Most land plants associate with mycorrhizal fungi that can connect roots of neighboring plants in common mycelial networks (CMNs). Recent evidence shows that CMNs transfer warning signals of pathogen and aphid attack between plants. However, we do not know how defence‐related signaling via CMNs operates or how ubiquitous it is. Nor do we know what the ecological relevance and fitness consequences are, particularly from the perspective of the mycorrhizal fungus. Here, we focus on the potential fitness benefits for mycorrhizal fungi (...) and outline hypothetical scenarios in which signal transfer via CMNs is modulated in order to acquire the most benefit for the fungus (i.e. acquisition of carbon) for minimal cost. We speculate that the signal may be quantitative and may elicit plant defence responses on different levels depending on the distance the signal is transferred. Finally, we discuss the possibility of practical applications of this phenomenon for crop protection. (shrink)

This paper explores marital adjustment among couples raising a temperamentally difficult infant. Employing a multiple case study methodology we conducted ten interviews with six couples. The parenting distress these couples experienced meant they were at higher risk of marital maladjustment. Four couples experienced marital crisis, resulting in the separation of one couple. Our analysis suggests that reference to “insufficient father involvement” during the interviews signaled problems with the mother’s satisfaction and marital adjustment. We found that mothers consider four specific aspects (...) of paternal behavior as constituting involvement: 1. the father caring for the child in the mother’s presence, 2. the father caring for the child on his own, 3. the father sleeping in the same room as the mother and baby, and 4. the father being psychologically involved and supportive. (shrink)

Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal, and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’ designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways (...) of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualized. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasize its role in clinical and forensic research that makes it an important pragmatic kind. (shrink)

A large part of our exploration of the world consists in categorizing or classifying the objects and processes we encounter, both in scientific and everyday contexts. There are various, perhaps innumerable, ways to sort objects into different kinds or categories, but it is commonly assumed that, among the countless possible types of classifications, one group is privileged. Philosophy refers to such categories as natural kinds. Standard examples of such kinds include fundamental physical particles, chemical elements, and biological species. The term (...) natural does not imply that natural kinds ought to categorize only naturally occurring stuff or objects. Candidates for natural kinds can include man-made substances, such as synthetic elements, that can be created in a laboratory. The naturalness in question is not the naturalness of the entities being classified, but that of the groupings themselves. Groupings that are artificial or arbitrary are not natural; they are invented or imposed on nature. Natural kinds, on the other hand, are not invented, and many assume that scientific investigations should discover them. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the propensity toward identifying natural kinds with successful scientific categories in contemporary discussions of natural kinds within the philosophy of science. Success in this case is understood as the fulfillment of epistemic interests or goals in a given field of scientific research. The prevailing view is that, in order to have a theory of natural kinds that successfully captures current scientific practice, the relevant epistemic interests are the current interests of scientists working in a (...) particular field. In contrast, we concur with the Franklin-Hall (2015) that a wider range of possible interests needs to be taken into account, in order to avoid making natural kinds too dependent on the current stage of research. But unlike Franklin-Hall who suggests looking for an intersection between the interests and goals of current epistemic agents and our neighboring epistemic agents (the categorical bottleneck view), we advocate the view that all these different interests and goals need to be taken into account, and thus our view takes into account a much wider range of categories. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze, from a philosophical perspective, the scientific robustness of the construct of psychopathy as measured by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised that was developed by Robert Hare (1991; 2003). The scientific robustness and validity of classifications are topics of many debates in philosophy of science and philosophy of psychiatry more specifically. The main problem consists in establishing whether scientific classifications reflect natural kinds where the concept of a natural kind refers to the existence of (...) some objective divisions in nature that do not depend exclusively on subjective judgments of the classifier. The construct of psychopathy is especially interesting since the diagnosis of psychopathy has substantial social consequences. In the light of the recent debates regarding the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of psychiatry, we advocate the following distinction between two types of scientific classifications: natural and practical kinds. Natural kinds refer to those categories that are united by common causal mechanisms or properties. Practical kinds refer to categories that fulfill some practical classificatory goals such as prediction. We argue that the construct of psychopathy can fulfill the role of a practical kind. In addition, we contend that our current scientific knowledge about psychopathy does not allow us to conclude that this category is a natural kind. (shrink)

Článek se věnuje srovnání podoby a vývoje sporu o vivisekce v Anglii a českých zemích, s důrazem na propojení protivivisekčního a ženského hnutí. První část textu na pozadí rozvoje medicíny popisuje okolnosti vzniku sporu a cestu, která vedla k přijetí první legislativy regulující experimenty se zvířaty. Druhá část představuje postoj F. P. Cobbeové, která je nejvýraznější ženskou postavu v tomto sporu. Třetí část mapuje situaci v českých zemích a nabízí důvody, které vysvětlují, proč se u nás v dané době organizované (...) protivivisekční hnutí nezformovalo. Autorka tvrdí, že klíčovou roli sehrálo pozitivní vnímání vědců, které pramenilo z jejich zapojení do procesu národního obrození. V poslední části textu jsou pak představeny názory na vivisekci dvou postav českého ženského hnutí na počátku 20. století, P. Moudré a E. Vozábové. Autorka ukazuje, že v dané době argumenty, které líčily experiment v medicíně jako nepotřebnou a neužitečnou metodu bádání, již nemohly být přesvědčivé. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the question whether objective criteria could be provided for judging something to be a mental illness. I consider the two most prominent objectivist or naturalistic accounts of mental illness, evolutionary and bio-statistical account, which offer such a criterion by relying on the notion of biological function. According to such suggestions, illness is a condition in which there is dysfunciton in some feature of an organism. In this context, I consider different accounts for ascribing functions in (...) biologyand their relationship with the suggested accounts of illnesses. Special focus is placed on the objections according to which the ascription of functions, as envisaged in naturalistic accounts of illness, is incompatible with actual medical and psychiatric practice. I conclude that these objections are legitimate insofar we want to an account of illness that preserves the current practice of ascribing illness. However, the question remains, could a theory that tries to capture the actual medical practice be value-neutral, since our ordinary conception of illness is permeated with value judgments that indirectly enter into medical practice. In that respect, it seems that the requirement for pure objectivity is too strong and thus, it is not reasonable to expect that naturalistic accounts can satisfy it. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical and empirical issues related to the question whether psychopathy can be considered a psychiatric natural kind. Natural kinds refer to categories that are privileged because they the capture certain real divisions in nature. Generally, in philosophical debates regarding psychiatry, there is much scepticism about the possibility that psychiatric categories track natural kinds. We outline the main positions in the debate about natural kinds in psychiatry and examine whether psychopathy can be considered as a natural kind on (...) any of the proposed accounts. By examining the scientific literature on psychopathy, we draw two main conclusions: (1) the empirical data currently do not support the view that this condition is unified enough to be considered a natural kind; (2) the construct of psychopathy plays useful roles both in the context of scientific research and in forensic and clinical settings. These considerations bring us to our tentative conclusion about psychopathy as a kind in the making, a sort of “under construction” category with potential for improvement and refinement with further research. (shrink)

Text nabízí přehled disertačních prací, které předložily ženy na filozofické a přírodovědecké fakultě Masarykovy univerzity od jejího založení do roku 1939. Podrobněji se věnuje těm disertačním pracím, které tematicky spadaly do tzv. filozofických věd. V dobovém chápání se jednalo o filozofii, psychologii, pedagogiku a sociologii. Hlavním cílem je představit odborný zájem žen v daném místě a časovém období.

Text nabízí přehled disertačních prací, které předložily ženy na filozofické a přírodovědecké fakultě Masarykovy univerzity od jejího založení do roku 1939. Podrobněji se věnuje těm disertačním pracím, které tematicky spadaly do tzv. filozofických věd. V dobovém chápání se jednalo o filozofii, psychologii, pedagogiku a sociologii. Hlavním cílem je představit odborný zájem žen v daném místě a časovém období.

zen vlen ekonomiky bhem druh svtov vlky pinelo americk federln vld mnoho zsadnch vzev. Klovm nstrojem pro zvldnut tohoto nelehkho kolu byla fiskln politika. V tto pevratn dob dolo k etablovn mnoha novch prvk v americk ekonomice i fiskln politice. Nkter z nich jsou patrn dodnes. Clem tto studie je analyzovat a kriticky zhodnotit hlavn trendy ve vvoji vlen ekonomiky a fiskln politiky USA bhem druh svtov vlky. Dl vzkumn otzky se tkaj role federln vldy bhem strukturlnch zmn v hospodstv (...) i vznamu vldy v hospodskm rstu v kontextu dalch vdajovch sloek hrubho nrodnho produktu. V rmci fiskln politiky je zkoumna struktura vdajov strnky federlnho rozpotu s ohledem na dominanci vlench (obrannch) vdaj, rozloen daov zte mezi ekonomick subjekty a pm a nepm dan i zpsob financovn zvench vldnch vdaj. Na zklad metody dekompozice rstu hrubho nrodnho produktu a analzy asovch ad lze tvrdit, e logicky dochzelo k vytlaovn spoteby domcnost a investic firem vldnmi spotebnmi vdaji. Pochopiteln tento zvr plat i pro vsledky strukturln analzy hrubho nrodnho produktu. Regulatorn role federln vldy tedy byla na mnoha dlch trzch zcela zsadn. Co se te fiskln politiky, vlen vdaje vznamn dominovaly vdajov strnce federlnho rozpotu. V sti nevlench vdaj se nejvce prosadily kapitoly obchod a doprava a mezinrodn zleitosti a finance. Na pjmov stran rozpotu se vrazn zvyovaly pm progresivn individuln dan, mrnji pak korportn dan. Prohlubujc se fiskln deficit byl financovn z vce jak poloviny nedluhov, tj. vym daovm vbrem, z men sti pak kumulac dluhu. (shrink)

Studie analyzuje podmínky a specifika, která vedla k tomu, že v roce 1678 získala na Univerzitě v Padově jako první žena na světě doktorát z filozofie Elena Lucrezia Cornaro Piscopia. Autorka zpřítomňuje širší dobový kontext, který rámcoval tuto výjimečnou událost. Upozorňuje na to, že i navzdory skutečnosti, že univerzity neumožňovaly řádné studium ženám, se Eleně Cornaro získat doktorát podařilo, a to díky souběhu několika okolností, které vytvořily příznivé podmínky pro jeho udělení této ženě. Z nich autorka vyzdvihuje zejména tradici intelektuálních (...) center na renesančních dvorech na území dnešní Itálie, vedených vzdělanými aristokratkami; rozvoj Benátské republiky v 16. a 17. století, který ovlivnil i postavení žen, zejména z aristokratických rodin; tradice aristotelismu na italských univerzitách a otevřený přístup, zejména Univerzity v Padově a v Bologni, ke studiu žen. Hlavní pozornost je věnována rodinnému prostředí, životním osudům a studiu Eleny Cornaro. Na závěr je krátce pojednáno o osudu této ženy v historické paměti, zmíněny jsou další filozofky a vědkyně 17. a 18. století a je nastolena otázka, zda Elena Cornaro napomohla ke změně postoje univerzit ke vzdělání žen. (shrink)

Studie analyzuje podmínky a specifika, která vedla k tomu, že v roce 1678 získala na Univerzitě v Padově jako první žena na světě doktorát z filozofie Elena Lucrezia Cornaro Piscopia. Autorka zpřítomňuje širší dobový kontext, který rámcoval tuto výjimečnou událost. Upozorňuje na to, že i navzdory skutečnosti, že univerzity neumožňovaly řádné studium ženám, se Eleně Cornaro získat doktorát podařilo, a to díky souběhu několika okolností, které vytvořily příznivé podmínky pro jeho udělení této ženě. Z nich autorka vyzdvihuje zejména tradici intelektuálních (...) center na renesančních dvorech na území dnešní Itálie, vedených vzdělanými aristokratkami; rozvoj Benátské republiky v 16. a 17. století, který ovlivnil i postavení žen, zejména z aristokratických rodin; tradice aristotelismu na italských univerzitách a otevřený přístup, zejména Univerzity v Padově a v Bologni, ke studiu žen. Hlavní pozornost je věnována rodinnému prostředí, životním osudům a studiu Eleny Cornaro. Na závěr je krátce pojednáno o osudu této ženy v historické paměti, zmíněny jsou další filozofky a vědkyně 17. a 18. století a je nastolena otázka, zda Elena Cornaro napomohla ke změně postoje univerzit ke vzdělání žen. (shrink)

The label realist in the debate about natural kinds can imply different things. Many authors in this debate subscribe to views that are in some way realist, but without making clear whether the realism in question specifically attaches to kind categories or something else. The traditional understanding of realism about natural kinds is stated in terms of the mind-independence criterion. However, a recent tendency in the debate is to reject this understanding on the ground of its incompatibility with naturalistic approaches (...) to natural kinds. The aim of this paper is to disentangle different meanings attached to the term realism about natural kinds and examine arguments for rejecting the traditional mind-independence framing of the debate. I recommend the reestablishment of mind-independent realism as a legitimate contender for naturalist approaches to natural kinds by indicating that mind-independent realists have at their disposal all the resources to subscribe to such an approach. I proceed by showing how keeping the traditional distinction between realist and antirealist views in terms of mind-independence allows us to keep track of important distinctions between different accounts of natural kinds which are otherwise blurred. Then I examine the arguments against this traditional framing and conclude that they either (1) rest on a conflation between mind-independence of kinds versus entities belonging to kinds, or (2) unjustifiably presuppose that mind-independent realists do not have resources to uphold a naturalistic view of natural kinds. (shrink)

Dominic Murphy in several influential publications has formulated and defended what he calls the strong medical model of mental illness. At the core of this project is the objectivist requirement of classifying mental illness in terms of their aetiologies, preferably characterised by multilevel mechanistic explanations of dysfunctions in neurocomputational processes. We are sympathetic to this project and we devise an argument to support it based on a conception of psychiatric kinds. Murphy has, moreover, maintained that there are some open issues (...) concerning the applicability of his program to antisocial personality disorders and psychopathy. We argue that, as a matter of fact, there are already plausible and well-motivated classificatory proposals for these types of disorders that accommodate well within Murphy's strong medical model. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how the discussion about the existence of laws in biology, more specifically laws about species taxa, bears on the issue of whether species are kinds or individuals. One of the main arguments offered in favor of the view that species are individuals is that it explains the lack of laws about species taxa, since laws cannot refer to individuals. My aim in this paper is to question the premise that there are no laws about species (...) axa and consequently to show that the proposed argument fails. I will argue that even if there are no strict scientific laws about species taxa, still, scientifically interesting, law-like generalizations are made which are used for explaining phenomena and predicting properties of species members. The existence of these law-like generalizations, in turn, suggests that species are, at least prima facie, best conceived of as kinds. (shrink)

This article is about the problem of essentialism of natural and biological kinds, especially species. We will primarily focus on Michael Devitt’s work “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism” (2008). We will try to prove what a good candidate for the essence of the species could be. This article puts the problem of essentialism into the context of biology and, through the usage of examples, attempts to answer that problem. We are going to try to define essentialism and determine what meaning essentialism holds (...) in biology. We will cross-check the definitions of essentialism and compare the essence of various sciences with the suggestions of essences of species. We are going to analyse what Hilary Putnam states about natural kinds, about the so-called ‘hidden structures’, and what the essence of species could be. Using examples from biology, we are going to create a difference between ‘underlying’ and ‘exterior’ characteristics of organisms. We are going to analyse Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essentialism’ (2008) and check its advantages and disadvantages. Using examples from biology and using the analogy of examples from chemistry and biology, we will show whether Devitt’s ‘intrinsic biological essentialism’ is valid or not. (shrink)

In the debate on causal explanation in biology, in the past two decades largely influenced by the new mechanist approach, the concept of a pathway has recently reemerged as a promising research agenda, 551-572, 2018; The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72, 131-158, 2021). Ross’ account of biological explanation differentiates several autonomous types of causal structures that play explanatory and other roles across the life sciences. NM, however, prioritizes mechanisms as vehicles of biological explanations. According to this program, (...) the causal architecture of biological pathways and other causal structures, such as cascades and processes, can be interpreted with at least one of the NM’s mechanism concepts. In other words, these alternative causal structures are not sufficiently distinctive to merit the explanatory autonomy with regard to the NM corresponding concepts. We examine the explanatory practice of molecular biology and concur with Ross that there are indeed distinct types of causal structures, not all falling under the concept of a mechanism. Nonetheless, we show that the concept of mechanism is referring to a privileged causal structure, at the center of explanatory efforts in molecular biology. Pathways and other causal concepts, while somewhat distinct from mechanisms themselves, are explanatorily relevant to the degree in which they exhibit mechanistic features, are parts of a mechanistic architecture, or may lead to a mechanistic arrangement. What emerges in that manner is a hierarchy of causal structures with mechanisms at the explanatory top, and lower levels differing in the degree in which they contribute to mechanistic arrangements. (shrink)

The problem of defining the self has traditionally been conceived as a task for philosophers. However, the development of immunology in the second part of the 20th century has led many scientists to conclude that immunology is the science of the self. This led to two different approaches to biological individuality: physiological individuation that is mostly concerned with organisms seen as strongly cohesive and unified metabolic entities, and evolutionary individuation where evolution by natural selection is seen as the best framework (...) for individuating biological entities. I discuss physiological approaches to biological individuation with a special focus on the immunological theories of the self. I argue that the immunological theories can only function as vague metaphors that do not provide a valid criterion for individuating organisms in biology. (shrink)

We examine the use of the notion of natural selection in the philosophical debate on functions in biology. This debate has been largely shaped by the way in which different accounts assess various selective pressures in justifying claims about biological functions. Cummins (Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 157–172, 2002), one of the main proponents of the causal role account of biological functions, argues that a correctly understood neo-Darwinian notion of natural (...) selection has nothing to do with functional talk in biology. In this paper, we counter Cummins’ account by showing that progress in the molecular approaches to evolutionary biology—specifically scientific data available in neo-functionalization research—offers valuable support to the etiological selectionist approach to functions in biological and biologically-related sciences. Finally, we use the presented data to build our own account of biological functions, which tries to avoid the wrong turns taken by both major strands in the biological function debate, namely causal role and etiological accounts. According to our account, the function of a certain gene or a protein in the biological system that contains it is a particular causal activity, or a group of causal activities whose manifestation is in a specific way determined by corresponding mechanisms of genetic expression. Also, we argue that in many important cases this particular expression of genetic activity was positively selected at a certain point in evolutionary history. Since we take selection as an important but not the only factor that grounds biological functions, we are committed to a weak etiological account. (shrink)

U radu se nudi opis konteksta unutar kojeg je formuliran poznati dokaz za nužnost identiteta. Iznosi se formalni prikaz ovog dokaza kako ga je formulirao poznati filozof i logičar Saul Kripke. Također se razmatra gledište filozofa Allana Gibbarda koji nasuprot Kripkeu brani tvrdnju da neki iskazi identiteta mogu biti kontingentni. Osnovni cilj rada je upoznati domaćeg čitatelja s formalnim aspektom rasprave o nužnosti identiteta te dati kratki pregled konteksta unutar kojeg su formulirani argumenti za nužnost identiteta. In the paper, we (...) offer an overview of the context within which the well-known proof of the necessity of identity is formulated. A formal account of this proof is presented as formulated by the renowned philosopher and logician Saul Kripke. Furthermore, we discuss the account of the philosopher Allan Gibbard, who defends the claim that some statements of identity can be contingent. The main goal of the paper is to acquaint the readers who understand the Croatian language with the formal aspect of the discussion on the necessity of identity and to give a brief overview of the context within which the arguments for the necessity of identity are formulated. (shrink)

We show that considerable sets of positive linear operators namely their extensions as closures, adjoints or Friedrichs positive self-adjoint extensions form operator (generalized) effect algebras. Moreover, in these cases the partial effect algebraic operation of two operators coincides with usual sum of operators in complex Hilbert spaces whenever it is defined. These sets include also unbounded operators which play important role of observables (e.g., momentum and position) in the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics.

Článek nabízí kritickou reflexi způsobů, jimiž se filozofie snaží zajistit a zprostředkovat vědění o sobě samé, svých dějinách a klíčových problémech. Podrobně se věnuje procesům redukce a explikace, které jsou nedílnou součástí tohoto úsilí. S pomocí mnoha konkrétních příkladů ukazuje jejich úskalí a vzájemnou provázanost.

General psychopathology and cognition are likely to have a bidirectional influence on each other. Yet, the relationship between brain structure, psychopathology, and cognition remains unclear. This brief report investigates the association between structural properties of the cerebral cortex [surface area, cortical thickness, intracortical myelination indexed by the T1w/T2w ratio, and neurite density assessed by restriction spectrum imaging ] with general psychopathology and cognition in a sample of children from the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development study. Higher levels of psychopathology and lower (...) levels of cognitive ability were associated with a smaller cortical surface area. Inter-regionally—across the cerebral cortex—the strength of association between an area and psychopathology is strongly correlated with the strength of association between an area and cognition. Taken together, structural deviations particularly observed in the cortical surface area influence both psychopathology and cognition. (shrink)

Recenze: Zdeněk VAŠÍČEK, Jak se dělají filosofie. Praha: Triáda 2012, 240 s.