The formation of the human being is a fundamental subject in Saint Augustine’s thinking. In his first works references to liberal arts are highlighted, and the dialogue form appears as a privileged vehicle of the educative process. In De Ordine, Saint Augustine represents a clear example of the interest and the appropriation of dialogue as a philosophical exercise, which has the double purpose of taking his listeners to the truth and to introduce the reader to the same dynamic.

El presente artículo analiza las violencias e injusticias epistémicas que sufren las mujeres trans*, que se pueden rastrear en enunciados convencionales de los discursos médico, jurídico y mediático en torno al asesinato de mujeres trans*; dichos enunciados se refuerzan entre sí, perpetuando injusticias epistémicas contra estas mujeres en Colombia. Para esto, usaremos la noción de injusticia epistémica de Miranda Fricker y las propuestas de otrxs autorxs contemporáneos, como Moira Pérez, Blas Radi y Judith Butler, y mostraremos cómo los prejuicios identitarios (...) y la injusticia testimonial y hermenéutica a la que se ven expuestas las feminidades trans* implican marginarlas por medio de prácticas sociales de significación. (shrink)

Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin argue for a revolution in our cosmological ideas. Ideal for non-scientists, physicists and cosmologists.

Roberto Mangabeira Unger sets out to reinvent philosophy. His central theme is our transcendence-everything in our existence points beyond itself-and its relation to our finitude: everything that surrounds us, and we ourselves, are flawed and ephemeral. He asks how we can live so that we die only once, instead of dying many small deaths; how we can breathe new life and new meaning into the revolutionary movement that has aroused humanity for the last three centuries, but that is now weakened (...) and disoriented; and how we can make sense of ourselves without claiming for human beings a miraculous exception to the general regime of nature. For Unger, philosophy must be the mind on fire, insisting on our prerogative to speak to what matters most. (shrink)

Das systematische Problem „schlechter Unendlichkeit“, als dessen Überwindung die hegelsche Philosophie angetreten ist und das als solches weit über seinen Ursprung im Deutschen Idealismus hinausgeht, wird in dieser Arbeit rekonstruiert. Als dialektische Figur hat sie die Philosophie Hegels in ihrer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Kant, Fichte und der Romantik tiefgreifend geprägt. Schelling und Kierkegaard wiederum kritisieren, dass bei Hegel diese Figur eines scheiternden affirmativen Selbstbezugs nicht auf seine logische Struktur beschränkt bleibe, sondern auf die Beschreibung des neuzeitlichen Geistes übergreife, weshalb Hegel (...) in seinem eigenen System keine eigentliche Ethik und kein verantwortliches Selbst mehr denken könne.0. (shrink)

In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...) with the bodies of these beings. And, even as each of these ordinary entities extends through some space, so, also, each endures through some time. In line with that, each ordinary entity is at least very largely, and is perhaps entirely, an enduring physical entity (which allows that many might have certain properties that aren't purely physical properties.) Further, each ordinary enduring entity is a physically complex entity: Not only is each composed of parts, but many of these parts, whether or not absolutely all of them, are themselves enduring physical entities, and many of them also are such physically complex continuing entities. When an ordinary entity undergoes a significant change, then, at least generally, this change will involve changes concerning that entity's constituting physical parts, whether it be a rearrangement of (some of) these parts, or a loss of parts, or a gain of parts, or whatever. Often, the entity will still exist even after the change occurs. As we may well suppose, this happens when, from two strokes of an ax, an ordinary log loses just a chip of wood. As we may then say, such a change conforms with the log's "persistence conditions." Somewhat less often, such an ordinary entity undergoes a change that means an end to it: When a bomb's explosion makes our log become just so many widely scattered motes of dust, the log will no longer exist. Such a momentous change doesn't conform with the log's persistence conditions. (shrink)

Fazer filosofia, para Roberto Mangabeira Unger, é pensar radicalmente. É insistir em tratar dos assuntos mais importantes, ainda que tenhamos de fazê-lo na fronteira do que seja possível pensar e dizer. Resignado ao colonialismo mental, o pensamento brasileiro não está acostumado a tal ousadia. Neste primeiro livro, Mangabeira leva o leitor pela mão e se oferece como guia de seu despertar para a ambição de compreender o mundo das ideias mais básicas e influentes. Seu alvo é rever tudo em nossos (...) pontos de partida – na filosofia e na política – que negue ou desmereça nossa capacidade, como indivíduos e como povo, de criar o novo. O livro ressoará num Brasil que está pronto para se repensar e se refazer, e a passar pela desilusão da desilusão. Não à toa, o nosso autor trará ao título e ao cerne da sua análise e proposição dois conceitos (e práticas) hoje atacados pelo ideário totalitário: o conhecimento e a política. Conhecimento e política, publicado em 1975, foi o primeiro livro de Roberto Mangabeira Unger. A editora LeYa Brasil o publica novamente agora, na tradução primorosa da mãe do autor, a poetisa Edyla Mangabeira Unger, para dar início à reedição de toda a obra de Mangabeira no Brasil, uma obra que se mantém atual e, ao mesmo tempo, visionária. O tema do livro é a superação do mais influente sistema de ideias no pensamento Ocidental desde a Renascença: conjunto de conceitos que abrange o individualismo e o liberalismo na política, o ceticismo e o subjetivismo na ética, e o empiricismo e positivismo na filosofia do conhecimento e da natureza. Desde que saiu da sombra de Aristóteles e do cristianismo, o pensamento ocidental se entregou, argumenta Mangabeira, à construção de uma maneira de pensar que o levou a contradições insolúveis e nos fez perder o rumo do esclarecimento e da emancipação. No centro dessas contradições está um equívoco a respeito de quem somos e de como nos relacionamos com o mundo. Pensamos a partir de regimes de pensamento, mas não temos de ser prisioneiros deles. Podemos subvertê-los e transformá-los para chegar mais perto da realidade. Precisamos participar de determinada sociedade e cultura. Nenhum regime social e cultural, contudo, nos serve como moradia definitiva. Daí a importância de construir um regime que facilite sua própria transformação. Nesta obra, Mangabeira iniciou a longa busca do roteiro das rebeldias libertadoras no pensamento e na política. E se levantou contra a tradição intelectual que continua a nos acorrentar. (shrink)

Thomas Paine's words were like no others in history: they leaped off the page, inspiring readers to change their lives, their governments, their kings, and even their gods. In an age when spoken and written words were the only forms of communication, Paine's aroused men to action like no one else. The most widely read political writer of his generation, he proved to be more than a century ahead of his time, conceiving and demanding unheard-of social reforms that are now (...) integral elements of modern republican societies. Among them were government subsidies for the poor, universal housing and education, pre- and post-natal care for women, and universal social security. An Englishman who emigrated to the American colonies, he formed close friendships with Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, and his ideas helped shape the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. (shrink)

"a book about religion and a religious work in its own right, it proposes the content of a religion that can survive faith in a transcendent God and in life after death. According to this religion—the religion of the future—human beings can be more human by becoming more godlike, not just later, in another life or another time, but right now, on Earth and in their own lives."--Publishers website.

The civil rights and feminist movements of the sixties did not leave legal theory untouched. Over the following two decades, the critical legal studies movement--led by the Brazilian philosopher, social theorist and politician Roberto Unger--sought to transform traditional views of law and legal doctrine, revealing the hidden interests and class dominations in prevailing legal frameworks. It remains highly influential, having spawned more recent movements, including feminist legal studies and critical race theory. The Critical Legal Studies Movement develops its major ideas, (...) showing how laws and legal discourse hide the social inequalities and political biases that so interest philosophy and revolutionary politics. (shrink)

Einleitung -- Phänomenologie als Wesensforschung -- Leibphänomenologische Perspektiven -- Musik und Leiblichkeit -- Leibphänomenologie und Musikpädogogik? -- Bewegungen zu einem Orgelstück -- Ausblick.

Ethnicity and im/migrant classification systems and their constituent categories have a long history in the construction of public health knowledge on tuberculosis in the United Kingdom. This article critically examines the categories employed and the epidemiological discourses on TB, im/migrants, and ethnic minorities in health reporting between 1965 and 2015. We employ a Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse Analysis to trace the continuities and changes in the categories used and in the discursive construction of im/migrants, ethnic minorities, and TB. (...) These continuities and disjunctures are analysed within their socio-historical context to demonstrate the historical contingency of epidemiological knowledge production. We outline two historical phases in knowledge construction. The first coincides with the period of decolonisation, which witnessed a change in discursive identity ascriptions from ‘immigrants’ to ‘ethnic groups’ in health reporting as the ‘other’. The second commenced after 1991, when the adoption of the census ethnicity categories as a standard in the collection of population statistics entrenched ethnicity categories in health reporting. We argue the health reporting discourse reveals that the ‘new’ public health exhibits continuities with the ‘old’ by targeting the immigrant ‘other’ through biosecuritisation practices. We contend that these categories originated within a postcolonial paradigm and that increasing immigration and new forms of mobility are creating the preconditions for new discourses on identity construction that have implications for the current collaborative TB strategy. (shrink)

There is, naturally, no more ambiguous factor in all human knowledge than the possible bearing of what we do not know on what we do know.

In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is (...) the case. (shrink)

By contributing a few hundred dollars to a charity like UNICEF, a prosperous person can ensure that fewer poor children die, and that more will live reasonably long, worthwhile lives. Even when knowing this, however, most people send nothing, and almost all of the rest send little. What is the moral status of this behavior? To such common cases of letting die, our untutored response is that, while it is not very good, neither is the conduct wrong. What is the (...) source of this lenient assessment? In this contentious new book, one of our leading philosophers argues that our intuitions about ethical cases are generated not by basic moral values, but by certain distracting psychological dispositions that all too often prevent us from reacting in accord with our commitments. Through a detailed look at how these tendencies operate, Unger shows that, on the good morality that we already accept, the fatally unhelpful behavior is monstrously wrong. By uncovering the eminently sensible ethics that we've already embraced fully, and by confronting us with empirical facts and with easily followed instructions for lessening serious suffering appropriately and effectively, Unger's book points the way to a compassionate new moral philosophy. (shrink)

En su ensayo Para una crítica de la violencia, Walter Benjamin reivindica el fenómeno social de la huelga general revolucionaria teorizada por Georges Sorel en su obra Reflexiones sobre la violencia, como una figura ejemplar de lo que sería un “medio puro de la política”, al margen de cualquier forma legitimada de poder. En este marco, pocos comentadores contemporáneos advierten una discordancia conceptual entre ambos filósofos: para Sorel, la huelga revolucionaria es un mito social, mientras que el mito, categoría esencialmente (...) negativa en Benjamin, describe la violencia que aprisiona la vida y que se traduce en una forma de poder político superior. En este artículo quisiéramos demostrar esta discordancia conceptual para examinar en seguida cómo ha sido comentada por otros pensadores contemporáneos. La filosofía de la historia, la posibilidad de una acción política ética y la temporalidad mesiánica aparecen en el horizonte teórico que emparenta a estos filósofos y por el cual podría descifrarse su impasse conceptual. Esto se confirma si se despliega la idea de un “medio puro de la política”, pista que Benjamin ofrece sin profundizar y sobre la cual reenvía al pensamiento de un filósofo poco explorado, Erich Unger. En la última parte de este artículo desarrollaremos las claves dadas por Unger, que entran justamente en sintonía con la mención de la huelga general como medio puro de la política. In his Critique of violence, Walter Benjamin claimed that the social phenomenon of the revolutionary general strike was an example of what would be a “pure political mean”. In this context, not many contemporary commentators note an important conceptual incoherence between those two philosophers: for Sorel the revolutionary general strike is a social myth, while in Benjamin the category of myth, essentially negative, describes the violence that imprisons life and crystallizes it in a higher form of political power. In this article, we demonstrate this conceptual discrepancy in order to examine the way it has been approached by other philosophers. The philosophy of history, the possibility of an ethical political action, and messianic temporality, all appear on the theoretical horizon linking these philosophers, and through these ideas a conceptual impasse can be decoded. Moreover, this horizon can be confirmed if we follow the idea of a “pure political means” that Benjamin proposes and which moves forward to the thought of an unexplored philosopher mentioned by him: Erich Unger. In the last part of this article we will develop the keys given by Unger, which fall right in line with the notion of the general strike as a pure political mean. (shrink)

We present a new technique for changing the cofinality of large cardinals using homogeneous forcing. As an application we show that many singular cardinals in [Formula: see text] can be measurable in HOD. We also answer a related question of Cummings, Friedman and Golshani by producing a model in which every regular uncountable cardinal [Formula: see text] in [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-supercompact in HOD.

Peter Unger’s book has both substantive and methodological aims. Substantively, it aims to prove the following four claims in the following order: we must, in general, suffer great losses of property to prevent suffering and death; we may, in general, impose such losses on others for the same goals; we may, in general, kill others to prevent more deaths; and we must, in general, kill ourself to prevent more deaths. Methodologically, it aims to show that intuitive judgments about cases that (...) would be presented as evidence against the four substantive claims—the standard technique of nonconsequentialists arguing against consequentialists—are worthless because we can construct cases that generate the opposite intuitive judgment; further, we can show that the factors that distinguish the cases yielding such different intuitions are not morally significant; and hence, we must decide which judgments are correct by consulting such general moral values as the importance of reducing suffering and death. Thus, Unger offers an error theory of nonconsequentialist restrictions on harming others and prerogatives not to make large sacrifices to aid. This error theory is based on the psychological effects of morally insignificant factors. (shrink)

The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his (...) discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life. (shrink)