This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...) e m a j o r d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t , w h i l e b o t h Connectionist and Classical architectures postulate representational mental states, the latter but not the former are committed to a symbol-level of representation, or to a ‘language of thought’: i.e., to representational states that have combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure. Several arguments for combinatorial structure in mental representations are then reviewed. These include arguments based on the ‘systematicity’ of mental representation: i.e., on the fact that cognitive capacities always exhibit certain symmetries, so that the ability to entertain a given thought implies the ability to entertain thoughts with semantically related contents. We claim that such arguments make a powerful case that mind/brain architecture is not Connectionist at the cognitive level. We then consider the possibility that Connectionism may provide an account of the neural (or ‘abstract neurological’) structures in which Classical cognitive architecture is implemented. We survey a n u m b e r o f t h e s t a n d a r d a r g u m e n t s t h a t h a v e b e e n o f f e r e d i n f a v o r o f Connectionism, and conclude that they are coherent only on this interpretation. (shrink)
6. Seeing With the Mind ’ s Eye 1 : The Puzzle of Mental Imagery 6. 1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery? 6. 2 Content, form and substance of representations 6. 3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?
U radu autor prikazuje dva nedavno objavljena zbornika posvećena onome što se danas imenuje kao »zaokret ka prostoru«. Nakon što je opisao ključna pitanja koja zaokupljuju priloge sakupljene u zbornicima, autor koristi prigodu ukazati na problematično izostavljanje njemačke tradicije promišljanja prostora iz dominantnih teorijskih paradigmi koje izrastaju iz rečenog spacijalnog zaokreta. Na kraju prikaza autor nudi nekoliko zapažanja o razlozima elidiranja problematike prostornosti u domaćoj teorijskoj produkciji.In the article the author discusses two recently published collections of essays devoted to what (...) is today designated as the “spatial turn”. After addressing the key questions that preoccupy the contributions collected in these publications, the author uses the occasion to point to the problematic omission of the German tradition of thinking space from the dominant theoretical paradigms which have emerged from the above mentioned spatial turn. At the end of the article the author offers a number of observations relating to the reasons for the elision of the spatial problematic in Croatian theoretical production. (shrink)
PAUL THAGARD’S DEMARCATION CRITERIA S u m m a r y In Paul Thagard’s article “Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience”, we might find some demarcation criteria which are best used in determining whether certain fields with a lot of practitioners can be claimed to be pseudoscientific. Theory T for the pseudoscience club is if T has long been less progressive than its competitors and faces many more unsolved problems; and, adherents to T do not try to develop the theory to (...) solve puzzles, do not attempt to evaluate T with respect to its alternatives, and are highly reserved and selective in seeking confirmation and falsification. Ten years later Thagard gave us new proposals. If T is a pseudoscience, then it is usually the case that (1) T is neither simple nor unified; the explanations, resources, (2) and predictions of T tend to be ad hoc, spurious, or ill-fitted to the rest of T; or, (3) adherents to T do not try to develop the theory to solve puzzles, do not attempt to evaluate T with respect to competitors, and (4) are highly reserved and selective in seeking confirmation and falsification. In this article, Paul Thagard’s criteria of demarcation are examined and evaluated from the point of view of the history of astrology. (shrink)
This paper follows the Salt-Wind and subterraneous freshwater flows in Hawaiian poet Brandy Nālani McDougall's collection of poetry The Salt-Wind/ka Makani Pa'akai. McDougall illustrates that in order to begin again in the aftermath of American imperialism and environmental destruction, one must return to the salt-water and sub-surface waterings, and the ancestral connections and voices therein who beckon her home. In this way, her work is situated within contemporary movements within the Pacific, presently coming together in deimperializing efforts to restructure a (...) future for the Pacific that is ‘beyond empires’. Selecting two poems in particular from McDougall's collection—'Hāloanaka’ and ‘On a Routing Slip from the U.S. Postal Service, Pukalani Branch'—I illustrate how they chart the ancestral, cosmological, and historical flows of kinship between Kānaka Maoli and their near and distant earthly and spiritual relations. In particular, the water that passes through the taro plant infuses all manner of kinship, economic, and social relations in Hawai'i, connecting Kānaka Maoli to their ancestor Hāloa, and to land, sea, and each other, as well as—through the formative oceanic movements of Moana Nui—to other Pacific islanders. A thirst for water—sacred, imaginative, mobile, past, present—underwritten by an assertion of Hawaiian sovereignty, language, and tradition flows just beneath the surface of McDougall's words. (shrink)
Bilješke koje je Martin Heidegger unosio u takozvane »crne bilježnice« potakle su, netom nakon objavljivanja, intenzivne diskusije, osobito oko pitanja antisemitizma i nacionalsocijalizma. Je li se Heideggerova osobna naklonost ka ovim ideologijama odrazila i na njegovo filozofsko djelo? U ovom ogledu razmatra se jedna, s ovim pitanjima povezana, važna tema u Crnim bilježnicama – tema sveučilišta. Ona postaje frekventnija u tri navrata, obilježena značajnim događajima u Heideggerovoj profesionalnoj biografiji: preuzimanjem funkcije rektora sveučilišta u Freiburgu, napuštanjem te funkcije te isključenjem iz (...) nastave u sklopu poratne denacifikacije Njemačke. Pokazuje se da shvaćanje sveučilišta u Crnim bilježnicama odgovara idejama predočenim u Heideggerovu rektorskom govoru, kao i da to shvaćanje nije jednako nacionalsocijalističkom, već izražava filozofovo »narodnjačko« misaono usmjerenje. Iako posjeduje neke elemente vokabulara koji su bili prisutni u nacističkoj propagandi, Heidegger svoje stavove o stvarnosti i budućnosti sveučilišta integrira s drugim svojim idejama – kritikom svođenja znanja na tehničke aspekte, kritikom izoliranja znanosti u samostalna područja i uopće kritikom zapadnjačkog mišljenja. The notes that Martin Heidegger made in the so-called Black Notebooks stimulated, immediately after publication, intense discussions, especially on the issue of anti-Semitism and National Socialism. Does Heidegger’s personal fondness for these ideologies reflect on his philosophical work? In this essay, one important topic related to these issues in Black Notebooks is discussed – the topic of university. It became more frequent on three occasions, marked by significant events in Heidegger’s professional biography: taking over as rector of the University of Freiburg, leaving that position, and exclusion from teaching as part of the postwar denazification of Germany. It turns out that the understanding of the university in the Black Notebooks corresponds to the ideas presented in Heidegger’s rector’s speech, and that this understanding is not equally National Socialist, but expresses the philosopher’s “populist” thinking. Although he possesses some elements of vocabulary that were present in Nazi propaganda, Heidegger integrates his views on the reality and future of the university with his other ideas – a critique of reducing knowledge to technical aspects, a critique of isolating science into independent fields, and a critique of Western thought. (shrink)
Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology. The Logical Investigations is Edmund Husserl's most famous work and has had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Logical Investigations in historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy.
The paper represents an attempt to channel polemical exchanges concerning the process of democratization in Serbia into the frames of scientific dialogue which is considered here to be a more productive genre of scientific communication than are polemics. The most important issue addressed concerns providing adequate theoretical explanations of the?revolution of October the 5th? and of the roles that the student / popular movement?Otpor? played in it. According to the thesis defended by the author, the models of?waves of democratization? and (...) of?electoral revolution? offer an adequate theoretical frame for the discussion of such problems. Among the questions that are addressed in the paper are the following: how much can relying on external sources blur the understanding of local processes; what is the difference between?exported/imported? and?electoral revolutions?; how should one situate the Serbian?October revolution? in the waves of post communist democratization; what are the particularities of the Serbian electoral revolution compared to other?colored revolutions?; how should the respective roles of external and internal players in the Serbian case be evaluated; what are the particularities of projects of democratization based on synergy as opposed to those based on hierarchy and relations of rower what binds together the strategy of non-violent resistance, proactive politics and Otpor?s?Plan B?; finally, can a direct link between the amount of foreign assistance and the degree of loss of control over the results of political reform be presupposed. In the final section, offered is an assessment of the negative and positive aspects of Otpor?s political legacy as well as an attempt to link this legacy with an understanding of the?dynamics of hope? as a political project on which Otpor worked systematically. Rad predstavlja pokusaj da se jedna konkretna naucna polemika o temi koja je opterecena znatnim ideoloskim nabojem "zanrovski" preusmeri ka formi naucnog dijaloga, i time ucini plodnijom u naucnom smislu. Glavna pitanja koja se razmatraju ticu se pokusaja teorijskog odredjenja petooktobarske revolucije i uloge koju je pokret "Otpor" imao u njoj. U radu se brani teza da teorijski modeli "talasa demokratizacije" i "izborne revolucije" nude najutemeljenije okvire za razmatranje pitanja koja se u tekstu otvaraju. Kljucni problemi o kojima se u radu raspravlja su sledeci: u kojoj meri oslanjanje na strane izvore i teorijske okvire zakrivljuje uvide u lokalne politicke procese kakva je razlika izmedju "uvezenih" i "izbornih revolucija"; koje su posebnosti izborne revolucije u Srbiji i koje je njeno mesto u "drugom talasu" postkomunisticke demokratizacije; koliki je relativni znacaj stranih i lokalnih inicijativa prilikom organizovanja izbornih revolucija; u cemu je razlika izmedju klasicnih odnosa izmedju davalaca i primalaca politicke pomoci i novih odnosa, koji se zasnivaju na nacelu sinergije; koja su ogranicenja ili-ili logike objasnjenja u razmatranju politicke saradnje stranih i domacih aktera; sta povezuje strategiju nenasilnog otpora, proaktivnu logiku politickog delovanja i Otporov "Plan B"; najzad, postoji li mehanicka veza izmedju prisustva strane pomoci i gubljenja kontrole nad rezultatima izborne revolucije. U zavrsnom odeljku, otvara se pitanje negativnih i pozitivnih aspekata nasledja Otpora kao politickog projekta i nudi pokusaj da se razmatranje o dometima pokreta poveze sa razumevanjem "dinamike nade" kao politickog projekta na kojem je Otpor sistematski radio. (shrink)
Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)
Over the last ten years, „Theory U″, written by C.O. Scharmer in 2007, has earned broad international recognition. However, critical reviews of its grounding in social sciences and philosophy have been rare. After a brief introduction to Theory U this article examines its methodic approach in the context of its references to the universal history of Toynbee, and epistemological sources in the works of Nietzsche, Capra, Varela, Husserl, and Steiner. The investigation of Theory U’s historical and philosophical grounding comes to (...) the conclusion that it is evidently falling short of adequately capturing real world complexity and does not match widely accepted academic standards. Despite its evident deficiencies, Theory U deserves the merit of uniquely embracing non conventional schools of thought beyond the mainstream literature on leadership theories. (shrink)
This systematic investigation of computation and mental phenomena by a noted psychologist and computer scientist argues that cognition is a form of computation, that the semantic contents of mental states are encoded in the same general way as computer representations are encoded. It is a rich and sustained investigation of the assumptions underlying the directions cognitive science research is taking. 1 The Explanatory Vocabulary of Cognition 2 The Explanatory Role of Representations 3 The Relevance of Computation 4 The Psychological Reality (...) of Programs: Strong Equivalence 5 Constraining Functional Architecture 6 The Bridge from Physical to Symbolic: Transduction 7 Functional Architecture and Analogue Processes 8 Mental Imagery and Functional Architecture 9 Epilogue: What is Cognitive Science the Science of? (shrink)
It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...) ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look. (shrink)
This study presents findings from an ontological and contextual determination of the concept of dignity. The study had a caritative and caring science perspective and a hermeneutical design. The aim of this study was to increase caring science knowledge of dignity and to gain a determination of dignity as a concept. Eriksson’s model for conceptual determination is made up of five part-studies. The ontological and contextual determination indicates that dignity can be understood as absolute dignity, the spiritual dimension characterized by (...) responsibility, freedom, duty, and service, and relative dignity, characterized by the bodily, external aesthetic dimension and the psychical, inner ethical dimension. Dignity exists in human beings both as absolute and relative dignity. (shrink)