In what, if any sense are our torts and our breaches of contract 'wrongs'? These two branches of private law have for centuries provided philosophers and jurists with grounds for puzzlement and this book provides both an outline of, and intervention in, contemporary jurisprudential debates about the nature and foundation of liability in private law.

This is the first book that attempts to analyze and define the metholodology and values of contemporary accounts of adjudication, which can be divided into orthodox philosophies on the one hand and heretical accounts on the other. The author offers an incisive and original analysis of how these supposedly incompatible accounts actually differ.

This essay addresses a version of Jerome Frank’s question – ‘Are Judges Human?’ – asking instead: are human judges necessary? It begins, in section II, by outlining the technological developments which inform the view that they are not and critically evaluates the juristic position that seemingly endorses it. That position is labelled ‘technological evangelism’ and it consists of three claims about law and adjudication: the certainty, determinacy and partiality claims. Section III shows that these three claims are utterly incompatible with (...) what it calls standard and non-standard views of adjudication and law, while section IV considers some ways in which proponents of technological evangelism might try to reject standard and non-standard views. That section concludes that no plausible efforts have so far been made by technological evangelists to reject standard and non-standard views, and that those views therefore maintain their existing explanatory and normative priority. The overall conclusion of the essay is that technological evangelism is not a critical explanatory and normative engagement with law and adjudication as we know them, but an effort to replace them: not a game-changing intervention, but a game-ending one. (shrink)

This article tackles two issues: the nature of law's judgment and what, if anything, might be said in its favour. As to the first issue, the article reminds lawyers of the obvious, namely, that law's judgment is abstract, elucidating both what this entails and why it may be thought problematic. The main burden of the article is to consider what might be said in favour of law's abstract judgment. Only one family of arguments, part of a wider but still not (...) all-encompassing class, are considered here: arguments from the rule of law ideal. Three different arguments from the rule of law are examined, the conclusion being that two of three cannot provide unproblematic and unambiguous support for law's abstract judgment. (shrink)

EspañolLa iconografía de los tribunales de todo el mundo está dominada por la imagen de la Justicia. Casi invariablemente sostiene balanzas y una espada y a menudo tiene los ojos vendados porque, por supuesto, la justicia es ciega. Pero no del todo. Cuando nosotros, los destinatarios de la ley, nos encontramos en la sala del tribunal frente a la sentencia, o leemos el copioso y complejo cuerpo de "lo que se debe y lo que no se debe hacer" en materia (...) jurídica según la legislación, en las sentencias judiciales y en nuestros libros de texto jurídicos, una cosa se hace evidente: la ley no está interesada en todos los aspectos de nuestro carácter, nuestra conducta y nuestro contexto.InglésCourthouse iconography around the world is dominated by the image of Justitia. She almost invariably holds scales and a sword and she is often blindfolded because, of course, justice is blind. But not quite. Or so I argue in Law’s Judgement. For when we —the addressees of the law— stand in the court room facing judgement, or read the copious and complex body of juristic ‘do’s and don’ts’ we find in statutes, court judgements and in our legal textbooks, one thing becomes obvious: the law is certainly not interested in every aspect of our character, conduct and context.FrancésL'iconographie des tribunaux du monde entier est dominée par l'image de la justice. Presque invariablement, elle tient une balance et une épée et a souvent les yeux bandés parce que, bien sûr, on sait que la justice est aveugle, mais pas tout à fait. Lorsque nous, les destinataires de la loi, nous trouvons dans la salle d'audience face à la sentence, ou lisons le corpus copieux et complexe de "ce qui devrait être fait et ce qui ne devrait pas être fait" en matière juridique selon la législation, chez les décisions de justice et de nos manuels juridiques, une chose devient claire : la loi ne concerne pas tous les aspects de notre caractère, de notre conduite ni de notre contexte.PortuguésA iconografia dos tribunais do mundo todo é dominada pela imagem da Justiça. Quase invariavelmente, ele segura uma balança e uma espada e, muitas vezes, está com os olhos vendados porque, é claro que a justiça é cega, mas não exatamente. Quando nós, destinatários da lei, nos encontramos na sala do tribunal face à sentença, ou lemos o copioso e complexo corpo do "que deve e o que não deve ser feito" em matéria jurídica de acordo com a legislação, nas decisões judiciais e de nossos livros jurídicos, uma coisa fica clara: a lei não se preocupa com todos os aspectos de nosso caráter, nossa conduta nem nosso contexto.Chino全世界法官的肖像画以正义形象为主导。他几乎总是拿着天平和利剑，而且常常蒙着眼睛，当然因为正义是盲目的，但并不总是如此。当我们（法律的接受者）发现自己面对法庭的判决，或者阅读 法律中有关法律事项如“应该做什么和不应该做什么”的充实而复杂的内容时，从法院的裁决和我们的法律教科书中，有一件事情日趋清楚：法律对我们品格，行为和背景的所有方面都并不感兴趣。. (shrink)

Law's Judgement elucidates and defends a feature of contemporary law that is currently either overlooked or too glibly dismissed as morally troublesome or historically anachronistic. That feature is the abstract nature of law's judgement and its three components show that, when law judges us, it often does so in ignorance of our particular characters and abilities, on the one hand, and in ignorance of our context and circumstances, on the other. Law's judgement is thus insensitive to all or much that (...) makes us the particular people we are. The book explores various connections between this mode of judgement and some of our most important legal and political values. It shows that law's abstract judgement is closely related to important juristic conceptions of personhood, responsibility and impartiality, and that these notions are not without moral significance. The book also examines the connections between modern law's judgement and three of our most important political values, namely, dignity, equality and community. It argues that, if we value particular conceptions of dignity, equality and community, then we must also value law's judgement. Illuminating these connections therefore serves a double purpose: first, it makes a case against those who counsel liberation from law's abstract judgement and, second, it redirects attention to the task of morally evaluating law's abstract judgement in its own terms. (shrink)

Hobbes' philosophy is one of the high points of a century of great philosophical achievement and Leviathan is recognized as one of the great classics of political theory. But the response from Hobbes's contemporaries to his secular analysis of society demonstrated the challenging nature of his ideas. This collection of many of the major contemporary responses to his thought by leading figures, mostly never republished, provides an outstanding source for assessing his immediate impact and the long-term importance of his work.

This review article discusses the various conceptions of the legal person delineated and evaluated in Ngaire Naffine's recent book, Law's Meaning of Life. The article argues that, of the four conceptions Naffine examines, her treatment of one—the rationalist legal person—is perhaps the most problematic. The primary problem is an exaggeration of both the power and range of the rationalist legal person. This problem is not insignificant. However, the book as a whole is a lively and stimulating example of legal philosophy (...) that is engaged with general questions about the nature of law, while also being rooted in historic and contemporary features of particular legal systems. It is a contribution to jurisprudence which both strives to be, and actually succeeds in being, interesting. (shrink)