4 found
Order:
  1.  57
    Satisficing Revisited.Michael A. Goodrich, Wynn C. Stirling & Erwin R. Boer - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):79-109.
    In the debate between simple inference heuristics and complex decision mechanisms, we take a position squarely in the middle. A decision making process that extends to both naturalistic and novel settings should extend beyond the confines of this debate; both simple heuristics and complex mechanisms are cognitive skills adapted to and appropriate for some circumstances but not for others. Rather than ask `Which skill is better?'' it is often more important to ask `When is a skill justified?'' The selection and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  37
    Satisficing, Preferences, and Social Interaction: A New Perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.
    Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  65
    Games Machines Play.Wynn C. Stirling - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):327-352.
    Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a well-defined notion of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  9
    Coordinated Rational Choice.Luca Tummolini & Wynn C. Stirling - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):317-327.
    When acting in social contexts, we are often able to voluntarily coordinate our choices with one another. It has been suggested that this ability relies on the adoption of preferences that transcend those of the individuals involved in the social interaction. Conditional game theory provides a formal framework that facilitates the study of coordinated rational choice in a way that disentangles the concepts of individual preference and group agency. We argue that these concepts are complementary: individual preferences are formed in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark