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William S. Robinson [73]William Spencer Robinson [2]
  1. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness.William S. Robinson - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities such as colours, sounds and odours to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. This (...)
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  2. Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  3.  83
    Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification.William S. Robinson - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):185-192.
    This article defends epiphenomenalism against criticisms raised in Dwayne Moore’s “On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection”.
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  4. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness.William S. Robinson - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):142-144.
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  5. Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think (...)
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  6.  16
    "Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's" Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms".William S. Robinson - 1985 - Behaviorism 13 (2):157-162.
  7.  31
    A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
  8.  2
    Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal Conditions.William Spencer Robinson - 1988 - Temple University Press.
  9. Causation, Sensations, and Knowledge.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Mind 91 (October):524-40.
  10. Knowing Epiphenomena.William S. Robinson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.
    This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things.
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  11.  10
    Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic ‘what it is like’ to think (...)
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  12. Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman's Critique. [REVIEW]William S. Robinson - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.
    Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...)
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  13. Zooming in on Downward Causation.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):117-136.
    . An attempt is made to identify a concept of ‘downward causation’ that will fit the claims of some recent writers and apply to interesting cases in biology and cognitive theory, but not to trivial cases. After noting some difficulties in achieving this task, it is proposed that in interesting cases commonly used to illustrate ‘downward causation’, (a) regularities hold between multiply realizable properties and (b) the explanation of the parallel regularity at the level of the realizing properties is non-trivial. (...)
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  14. Epiphenomenal Mind: An Integrated Outlook on Sensations, Beliefs, and Pleasure.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Routledge.
    According to epiphenomenalism, our behavior is caused by events in our brains that also cause our mentality. This resulting mentality reflects our brains¿ organization, but does not in turn cause anything. This book defends an epiphenomenalist account of philosophy of mind. It builds on the author¿s previous work by moving beyond a discussion of sensations to apply an epiphenomenalist outlook to other aspects of mental causation such as beliefs, desires, pleasure, and displeasure. The first four chapters of the book argue (...)
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  15.  44
    States and Beliefs.William S. Robinson - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):33-51.
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  16.  69
    The Hardness of the Hard Problem.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25.
    This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly developed representative version of relational theory and explain why (...)
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  17. The Legend of the Given.William S. Robinson - 1975 - In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill.
     
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  18.  34
    Computers, Minds, and Robots.William S. Robinson - 1992 - Temple University Press.
    Discusses the problems that surround the developing science of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This title introduces and clarifies the basic concepts for understanding these problems and also discusses opposing views and possible solutions. It describes the kinds of research that seem to improve our understanding of the mechanisms of intelligence.
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  19.  36
    Toward Eliminating Churchland’s Eliminationism.William S. Robinson - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):60-67.
  20.  18
    Toward Eliminating Churchland’s Eliminationism.William S. Robinson - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):61-68.
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  21.  82
    What is It Like to Like?William S. Robinson - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.
    The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought (...)
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  22.  7
    Dis-Illusioning Experiences.William S. Robinson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    In his defense of Illusionism, D. Pereboom quotes S. Shoemaker as finding it mysterious how we can represent properties that are nowhere instantiated in our world. This paper begins by detailing the problem, clarifying its relation to Illusionism, and explaining the inadequacy of Pereboom’s response. It then examines papers by K. Frankish and F. Kammerer, and finds that they face the same problem. With this background, it becomes plausible that representation of uninstantiated properties is an endemic problem for illusionism. Responding (...)
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  23.  12
    Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology.William S. Robinson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-187.
  24.  13
    Brains and People.William S. Robinson - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):101-104.
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  25.  71
    Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense.William S. Robinson - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71.
    In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
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  26.  59
    Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.
    Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for (...)
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  27. Perception, Affect and Epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's.William S. Robinson - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
    This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
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  28.  22
    James’s Evolutionary Argument.William S. Robinson - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (39):229-237.
    This paper is a commentary on Joseph Corabi’s “The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument”, this Journal, vol. VI, No. 39; pp. 199-227. It defends William James’s formulation of the evolutionary argument against charges such as mishandling of evidence. Although there are ways of attacking James’s argument, it remains formidable, and Corabi’s suggested revision is not an improvement on James’s statement of it.
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  29.  56
    Ascription, Intentionality and Understanding.William S. Robinson - 1986 - The Monist 69 (4):584-597.
    The three terms of my title are connected in an interesting and mutually illuminating way. To exhibit this connection I shall first state a view about our ascriptions of psychological states. I shall then make use of this view in sketching an account of intentionality. Defending this account will require us to envisage a certain kind of involvement in linguistic practice. This involvement is related to historical understanding and to the view that this must be contrasted with explanation. In my (...)
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  30. Colors, Arousal, Functionalism, and Individual Differences.William S. Robinson - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
    Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper examines three experiments, two of which apparently offer support for the view. It argues that careful consideration of these experiments undermines this appearance of (...)
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  31. Qualia Realism.William S. Robinson - 2000 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
  32.  23
    A Few Thoughts Too Many?William S. Robinson - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  33. Penrose and Mathematical Ability.William S. Robinson - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):80-88.
  34. Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Vive la Difference!William S. Robinson - manuscript
     
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  35.  60
    Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.
    Philip Pettit has advocated a “looks as powers” theory as an alternative to theories that rely on instances of qualia in their account of looking red. Andy Clark has offered a similar view. If these accounts are successful, the Hard Problem is moribund. This paper asks how red comes into cases of something’s looking red to someone. A likely suggestion leads to a conundrum for LAPT: the physical complexity that it attributes to the property red is not evident in experience, (...)
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  36.  40
    Papineau's Conceptual Dualism and the Distinctness Intuition.William S. Robinson - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):319-333.
    As part of a defense of a physicalist view of experiences, David Papineau has offered an explanation for the intuition that properties found in experiences are distinct from neural properties. After providing some necessary background, I argue that Papineau’s explanation is not the best explanation of the distinctness intuition. An alternative explanation that is compatible with dualism is offered. Unlike Papineau’s explanation, this alternative does not require us to suppose that the distinctness intuition rests on fallacious reasoning. Relations of the (...)
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  37. Could a Robot Be Qualitatively Conscious?William S. Robinson - 1998 - Aisb 99:13-18.
     
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  38. 8 Evolution and Self-Evidence.William S. Robinson - 1999 - In Philip R. Loockvane (ed.), The Nature of Concepts: Evolution, Structure, and Representation. Routledge. pp. 168.
     
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  39. Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's: "Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms".William S. Robinson - 1985 - Behavior and Philosophy 13 (2):157.
     
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  40. Judgments involving identification.William S. Robinson - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):206.
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  41. Philosophy: The Basic Issues, Klemke.William S. Robinson - 1982 - New York: St Martin's Press.
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  42. Representation and Cognitive Explanation.William S. Robinson - 1999 - In Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality, Riegler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
  43. Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality, Riegler.William S. Robinson - 1999 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
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  44. Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia.William S. Robinson - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):151-64.
  45.  31
    Concept Acquisition and Experiential Change.William S. Robinson - 2014 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9.
    Many have held the Acquisition of Concepts Thesis that concept acquisition can change perceptual experience. This paper explains the close relation of ACT to ADT, the thesis that acquisition of dispositions to quickly and reliably recognize a kind of thing can change perceptual experience. It then states a highly developed argument given by Siegel which, if successful, would offer strong support for ADT and indirect support for ACT. Examination of this argument, however, reveals difficulties that undermine its promise. Distinctions made (...)
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  46. Dretske's Etiological View.William S. Robinson - 1983 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 9:23-29.
  47.  37
    Philosophy’s Second Revolution.William S. Robinson - 1999 - Teaching Philosophy 22 (1):88-91.
  48. Sellarsian Materialism.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (June):212-27.
    Wilfrid Sellars has proposed a materialist account of sensation which relies in part on the postulation of special kinds of individuals. This postulational strategy appears to be analogous to the one that introduces such entities as electrons. After setting out Sellars' account, I focus on his application of the postulational strategy. I argue that this application requires the discovery of new effects for familiar properties; that this kind of discovery is disanalogous to what postulation usually does; and that this kind (...)
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  49.  27
    Le dualisme conceptuel et l'intuition de la distinction chez David Papineau.William S. Robinson - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):319-333.
    Défendant le point de vue physicaliste de l’expérience, David Papineau propose une explication à l’intuition que les propriétés contenues dans les expériences se distinguent des propriétés nerveuses. Après avoir présenté quelques éléments de contexte, je soutiens que l’hypothèse de Papineau n’est pas la meilleure pour expliquer l’intuition de la distinction. Il existe une explication alternative, compatible avec le dualisme. A la différence de celle de Papineau, cette explication ne demande pas de supposer que l’intuition de la distinction soit fondée sur (...)
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  50.  44
    Qualia Realism and Neural Activation Patterns.William S. Robinson - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):65-80.
    A thought experiment focuses attention on the kinds of commonalities and differences to be found in two small parts of visual cortical areas during responses to stimuli that are either identical in quality, but different in location, or identical in location and different only in the one visible property of colour. Reflection on this thought experiment leads to the view that patterns of neural activation are the best candidates for causes of qualitatively conscious events . This view faces a strong (...)
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