Welfarism, a position which for a long time enjoyed a hegemonic status in the field of normative economics, holds that the sole ethically relevant information for assessing social states of affairs pertains to individual utilities. Serge-Christophe Kolm presents the Equal-Labour Income Equalization model very explicitly and repeatedly as breaking with the still dominant tradition of welfarism. This paper explores the meaning of this distancing from welfarism found in the ELIE model. After having provided conceptual clarifications concerning both ELIE and welfarism, (...) we discuss various opposing aspects of this model of income redistribution to welfarism. We show that the refusal of welfarism by the ELIE model does not depend mainly on its axiomatic features, but on its deontological perspective. (shrink)

While the philosophical literature has extensively studied how decisions relate to arguments, reasons and justifications, decision theory almost entirely ignores the latter notions. In this article, we elaborate a formal framework to introduce in decision theory the stance that decision-makers take towards arguments and counter-arguments. We start from a decision situation, where an individual requests decision support. We formally define, as a commendable basis for decision-aid, this individual’s deliberated judgment, a notion inspired by Rawls’ contributions to the philosophical literature, and (...) embodying the requirement that the decision-maker should carefully examine arguments and counter-arguments. We explain how models of deliberated judgment can be validated empirically. We then identify conditions upon which the existence of a valid model can be taken for granted, and analyze how these conditions can be relaxed. We then explore the significance of our framework for the practice of decision analysis. Our framework opens avenues for future research involving both philosophy and decision theory, as well as empirical implementations. (shrink)

Biodiversity sciences witness a double dynamic. Whereas the need for interdisciplinary approaches is increasingly appreciated, most disciplinary studies are still confined to developing operational, discipline-specific indices. We show that a reassessment of the general notion of biodiversity is needed to clarify this situation. We advocate a new approach, according to which the main usefulness of this notion is not to capture quantitatively biological objects or processes, but to organize meaningful and coherent interdisciplinary interactions by constructively criticizing disciplinary studies. We apply (...) this approach to ecological-economic models, in the hope of launching more fruitful critical dialogs between economists and biologists. (shrink)

L’analyse de la notion de procéduralisme montre qu’elle est utilisée dans la littérature en deux sens très différents. Nous mettons en évidence une condition suffisante à la mise en cohérence de ces deux idées, basée sur une compréhension pragmatique de la notion d’acceptabilité. Nous montrons alors que l’adoption de cette condition suffisante implique que tout dépassement procéduraliste du welfarisme passe par un travail de formation des préférences.

Environmental economic valuations of biodiversity are an increasingly active field of academic inquiry, often presented as a prominent means to rationalize decision-making on environmental issues. However, the meaning of this argument is unclear, because it uses the term “rationalize” in a loose way. This argument, as it is typically formulated in the literature, makes it look as though economic valuations do not involve any value-judgment by economists: by emphasizing rationalization, this argument silences value-judgements. This blind spot is critical, since environmental (...) inequalities are pervasive in economic valuations and their applications, and environmental decision making hence unavoidably involves value-judgements. In this article, we identify conditions upon which environmental economic valuations can truly contribute to rationalizing decision making, despite environmental inequalities. We review the main arguments found in the literature to entrench the credentials of economic approaches to rationalize decision-making, and argue that these approaches fail, at a fundamental level. We then argue that the key for economic valuations to truly contribute to rationalization is that their usage should be embedded in the deployment of what we will call a justificatory task. We then take advantage of an analysis of the notion of rationality, when applied to decision-aiding processes, to translate this reasoning in the concrete terms of applications of environmental economic valuations. According to the argument that we articulate here, standard economic valuations, just like any other application of economic tools, can indeed play a role in rationalizing environmental decisions, in spite of the inequalities that they produce. But this possibility is conditioned by the requirement that the economist implementing them should produce justifications. (shrink)

Conservation biology is a branch of ecology devoted to conserving biodiversity. Because this discipline is based on the assumption that knowledge should guide actions, it endows experts with a power that should be questioned. The work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault can be seen as a relevant conceptual resource to think these aspects of conservation biology through. I critically analyse the relevance of the Foucauldian approach to conservation. I argue that Foucauldian arguments are deeply ambiguous, and therefore useless for (...) conservation purposes, unless they are supplemented with unsaid assumptions that are, depending on the case at hand, untenable, or at least at odds with basic assumptions underlying conservation biology. In any case, the prospects of using the Foucauldian approach for conservation purposes are deeply undermined. However, the Foucauldian reasoning contains some ideas that can be important and useful for conservation purposes, if they are duly clarified. (shrink)