I propose that a logical formalization of a natural language text may be regarded as adequate if the following three groups of beliefs can be integrated into a wide reflective equilibrium: our initial, spontaneous beliefs about the structure and logical quality of the text; our beliefs about its structure and logical quality as reflected in the proposed formalization, and our background beliefs about the original text’s author, his thought and other contextually relevant factors. Unlike a good part of the literature, (...) I stress the indispensable role of initial beliefs in achieving such a wide reflective equilibrium. In the final sections I show that my approach does not succumb to undue subjectivism or the mere perpetuation of prejudice. The examples I use to illustrate my claims are chiefly taken from Anselm’s Proslogion 2–3 and the various attempts to formalize these texts. (shrink)

It is controversial whether ”Christian Philosophy’ is a useful or even consistent notion. After providing some historical background to the problem, I will distinguish and explicate two possible understandings of ”Christian Philosophy’ which should be kept apart: a ”Thomistic’ and an ”Augustinian’ one, of which the latter has garnered more attention in the recent literature. A sketch of the most prominent current ”Augustinian’ position leads to some considerations for why a ”Thomistic’ understanding of ”Christian Philosophy’ has more to recommend it, (...) if the term is regarded as useful at all. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a moderately cognitive account of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are interpreted as “worldview beliefs”, which I explicate as being indispensable to our everyday and scientific practice; my reading is nonetheless distinct from non-cognitivist readings of “worldview belief” which occasionally appear in the literature. I start with a brief analysis of a recent German contribution to the debate which on the one hand insists on the priority of epistemic reasons for or against religious beliefs, but on (...) the other hand contends that religious beliefs are worldview beliefs. This leads me to explicate a special sense of worldview beliefs, as well as their cognitive role. After that, I shed some light on a special epistemological characteristic of worldview beliefs, namely the strong involvement of “free certitude” in their acceptance. I explore the implications for the possible role of arguments for worldview beliefs, especially for worldview beliefs concerning theism. (shrink)

This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term "to know" vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may "epistemic virtues" play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? What is the structure and significance of testimonial knowledge and (...) belief? And when is disagreement rational, especially if it occurs among "epistemic peers"? In addition, a section is devoted to novel discussions of the work of Wittgenstein. Papers by A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, W. Davis, C. Elgin, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, A. Kemmerling, H. Kornblith, M. Solomon, M. Williams, and many others. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays in systematic ontology. The parts of its title Things and Ways They Are are indicative of two broadly and intensively discussed issues in current ontology, namely, what categories of entities there are and in what ways they are relevant for our discourses. The three sections of the volume correspond to focuses of ontological research: Before Ontology is dedicated to conceptual, methodological, and meta-ontological issues; Ontology at Work raises general topics of categorial ontology, and (...) the final section Ontology in Application discusses questions such as those relating to free will and our conception of the human being. The book is a tribute to Edmund Runggaldier on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Its seventeen papers are authored by such distinguished scholars as Lynne Rudder Baker, Franz von Kutschera, E. J. Lowe, Otto Muck, Paul Weingartner, Timothy Williamson, and many others.". (shrink)

Die Beziehungen zwischen analytischer Philosophie und Armut sind ein Thema, dessen Existenz und Relevanz sich nicht auf den ersten Blick erschließen: Ein kanonisches Thema analytischer Philosophie ist ›Armut‹ nicht, am ehesten kommt sie noch als Seitenaspekt der Gerechtigkeitsthematik zur Sprache. Wenn Internetrecherchen sehr bald auch David Papineaus Antrittsvorlesung »The Poverty of Analysis« empfehlen, dann scheint es prima facie nicht allzu viel Einschlägiges zu geben. Für die analytische Philosophie – die überdies ihre Schwerpunkte eher im theoretisch-philosophischen Bereich hat – scheint nochmals (...) verstärkt das zu gelten, was für die Philosophie im Allgemeinen gilt : Gemessen am offensichtlichen sozialen und politischen Problemdruck in vielen Weltgegenden ist Armut bislang ein merkwürdig randständiges Thema, sogar in der politischen Philosophie. Entgegen diesem ersten Eindruck soll in diesem Kapitel gezeigt werden, dass die analytische Philosophie auf die gegenwärtigen Ansätze zur Philosophie der Armut de facto erheblichen Einfluss hatte, und dass sie auch pro futuro einiges Potenzial für sie bergen würde. (shrink)

The paper has two main tasks: to trace the systematic connections between two recent pieces of epistemological work by David Henderson and Terry Horgan, and to criticize as unintelligible the concept of epistemically relevant possible worlds, which is central to one of them. Iceberg Epistemology sketches a general account of the structure of our cognitive organisation, which can, by and large, be classified as an externalist, reliabilist account. I argue that Henderson & Horgan's new objective epistemic value (labelled robustness of (...) reliability and loosely defined as reliability across a wide range of epistemically relevant possible worlds) is introduced to clarify the connection between reliability and the ideal of truth (and by that to remedy a standard shortcoming of externalist accounts). However, the concept of an epistemically relevant possible world seems to be unintelligible (at least on the basis of the introductory examples offered so far). Some concluding remarks address the status and the achievability of robustness of reliability as an epistemic ideal. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 5 Seiten: 994-1000.

Otto Muck (*1928) verbindet in seinem Denken analytische Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie mit bleibend gultigen Einsichten der aristotelisch-scholastischen und transzendentalphilosophischen Traditionen. Zentral ist dabei eine integrative Konzeption von Metaphysik: Metaphysik erstellt keine Zusatz- oder Alternativtheorien zu anderen Wissenschaften, sondern expliziert den fundamentalen kategorialen Rahmen, in dem speziellere wissenschaftliche Begrifflichkeiten und Theorieansatze konstituiert werden und ihre Problemlosungsfahigkeit entfalten. Die Essays in diesem Band widmen sich auch Mucks Wahrheitsauffassung, der Rolle von Retorsionsargumenten, seiner Konzeption von wissenschaftlichen und weltanschaulichen Erklarungen sowie theologischen Anwendungen seines (...) Denkens. Beitrage von E. Runggaldier, C. Kanzian, H. Weidemann, G. Siegwart, W. Loffler, H.-D. Mutschler und N. Wandinger.". (shrink)

From cosmology to the fact that the existence of God and nature, to address these issues, the development of two kinds of controversial contemporary line of argument, I compared and assessed in this paper: the physical cosmology as a starting argument and the natural design as a starting point of the argument. I made ​​some preliminary assessment of the court. The results showed that the Big Bang argument are quite reasonable, however, found the natural design of the demonstration clearly insufficient. (...) I compare and evaluate two contemporary and controversial lines of argument from cosmological facts to the existence and nature of God: the argument from physical cosmology and the argument from design in nature. As a preliminary step, some criteria for such an evaluation are proposed. It turns out that the Big Bang argument keeps considerable plausibility , whereas the Design argument can be shown to be deficient. (shrink)