I argue that Aristotle’s arguments in passages regarding chance in the Physics and in passages about ignorance in action in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics presuppose two different uses of ‘for the sake of something’, which are able to explain respectively the wish or thought of agents and the type or nature of what they actually do. In my view, however, this does not commit Aristotle, in the ‘ignorance’ passages from the two Ethics, to holding that the type or nature (...) of what the agents actually do is for the sake of killing or wounding. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Aristotle’s refutation of the Eleatic argument in Physics I.8 is based on the idea that a thing at the starting point of coming to be is composite and is made up of what underlies and a priva­tion. In doing so, I clarify how the concept of accidentality as used in his solution should be understood in relation to the composite nature of what comes to be. I also suggest an explanation of why Aristotle’s discus­sion (...) of the Eleatic dilemma in Physics I.8, unlike his discussion in the previous chapter, is not clear. (shrink)

In Kafka’s unfinished story, The Burrow, an unidentified subterranean creature struggles while digging in a burrow, constantly engulfed in anxiety for potential intruders. His obsessive anxiety starts to be materialised in his hearing of a noise everywhere and at constant intensity. Incessantly speculating the cause of this noise, his dreadful imagination first finds it as a swarm of small fries, eventually growing into a single gigantic monster threatening his burrow, as if desiring an irresistible entity that goes beyond the idea (...) of the individual. Inspired by this story of a creature suffocating from his lonesome effort of nesting, this paper discusses how an individual sensation of dread could potentially transcend to an ability to imagine social totality, drawing on the philosophical readings of Kafka’s other character Odradek by Benjamin and Adorno. I further argue that this process is aesthetic, correlating Freud’s idea of the uncanny with Adorno’s theory of aesthetic experience which examine the negotiation between individuation and socialisation in an experience of desubjectification. By sketching out the anxious hearing in The Burrow in reference to the disturbing seeing of object-creature Odradek, I discuss the feeling of dread that marks the transformation of individual entities into a transcendent social/collective being. (shrink)

Ancient Philosophy Today, Volume 4, Issue 2, Page 241-247, October, 2022.

"El amor en su singularidad erótica es tratado en esta obra desde el auspicio de la poesía y la filosofía, las cuales nos llevan de la mano a los desolados parajes del mundo biológico-psíquico para retener aquello de lo que "no se puede decir nada". Aun así, no es éste un intento de explicar fenomenológicamente el amor, sino una modesta evocación de los momentos y comportamientos humanos en su tránsito hacia el Eros y la experiencia que de ellos se ha (...) obtenido."-- Cubierta trasera. (shrink)

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

Maquiavelo y su tiempo.--Reacción de algunos escritores españoles de los siglos XVII y XVIII ante la doctrina de Maquiavelo.--El maquiavelismo y las prácticas de gobierno.

Planteamiento de la naturaleza, de la filosof a y de su raz n hist rica, al contemplar panor micamente la totalidad de su pasado e intentar reconstruir el dram tico suceso de su origen.

DICTIONARY OF SPANISH VERBS WITH THEIR ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS AND MODELS OF CONJUGATION/DICCIONARIO CON LOS VERBOS EN ESPAÑOL, SU TRADUCCIÓN AL INGLÉS Y CONJUGACIONES.

1. Escritos doctrinales -- 2. Escritos histórico-filosóficos.

Appearing in English for the first time, this book comprises two of Ortega’s most important works, ¿Qué es conocimiento? and the essay “Ideas y creencias.” This is Ortega’s attempt to systematically present the foundations of his metaphysics of human life and, on that basis, to provide a radical philosophical account of knowledge. In so doing, he criticizes idealism and overcomes it. Accordingly, this book goes well beyond a treatise on epistemology; in fact, as understood in modern philosophy, this discipline and (...) its questions are shown to be derivative and, in that sense, they are transcended here by Ortega’s systematic effort. -/- Written during the time of his maturity, these works are representative of his fruitful and radical period. Both ¿Qué es conocimiento? and “Ideas y creencias” are equally decisive not only for the understanding and radical completion of Ortega’s work, but also for their relevance to the work of continental philosophers during the same period and for years to come (e.g., Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and others). (shrink)

The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines the Abhidhamma perspective on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which provides the ontological foundation for Abhidhamma philosophy. (The dhamma theory is an Abhidhammic innovation that gives an overview of the bare phenomenon that form this world; it's a theory of real existents.) He then explains the category of "the conceptual" as the Abhidhamma's answer to the objects of common-sense realism. Among the other topics discussed (...) are the theory of double truth (ultimate and conceptual truth), the analysis of mind, the theory of cognition, the analysis of matter, the nature of time and space, the theory of momentary being, and conditional relations. The volume concludes with an appendix that examines why the Theravāda came to be known as Vibhajjavāda, "the doctrine of analysis." Not limiting himself to abstract analysis, Karunadasa draws out the Abhidhamma's underlying premises and purposes--the Abhidhamma provides a detailed description of reality in order to identify all sources of suffering and thereby point to a complete cure for the problem of suffering. (shrink)

I. El hombre y la epoca.--II. Las doctrinas.--III. Notas. Apendices. Bibliografía.

I. El destino del normativismo en la ciencia jurídica contemporanea.--II. El fundamento de la seguridad social.

Sosyal bilimsel yaklaşımlar önemli ölçüde kültürel ayrımlara ve varsayımlara, kültürel ayrımlar ise örtük bir zaman tasavvuruna bağlıdır. Kültürün bir bileşeni olan zaman, gerçekliğin toplumsal ve tarihsel inşası sürecine dahildir. Toplumsal/tarihsel gerçekliğin incelenmesi adeta toplumun kurumsallaşmış unsurlarından biri olan zamanın da incelenmesini gerekli kılar. Kültürelci yaklaşımlarda zaman konusu bilhassa tarihselcilik ve eleştirisi bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Tarihselciliği eleştiren ve buna alternatif teşkil eden yaklaşımlar da zaman tasavvuru ve bunun seçilen yönteme etkisi bakımından tarihselciliğin bazı ön kabullerini paylaşmaktadır. Bu alternatifler modernist sosyal bilimlerin (...) zaman algısına yönelik esaslı bir sorgulamadan uzaktır. Postmodernist sosyal bilimlerdeki mekân vurgusu ise ötekini ortak bir insanlık zamanının dışında konumlandırmaya dönük modernist varsayımın izlerini taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma zaman tasavvurunun sosyal bilimsel yönteme yansımalarına ve kültürel taksonominin zamanla ilişkisine dair eleştirel/anlayıcı bir perspektif sunmak ve yöntembilim tartışmalarında eksik kalan bu boyuta katkı sağlamak amacındadır. (shrink)