This wide-ranging anthology of philosophical writings on the concept of God presents a systematic overview of the chief conceptions of deity as well as skeptical and atheistic critiques of theological ideas. The selections cover key philosophic developments in this subject area from ancient times to modern in both the East and West. Editors Hartshorne and Reese-two of the most highly respected scholars in the philosophy of religion-have not only selected many arresting passages from the world's great thinkers but have also (...) analyzed and evaluated the underlying ideas, showing how they fit into major, overarching systems of thought. Part One, "Classical Views," includes passages from ancient Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, and Judeo-Christian scriptures as well as philosophical writings from ancient Greece, the medieval church, and the Enlightenment. Part Two, "Modern Views," considers the ideas of more recent influential thinkers from diverse cultures and philosophical schools: Schelling, Peirce, Whitehead, Schweitzer, Buber, Radhakrishnan, and Watts, among others, are represented and discussed. Part Three, "Skeptical or Atheistic Views: Ancient and Modern," examines various kinds of skepticism and includes selections from Carneades, Buddha, Hume, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Dennes, and Freud. Throughout their presentation the editors analyze and contrast theistic, atheistic, pantheistic, and panentheistic systems of thought. Philosophers Speak of God is a richly varied selection of high-quality writing on a perennial subject that will provide the serious student a thorough foundation in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

First published in 1980, and now substantially revised and enlarged, this panoramic survey of philosophic and religious thought, both ancient and modern, provides access to a wide array of ideas. More than just a dictionary, this well-designed reference work contains analytical commentary and historical accounts on a vast range of topics, select bibliographies attached to many of the entries, and considerable cross-referencing. The cross-references run from philosophic movements, to technical terms, to the positions of individual philosophers, thus encouraging a personal (...) exploration of the themes, movements, and thinkers of any particular school of thought. The end result is a reasonably compact single volume with many of the features of a multivolume encyclopedia. Reese covers both analytic and Continental philosophy, and includes a good deal of the history of philosophy. There are biographical entries for more than 900 ancient, medieval, and modern philosophers, for a total number of entries of over 4000. This new edition expands on the original treatment of religion and Asian philosophy and includes enlarged perspectives on Continental philosophy. Named "Outstanding Reference Work" by the American Library Association, the first edition was a Book-of-the-Month science pick and a selection of the Quality Paperback Book Club. Authoritative, comprehensive, clear, and interesting, The Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion will benefit the nonspecialist and specialist alike. (shrink)

The Companion to Philosophy of Religion consists of seventy-eight newly commissioned essays, each five to eight pages in length on a large page, in eleven parts concerned with: philosophy in the major religions of the world; theology in Western history; twentieth-century currents in philosophy of religion; the linguistic turn; divine attributes ; justification of theistic belief; challenges to theistic belief; theism and modern science; theism and values; theistic doctrines ; and new directions in philosophy of religion. Within any given essay, (...) significant points are cross-referenced to other essays, and, finally, in the bibliographies, to books outside this volume. The title calls the book a companion—a companion, one presumes, to anyone interested in philosophy of religion. Companions are friendly by definition, and often helpful. The front flap says it is a guide. The back cover adds that it is comprehensive and authoritative. Presumably, anyone wishing to go anywhere in the field of philosophy of religion can get there by means of this trustworthy companion and guide. (shrink)

Aaron Gurwitsch's The Field of Consciousness develops with great care a phenomenological "field theory of conscience." The explorations of various aspects of, and approaches to, experience include extensive references to the literature; both mention and use are made of the work of Husserl, James, Piaget, von Ehrenfels, Stumpf, Koffka, Bergson, Ward, G. F. Stout, and Merleau-Ponty. Out of this research a phenomenological basis is provided for the concepts of an objective space, time, and existence. Roman Ingarden's Time and Modes of (...) Being, a translation of part of the first volume of his two-volume Spór o istnienie swiata, published in Polish in 1946-7, is concerned with developing for metaphysical use the concepts of all possible modes of being, once time, space, and individual existence are granted. Gurwitsch and Ingarden use highly sophisticated phenomenological tools originating with Husserl to gain phenomenological and ontological results. Nathan Rotenstreich in Spirit and Man, 1963, uses introspection as his method, accommodating himself to a number of the distinctions of phenomenology, e.g., intentionality; but the puristic stance of the phenomenologist is missing; hence the average number of conclusions per paragraph is notably higher than in either of the other works. Rotenstreich begins with awareness, like Gurwitsch; like Ingarden he discusses modes of being; but his purpose lies in discovering and interrelating the basic themes appropriate to certain conclusions about man's status in and over against the space-time world. (shrink)

The conceptual framework of religion is more like the frame of a picture than the frame of a house; and what goes on within the frame is other than conceptual. This is the hypothesis motivating the analysis which follows. Given the hypothesis, the problem is to conceive what religion is - this other-than-conceptual enterprise which tends to attract conceptual frames. A possible answer is available in Wittgensteinian ‘seeing-as’. A number of philosophers of religion have recently exercised this option. The present (...) paper adds to their work by comparing a number of types of religious seeing-as with the instances of visual ambiguity drawn on by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Recall, if you will, the standard objections to the traditional doctrines. While the most subtle of the competing doctrines is, in my opinion, the Aristotelian and scholastic account of abstraction, the objection to this doctrine is that it requires a realism which is too immediate, so that the forms of one's present state of knowledge are allowed to pass as the forms of nature. And although, as I understand it, Aristotelian mathematics is gained by abstraction from an already fairly abstract (...) matter, one naturally expects in this context one true geometry, rather than alternate geometries. At the same time the strength of this view lies in its confidence that our abstractions must refer to the real world. The defect of the standard Lockian doctrine is that it contains an inner inconsistency, the nature of which we shall notice in due course. And upon application the doctrine explodes at once. On the other hand, the strength of the Lockian doctrine, as well as the doctrine of Berkeley and Hume, lies in its reluctance to allow needless entities entrance into reality. The weakness of the doctrine of Berkeley and Hume is that in moving from the impossible image of Locke's doctrine, the emphasis on particularity requires the agency of custom or habit to join the particulars of sense into classes. But the edges of such classes remain always indefinite. Habit, or custom, would seem not to allow the clean separation of abstractions from each other which the results of intellection give us reason to demand in any adequate doctrine. The weakness of the Kantian doctrine lies in its inability to explicate an antecedent reality; that is, in affirming at last the incognizable thing in itself; while the strength of this doctrine derives from its ability to allow the construction of precise abstractions in a somewhat autonomous manner. (shrink)

If the figure of philosophical sandhogs is appropriately descriptive of this recent work, still one must recognize the manner in which modern philosophers are working away in different caissons; the workers differ in judgment concerning what is hardpan and what bedrock; while some believe only hardpan confronts us all the way down, a philosophic version of the bends would seem not to be uncommon in the analogate. And it is tempting, while possibly not unfair, to think of the linguistic philosopher (...) functioning in the equipment of the skin-diver, boldly setting off destructive charges at the foot of any piling which might be capable of furnishing support to a prospective "metaphysical edifice." Or, more modestly, one might say that whereas both Collins and Tillich are at work on the "foundations of the theory of being" Smart's enterprise, in "a spirit of higher-order neutrality," is directed toward the linguistic foundations of the theory of "being'," carefully bracketed from ontological reference through a rich use of inverted commas. (shrink)

I call attention to the following theses concerning possibility. 1) Anything that has become actual must have been possible in the period of time immediately preceding its actualization. 2) The logically possible is a conception, and conceptions exist within the mind. 3) The possible is not a mere name. 4) The possible is not a mental entity and that alone. 5) Every possibility, whether mental entity or not must be, or image, an ontological entity, real although not actual. 6) For (...) all we know logical possibility is the sufficient condition of ontological possibility. 7) Philosophers who lack the category of ontological possibility nonetheless refer to it as an implicit, if hidden, feature of their systems. 8) In some part of the period of time preceding its actualization, an ontological possibility becomes a nascent actuality, and external consistency a necessary condition for nascency. 9) The rise or fall of energy level through directed energy vectors, on human and nonhuman levels, is the third condition for the actualizing of possibilities, or for their failure to actualize. (shrink)