. “Good fences make good neighbors” are his only words in the poem, repeated in the last line like a counter-slogan to the narrator’s. The neighbor first offers his slogan in response to the fact that the wall is not needed for the practical purpose of keeping his and the narrator’s goods separate. Their goods do not need a wall to be kept apart: they have no cows to wander back and forth across the line, and the narrator’s “apple trees will never get across/And eat the cones under [the neighbor’s] pines.” For the neighbor, that is, the utility of the wall is not economic. Rather it serves to define the sort of relationship he wishes to have with those who surround him: his slogan expresses an ideology of human separation. In the neighbor’s eyes, apparently, all that makes a neighbor is the mere fact of owning an adjacent farm, hence what makes a good neighbor is his separateness. For what else could characterize the goodness of neighbors who are made good by fences?The neighbor thus personifies a position on property that disvalues community. Property is marked by walls, whose main function in his view... (shrink)

Maimonides requires the multitude to observe many ceremonial commandments, while Spinoza makes no such demand. This chapter focuses on some of the main points of agreement between Maimonides and Spinoza on true religion, the religion of reason, or philosophic religion. True religion includes also piety, that is, moral conduct, which follows from the rational life. The piety of the philosopher and the non‐philosopher both consist in doing good to others. Maimonides’ approach to true religion adumbrates Spinoza's. Spinoza's concept of amor (...) Dei intellectualis echoes Maimonides’ concept of the passionate intellectual love of God. Spinoza's concept of piety is adumbrated in Maimonides. The Maimonidean thrust of Spinoza's concept of true religion is evident in his discussion of “the divine Law” or, more precisely, “the natural divine Law” and the summum bonum in TTP4. In Maimonides’ language, true religion is based on the intelligibilia and popular religion on generally accepted opinions. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 244-247, June 2012.

Эта книга является в России фундаментальным исследованием, посвященным влиянию на современников и последующие поколения социологов ученого с мировым именем - Питирима Сорокина.

By analysing Rousseau's conception of the general will, Zev Trachtenberg characterises the attitude of civic virtue Rousseau believes individuals must have to cooperate successfully in society. Rousseau holds that culture affects political life by either fostering or discouraging civic virtue. However, while the cultural institutions Rousseau endorses would motivate citizens to obey the law, they would not prepare citizens to help frame it. Rousseau's view of culture thus works against his account of legitimacy, and Trachtenberg concludes that Rousseau's political theory (...) as a whole is inconsistent. (shrink)

By analysing Rousseau's conception of the general will, Zev Trachtenberg characterises the attitude of civic virtue Rousseau believes individuals must have to cooperate successfully in society. Rousseau holds that culture affects political life by either fostering or discouraging civic virtue. However, while the cultural institutions Rousseau endorses would motivate citizens to obey the law, they would not prepare citizens to help frame it. Rousseau's view of culture thus works against his account of legitimacy, and Trachtenberg concludes that Rousseau's political theory (...) as a whole is inconsistent. (shrink)

By analysing Rousseau's conception of the general will, Zev Trachtenberg characterises the attitude of civic virtue Rousseau believes individuals must have to cooperate successfully in society. Rousseau holds that culture affects political life by either fostering or discouraging civic virtue. However, while the cultural institutions Rousseau endorses would motivate citizens to obey the law, they would not prepare citizens to help frame it. Rousseau's view of culture thus works against his account of legitimacy, and Trachtenberg concludes that Rousseau's political theory (...) as a whole is inconsistent. (shrink)

This book brings together the most current thinking about the Anthropocene in the field of Environmental Political Theory ('EPT'). It displays the distinctive contribution EPT makes to the task of thinking through what 'the environment' means in this time of pervasive human influence over natural systems. Across its chapters the book helps develop the idea of 'socionatural relations'--an idea that frames the environment in the Anthropocene in terms of the interconnected relationship between human beings and their surroundings. Coming from both (...) well-established and newer voices in the field, the chapters in the book show the diversity of points of view theorists take toward the Anthropocene idea, and socionatural relations more generally. However, all the chapters exemplify a characteristic of work in EPT: the self-conscious effort to provide normative interpretations that are responsive to scientific accounts. The Introduction explains the complicated interaction between science and EPT, showing how it positions EPT to consider the Anthropocene. And the Afterword, by a pioneer in the field, relates all the chapters to a perspective that has been deeply influential in EPT. This book will be of interest to scholars already engaged in EPT. But it will also serve as an introduction to the field for students of Political Theory, Philosophy, Environmental Studies, and related disciplines, who will learn about the EPT approach from the Introduction, and then see it applied to the pressing question of the Anthropocene in the ensuing chapters. The book will also help readers interested in the Anthropocene from any disciplinary perspective develop a critical understanding of its political meanings. (shrink)