Results for 'Wldzimierz Rabinowicz'

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  1.  12
    Odds and Ends: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday.Sten Lindström, Wldzimierz Rabinowicz, Jan Österberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.) - 1996 - Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
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  2. In so Many Words Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Sven Danielsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday.Sven Danielsson & Wldzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Philosophical Society and the Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Uppsala.
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  3.  23
    Value Based on Preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):1.
    What distinguishes preference utilitarianism from other utilitarian positions is the axiological component: the view concerning what is intrinsically valuable. According to PU, intrinsic value is based on preferences. Intrinsically valuable states are connected to our preferences being satisfied.
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  4.  51
    II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33-51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  5.  45
    To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
  6.  84
    The strike of the demon: On fitting pro‐attitudes and value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
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  7.  27
    Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
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  8.  25
    To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions (...)
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  9.  14
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  10.  17
    The puzzle of the hats.Rabinowicz Wlodek & Bovens Luc - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):57-78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  11.  12
    Some remarks about the family "K" of modal systems.Włodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1980 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21:429-448.
  12.  5
    Values Compared.Włodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):73-96.
    Gert (2004) has suggested that several different types of value relations, including parity, can be clearly distinguished from each other if one interprets value comparisons as normative assessments of preference, while allowing for two levels of normativity - requirement and permission. While this basic idea is attractive, the particular modeling Gert makes use of is flawed. This paper presents an alternative modeling, developed in Rabinowicz (2008), and a general taxonomy of binary value relations. Another version of value analysis is (...)
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  13.  51
    A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  14.  2
    Ryberg’s Doubts About Higher and Lower Pleasures –Put to Rest?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):231 - 237.
  15.  20
    Letters From Long Ago: On Causal Decision Theory and Centered Chances.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - In Johansson Lars-Göran (ed.), Logic, Ethics, and All That Jazz - Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. pp. 247 - 273.
    This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights (...)
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  16.  21
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely (...)
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  17.  90
    A Simpler, More Compelling Money Pump with Foresight.Johan E. Gustafsson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (10):578-589.
    One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago by the discovery of a money pump with foresight, which works against agents who use backward induction. But backward induction implausibly assumes that the agent would act rationally and retain her trust in her future rationality even at choice nodes that could only be reached if she were to act irrationally. This worry does not apply to (...)
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  18.  14
    Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
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  19.  8
    In memoriam: Jordan Howard Sobel (1929–2010).Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):192-196.
    It's an obituary of Jordan Howard Sobel, a prominent American-Canadian moral philosopher and a decision theorist who died in 2010. The obituary focuses on Sobels' close contacts with the Swedish philosophical community and on his contributions to Theoria.
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  20. The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretetation.Rabinowicz Wlodek & Lina Ericsson - 2012 - Synthese.
    in Undetermined On an influential interpretation, the agent's degrees of belief asr identified with her betting rates. However, being placed in a betting situation can itself change one’s degree of belief in the proposition in question. The problem as such isn’t new. Ramsey, for example, was right on to this idea when he wrote: "… the proposal of a bet may inevitably alter [one’s] state of opinion; just as we could not always measure electric intensity by actually introducing a charge (...)
     
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  21.  16
    Safeguards of a Disunified Mind.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):356-383.
    The papers focuses on pragmatic arguments for various rationality constraints on a decision maker’s state of mind: on her beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind typically targets constraint violations. It purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be confronted with a decision problem in which she will act to her guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, she can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent herself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of (...)
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  22.  7
    Ratificationism without ratification: Jeffrey meets Savage.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (2):171-200.
  23.  52
    Prioritarianism for Prospects.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):2-21.
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli's hypothesis’ according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this result appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to the (...)
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  24. Levi on money pumps and diachronic dutch books.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper's focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic (...)
     
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  25. Value taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives From Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociolog. Oxford University Press. pp. 23-42.
    The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably (...)
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  26.  20
    Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.
    Free will is widely thought to require (i) the possibility of acting otherwise and (ii) the intentional endorsement of one’s actions (“indeterministic picking is not enough”). According to (i), a necessary condition for free will is agential-level indeterminism: at some points in time, an agent’s prior history admits more than one possible continuation. According to (ii), however, a free action must be intentionally endorsed, and indeterminism may threaten freedom: if several alternative actions could each have been actualized, then none of (...)
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  27.  24
    Betting Interpretation and the Problem of Interference.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Lina Eriksson - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:103-115.
    It has long been common to identify an agent’s degrees of belief with her betting rates. Here is this betting interpretation in a nutshell: A bet on a proposition A with price C and a non-zero stake S is said to be fair for an agent iff the latter is willing to take each side of the bet, to buy the bet as to sell it. Assuming that such a bet on A exists and that the C/S ratio is constant (...)
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  28.  66
    Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion.Alan Hájek & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):897-919.
    Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximation to better, worse, and equally good, which we (...)
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  29.  10
    Value relations: old wine in new barrels.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - In .
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, (...)
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  30.  4
    Value relations: old wine in new barrels.Rabinowicz Wlodek - 2011 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, (...)
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  31.  32
    Broome and the intuition of neutrality.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.
    In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra people at (...)
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  32. Incommensurability and vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’ analysis of value.
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  33.  8
    Intuitionistic truth.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (2):191 - 228.
  34.  6
    Act-utilitarian prisoner's dilemmas.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Theoria 55 (1):1-44.
  35.  22
    Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen on Schroeder.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2012 - Ethics at PEA Soup.
    Invited Critical Précis of Mark Schroeder’s “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons”.
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  36.  42
    Millian superiorities.Gustaf Arrenhuis & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The (...)
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  37.  11
    Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
    According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude – a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, in this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e., to con-attitudes. For a history (...)
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  38.  15
    Actual truth, possible knowledge.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Krister Segerberg - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):101-115.
    The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (= Truth implies knowability) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington''s suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds (...)
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  39.  17
    Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: a rejoinder to Seidenfeld.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to (...)
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  40.  14
    Stable and retrievable options.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):624-641.
    An option available to an agent is stable if it maximizes expected utility on the hypothetical assumption that the agent is going to choose it. As is well known, some decision problems lack a stable solution. Paul Weirich (1986 and 1988) has recently proposed a decision principle which prescribes that the option chosen should be at least weakly stable--or "weakly ratifiable", to use his terminology. According to him, full stability is an excessively strong demand. I shall argue that Weirich's proposal (...)
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  41.  28
    Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
    In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of ‘better’, ‘worse’, ‘equally as good as’ and ‘incomparable in value’. Unfortunately, the approach (...)
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  42.  24
    Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 213--226.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value , which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  43.  13
    The Size of Inequality and Its Badness – Some Reflections around Temkin’s “Inequality”.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Theoria 69 (1-2):60-84.
    This paper puts forward the following claims: (i) The size of inequality in welfare should be distinguished from its badness. (ii) The size of a pairwise inequality between two individuals can be measured by the absolute or the relative welfare distance between their welfare levels, but it does not depend on the welfare levels of other individuals. (iii) The size of inequality in a social state may be understood either as the degree of pairwise inequality or as its amount. (iv) (...)
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  44.  7
    Relacje Wartości.Włodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Etyka 42:85-120.
    W artykule przedstawiam ogólne ujęcie relacji wartości. Jako punkt wyjścia przyjmuję szczególny typ relacji wartości, równorzędność, stanowiącą zdaniem Ruth Chang pewną postać porównywalności wartości, która rożni się od trzech standardowych postaci porównywalności: lepszości, gorszości i równowartości. Joshua Gert zasugerował niedawno, iż pojęcie równorzędności można wyjaśnić, jeśli porównania wartości zinterpretuje się jako normatywne oceny preferencji. Chociaż podstawowa idea przyświecająca Gertowi jest atrakcyjna, sposób w jaki ją rozwija jest błędny. Jego model wartości sformułowany w kategoriach dopuszczalnych sił preferencji jest nieadekwatny. Zamiast tego (...)
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  45.  9
    Discussion – Ryberg's doubts about higher and lower pleasures – put to rest?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):231-235.
  46. .Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016
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  47.  13
    Letters from long ago: on causal decision theory and centered chances.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown - In .
    This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights (...)
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  48.  3
    Hare on prudence.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Theoria 55 (3):145-151.
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  49.  7
    Prioritarianism and uncertainty: on the interpersonal addition theorem and the priority view.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Dan Egonsson (ed.), Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values. Ashgate. pp. 139-165.
    I begin, in section 1, with a presentation of the Interpersonal Addition Theorem. The theorem, due to John Broome (1991), is a re-formulation of the classical result by Harsanyi (1955). It implies that, given some seemingly mild assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be seen as the sum of its individual utilities. In sections 1 and 2, I discuss the theorem's connection with utilitarianism and in particular consider its implications for the Priority View, according to which benefits (...)
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  50. Modernizm rosyjski - między dwiema otchłaniami (Świat od końca i świat od początku po jednym biegnące torze).Wadim Rabinowicz - 1999 - Humanistyka I Przyrodoznawstwo 5.
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