This article delves into Captain Samuel Alfred Warner’s dogged campaign to sell two inventions – his submersible mine and “long range” missile – to the British government in the 1840s and 1850s. Departing from a historiography that dismisses Warner as a fraudster, it clarifies how he managed to generate widespread interest in his weapons technologies for nearly twenty years. I therefore analyze three key elements of his self-promotion: his personal branding, his pitch, and his simultaneous embrace and rejection of publicity. (...) Neither elite nor highly educated, Warner ran up against a culture of “polite science” that distinguished disinterested practitioners from profit-minded schemers. To establish his credentials, he emphasized his practical maritime experience and represented himself as a martyr willing to bear the scorn of a disbelieving establishment. In pitching his devices, Warner capitalized on alarmism over border security and the integrity of the empire; he declared that they could hobble France’s modernizing navy and quickly end colonial conflicts. When skeptics began to fret over the proliferation of his destructive weapons, Warner flipped the script and lauded the threat of mutual annihilation as a deterrent to needless warfare. The issue of publicity, however, would ultimately be Warner’s professional undoing. Despite successful demonstrations, his clashes with official investigators and his refusal to disclose his chemical secrets led critics to dispute the originality of his discoveries. An examination of Warner’s self-promotional strategies, his fraught interactions with the British state, and the ambivalent public reaction to his contraptions provides insight into how scientific authority was acquired and lost in this period. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l’entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu’aucune de ces solutions n’est pleinement satisfaisante. Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos (...) doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l’œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion. / This paper deals with the problem of the συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν in the Sophist. In the first part, after a brief presentation of this problem, I discuss different solutions which have been proposed in the recent literature. I try to show that none of them is entirely satisfying. In the second part, I propose and explain a new solution based on a distinction between two types of logos : dialectical logos and doxastic logos. In the third part, I try to justify this solution on the basis of some passages of the Sophist and of the final part of the Theaetetus. To conclude, I suggest that the distinction between dialectical logos and doxasticlogos matches the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato in his dialogues. (shrink)

Let equation image be the semigroup of all mappings on the natural numbers equation image, and let U and V be subsets of equation image. We write U≼V if there exists a countable subset C of equation image such that U is contained in the subsemigroup generated by V and C. We give several results about the structure of the preorder ≼. In particular, we show that a certain statement about this preorder is equivalent to the Continuum Hypothesis.The preorder ≼ (...) is analogous to one introduced by Bergman and Shelah on subgroups of the symmetric group on equation image. The results in this paper suggest that the preorder on subsemigroups of equation image is much more complicated than that on subgroups of the symmetric group. (shrink)

In Plato's Sophist, a mysterious Eleatic Stranger, the main character of the dialogue, undertakes a systematic definition of the philosopher's fiercest rival, the sophist. His hunt for a definition of the sophist, however, is interrupted by an attempt to refute the ontology of Parmenides. The philosophical significance of this refutation and its exact relationship to the sought-after definition remains a matter of great scholarly dispute. This book, by means of a running commentary on the dialogue, argues that the oft-neglected distinction (...) between dialectic and appearances is not only the key to solving this and other exegetical conundrums, but also reveals the unity and originality of Plato's argument in the Sophist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.

ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value. Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast (...) cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases. (shrink)

The Limits of Cognition and the Shape of Being Based on the Thought of Karl Jaspers The article points out the elements of Karl Jaspers’ epistemological conception that cross out the possibility of a comprehensive account of being. The key issue here is the limits of cognition, which take the form of object cognition. The theme of limits points to the inadequacies of human thinking in the context of quantifiable and absolutist representations of reality. The impossibility of adequately grasping the (...) totality of reality will be illustrated here by means of the criticism Jaspers levelled at absolutising metaphysics. In connection with the description of the structure of cognition proposed by Jaspers, the article points out the conceptual proximity of the issue of worldview and metaphysics in the light of the thought of the cited author. (shrink)

Self-compassion is considered to be a healthy and adaptive attitude towards oneself, occurring both as a feature, as well as a state. Self-compassionate attitude towards oneself is composed of: a) kindness and understanding given to oneself b) mindfulness of one’s own experiences and c) a sense of community of experiences with humanity. Compassion towards oneself is structurally and functionally distinct from the self-commiseration and self-pity that lead to worse adaptation. Research shows that self-compassion is associated with better regulation of negative (...) emotions. Neff in her theoretical assumption states that due to more effective emotion regulation, people with a higher level of selfcompassion can generally cope better with reality. Therefore a question arises as to what the relationship is between a compassionate attitude towards oneself and social functioning of people. This article is a review of research that has been conducted so far regarding relations between self-compassion and the various dimensions of social functioning. (shrink)

Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have evolved to promote moral behavior and how exchange itself may make us more (...) virtuous. Examining the biological basis of economic morality, tracing the connections between morality and markets, and exploring the profound implications of both, Moral Markets provides a surprising and fundamentally new view of economics--one that also reconnects the field to Adam Smith's position that morality has a biological basis. Moral Markets, the result of an extensive collaboration between leading social and natural scientists, includes contributions by neuroeconomist Paul Zak; economists Robert H. Frank, Herbert Gintis, Vernon Smith, and Bart Wilson; law professors Oliver Goodenough, Erin O'Hara, and Lynn Stout; philosophers William Casebeer and Robert Solomon; primatologists Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal; biologists Carl Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Peter Richerson; anthropologists Robert Boyd and Michael Lachmann; political scientists Elinor Ostrom and David Schwab; management professor Rakesh Khurana; computational science and informatics doctoral candidate Erik Kimbrough; and business writer Charles Handy. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics has the potential to fundamentally change the way economics is done. This article identifies the ways in which this will occur, pitfalls of this approach, and areas where progress has already been made. The value of neuroeconomics studies for social policy lies in the quality, replicability, and relevance of the research produced. While most economists will not contribute to the neuroeconomics literature, we contend that most economists should be reading these studies.

Peterson et al. (2023) write that there’s “a rich philosophical debate on the nature of authenticity in dementia” involving the relationship of identity and autonomy. I explore this with Jaworska’s...