According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they (...) decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the concept of tolerance and suggest a description of that concept that could be accepted regardless of the political theory one supports. Since a neutral perception of the limits of tolerance is impossible, this paper offers a guideline for a substantive-liberal or a perfectionist-liberal approach to it. The limits of tolerance are described through the principles of reciprocity and proportionality. The former explains why intolerance should not be tolerated whereas the latter prescribes how and to (...) what extent it should be tolerated. The cumulative effect of these principles is that apart from extremely rare occasions intolerance should not be tolerated at any time. (shrink)

Most democratic states tolerate, to various extents, conscientious objection. The same states tend not to tolerate acts of civil disobedience and what they perceive as selective conscientious objection. In this paper it is claimed that the dichotomy between civil disobedience and conscientious objection is often misguided; that the existence of a “civic conscience” makes it impossible to differentiate between conscientious objection and civil disobedience; and that there is no such thing as “selective” conscientious objection—or that classifying an objection as “selective” (...) has no significant moral or practical implications. These claims are supported by a preliminary, more general argument according to which conscientious objection is and should be tolerated because the objector lacks the ability to choose his conscience and to decide whether to act upon it. The lack-of-choice argument, it is claimed, applies equally to all types of conscientious objection, including those that are mistakenly called “selective” objection. It also applies to one type of civil disobedience. As a result, if a state is willing to tolerate non-selective conscientious objection, it may and at times must also tolerate selective conscientious objection and civil disobedience and to a similar degree. (shrink)

By enacting equality laws the liberal state decides the limits of liberal tolerance by relying on content-based rather than content-neutral considerations. Equality laws are not and cannot be neutral. They reflect a content-based moral decision about the importance and weight of the principle of equality vis-à-vis other rights or interests. This leads to the following conclusions: First, since equality laws in liberal democracies reflect moral-liberal values, conscientious objections to equality laws rely, almost by definition, on unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally (...) repugnant values. Secondly, we should not shy away from explicitly relying on moral-liberal views when deciding whether it is justified to grant exemptions from equality laws. Thirdly, conscientious objections to equality laws should normally not be tolerated or accommodated by the state, because conscientious objections that rely on what is rightly perceived as unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally repugnant values should not be tolerated in a tolerant-liberal democracy. (shrink)

Several possible approaches can be applied by the state when it responds to religious conscientious objections. These approaches compare the response to religious-conscientious objections with that to non-religious objections. If the content of the objector’s conscience is significant when deciding to grant conscientious exemptions, three approaches to the practice of granting conscientious exemptions are possible: First, a non-neutral liberal approach that takes into consideration the content of the conscience but not its religiosity as such; second, a pro-religious approach; and third, (...) an anti-religious approach. This paper contends that the non-neutral liberal approach and the pro-religious approach should be rejected in favor of an anti-religious approach to granting conscientious exemptions. The proposed anti-religious approach is as follows: (1) unjustified intolerance should not be tolerated; (2) empirical evidence links religion and intolerance – that is, people’s responses to measures of religion and intolerance are closely related; (3) theoretical evidence links (some) religions and intolerance; and (4) the religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to grant conscientious exemptions. (shrink)

This paper explores two main arguments. The first argument is that religious persons—because they are religious persons—are likely to be more intolerant than non-religious persons. This argument is supported by decisive empirical evidence. The second argument is that there are meaningful, clear and unique theoretical links between religion, or, more precisely, certain types of religion, and intolerance. It is submitted that the special links between religion and intolerance are the result of seven characteristics of religion which are specified in the (...) paper. Both arguments should encourage us to re-evaluate the proper place that religion should have in the legal and political sphere. (shrink)