13 found
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William W. Taschek [13]William Walter Taschek [1]
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William Taschek
Ohio State University
  1. Truth, assertion, and the horizontal: Frege on "the essence of logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "My Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...)
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  2. Institutionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command.Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):74.
  3. On Ascribing Beliefs.William W. Taschek - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (7):323-353.
  4. Belief, substitution, and logical structure.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):71-95.
  5. Frege's puzzle, sense, and information content.William W. Taschek - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):767-791.
  6. Content, character, and cognitive significance.William W. Taschek - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (2):161--189.
  7.  69
    Referring to Oneself.William W. Taschek - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):629 - 652.
    In her influential paper, ‘The First Person,’ Elizabeth Anscombe brings together a number of considerations which, she believes, lead to the startling conclusion that the first person pronoun is not a referring expression — that ‘I’ is never used to refer. This is startling, because if we consider even superficially the logical properties of first person statements, nothing could, prima facie, seem more obvious than that in any such statement, the first person pronoun functions logically as a singular referring expression. (...)
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  8.  44
    On Belief Content and That-Clauses.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):274-298.
    This paper is about the relations between the contents of our beliefs and the contents of the sentences used in the that‐clauses of our belief ascriptions. Loar has argued that any inference from sameness or difference of correct belief ascription to sameness or difference of belief content is illegitimate. In contrast, I defend a requirement (the Logic Requirement) that the logical properties of the sentence embedded in a belief ascription should, on that occasion of use, match the logical properties of (...)
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  9.  20
    Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: the Theory of Cognitive.William W. Taschek - 1992 - The Monist 75 (4).
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  10.  80
    Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects. [REVIEW]William W. Taschek - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):608-611.
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  11.  33
    Thought and Reference by Kent Bach. [REVIEW]William W. Taschek - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):38-45.
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  12.  52
    Context and Content. [REVIEW]William W. Taschek - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):98-108.
  13.  25
    Review of Petr Kotatko , Peter Pagin, Gabriel Segal (eds.), Interpreting Davidson[REVIEW]William W. Taschek - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6).