ABSTRACTAccording to some influential readings of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Critique of Taste: The Feeling of Life by Katalin MakkaiYoon ChoiKatalin Makkai. Kant’s Critique of Taste: The Feeling of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. viii + 209. Hardback, $99.99. Paperback, $29.99.This monograph offers a bold and original interpretation of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, focusing on judgments of taste (hereafter “aesthetic judgments”) and the special problem that Kant takes such judgments to raise. In Makkai’s (...) preferred terms, the problem is that aesthetic judgments are normative—they demand universal agreement—but also subjective (14). How are such judgments possible? Though the problem may seem clear enough, Makkai suggests that a closer look is in order; indeed, her “main focus is on working out a proper understanding of the problem” (15). Makkai undertakes this task over the course of five relatively short chapters, introducing several interpretive theses that come together to transform the problem of aesthetic judgment in illuminating, sometimes surprising, ways. [End Page 509]Chapter 1 introduces Kant’s theory of judgment, arguing that it is primarily about what Kant calls the “power of judgment” (44). This is the power exercised in the activity of “adopting a stance,” an activity that is not only identificatory but also evaluative, that reveals something about the judging subject as well as the object judged (63). Though aesthetic judgment is one way in which the power of judgment is exercised, there is something special about it, as Kant himself flags (KU AA 5:193, quoted on 37). For aesthetic judgment “models” an “essential aspect” of the power of judgment in a way that no other kind of judgment does (38). One of Makkai’s interpretive aims is to make sense of this claim; she accordingly returns to it in her conclusion.Chapter 2, however, turns to aesthetic judgment, focusing on the Second Moment of the Analytic (KU AA 5:211–19). In this section, Kant introduces the much-discussed claim that aesthetic judgment involves the “free play” of imagination and understanding (KU AA 5:217). According to Makkai, it is significant that Kant introduces the idea of “universal communicability” along with the idea of “free play” (KU AA 5:217). Communicability, in Makkai’s view, is underwritten by the activity of “making [one’s thoughts and feelings] communicable,” an activity that is involved not just in communicating one’s thoughts and feelings, but in knowing what one is thinking and feeling in the first place, and indeed in making aesthetic judgment possible, as Makkai goes on to argue (81). For when I have an “aesthetic encounter,” I come across a beautiful object, and though I “cognize it,... there is ‘something else’ there in my experience of it that I find I want to articulate” (90). In the activity of trying to “make communicable” what this “something else” is, the imagination and understanding are brought into free play, a state “characterized,” according to Makkai, by the “exercising” of my “capacity for rendering (something) communicable” (89; emphasis in original). The profound pleasure that accompanies this state, Makkai adds, arises from being “animated” by the beautiful object to this heightened activity in which my faculties are in “attunement” with each other and with the object; it is the feeling of being “brought to life” that Makkai refers to in her title (100–101).It is a central part of this view that to experience an object as beautiful is to respond to the way the object really is. As Makkai puts it, “a condition of the possibility of performing a judgment of taste is a prior fact of the object being beautiful” (125). But in what sense, then, is aesthetic judgment subjective? Makkai addresses this question in chapter 3, arguing that whereas cognitive judgment asserts, aesthetic judgment “acknowledges” (136). And to acknowledge a beautiful object, it is not enough to identify a beautiful object correctly. It is necessary to experience the object as beautiful: to encounter it and take pleasure in it (136). Aesthetic judgment thus has an “essentially first-personal character” (127). As Makkai puts it later, in such a judgment, I represent “my experience of the object, my pleasure in it”—that is... (shrink)

Scotland and South Korea are experiencing novel challenges in educating for and about migrant populations. Through a critical discourse analysis of these nations’ national curricula, we consider the guidance educators are offered in teaching about issues related to migration in increasingly diverse classrooms. Framed by theories of critical global citizenship, our analysis suggests that both curricula use ambiguous approaches to global citizenship education. These curricula acknowledge the presence of migrants without disturbing stable visions of Korean and Scottish national identities. Such (...) approaches are reflective of the challenges of integrating migrants into the civic life of South Korea and Scotland. (shrink)

This chapter explores what Kant means by “life”, the “feeling of life”, the “feeling of the promotion of life”, and related notions, such as the idea of a “vital power”, through the contrast between Kant’s account of the beautiful and his account of the sublime. We argue that it is significant that Kant characterizes the feeling of the beautiful as a feeling of the promotion of life but the feeling of the sublime in terms of vital powers. We account for (...) this difference by showing that in experiences of beauty, we are aware of ourselves as rational but embodied human beings, as part of nature. In the feeling of the sublime, by contrast, we are aware of ourselves as pure rational beings. This entails that in the beautiful, we experience nature as deeply life-promoting, while in the sublime, we experience the independence of our supersensible vocation from nature. (shrink)

This study investigated the influence of cross-cultural learning experiences on Korean preservice social studies teachers’ global perspectives development. Social studies preservice teachers in a large woman’s university in Korea participated in a cross-cultural learning course, which focused on critical understanding of globalization and global economy, in the United States. Building an insider-outsider research team, the researchers conducted participant observation, interviews, surveys, and documents analysis. Data indicates that the preservice teachers showed increased understanding of global economy and critical issues of globalization, (...) acquired worldmindedness and broadened perspective to reflect cultural, national, and global identification, and heightened confidence in teaching multicultural/global education as a result of the program. However, the participants expressed lack of consciousness of the legacy of imperialism on their knowledge and worldview, limited concerns on pedagogical reform, and passive and inactive attitudes during the program. (shrink)