Dispositional essentialists U. T. Place, George Molnar, and C. B. Martin hold that dispositions are intrinsically directed to their manifestations. Thomists have noted that this directedness is similar to Thomistic directedness to an end. I argue that Place, Molnar, and Martin would benefit from conceiving of dispositional directedness as the sort of directedness associated with Thomistic inclinations. Such Thomistic directedness can help them to account for the production of manifestations; to justify their reliance on dispositional directedness; to show the causal (...) relevance of dispositions; and to motivate their view that dispositions are not reducible to categorical bases. I argue, moreover, that Thomistic inclination to an end does not succumb to the most common objections to finality: it is not mentalistic or vitalistic, and it does not involve backwards causation. Place, Molnar, and Martin, therefore, can embrace the directedness associated with Thomistic inclination—and reap its benefits—without incurring any high metaphysical cost. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialists hold that the world is populated by irreducibly dispositional properties, called “potencies,” “powers,” or “dispositions.” Each of these properties is marked out by a characteristic stimulus and manifestation bound together in a metaphysically necessary connection. Dispositional essentialism faces an old objection from David Hume. Hume argues, in his Treatise of Human Nature, that we have no adequate idea of necessary connection. The epistemology of the Treatise allegedly rules the idea out. Dispositional essentialists usually respond by attacking Hume’s epistemology. (...) In this paper, I give an alternative response. I argue that we can draw an idea of necessary connection from the Treatise’s relations of ideas. We are able, therefore, to overcome Hume’s objection without needing to attack his epistemology or its related principles. (shrink)

Understanding traditional natural law requires us to understand the concept of intrinsic nature, as well related concepts such as intrinsic inclination to an end and nature fulfillment. In this paper, I argue that proponents of traditional natural law theory should be attentive to the work of Martin Heidegger. If Heidegger is right about what he says concerning modern technology, then modern technology poses a threat to our understanding of the concept of intrinsic human nature and other associated concepts, and thus (...) a threat to our understanding of natural law. Heidegger may also provide an insight into how proponents of traditional natural law can respond to the threat of modern technology. Advocates of traditional natural law theory can respond to the threat of modern technology by engaging in, and promoting, certain arts, trades, skills, and activities that reveal natures. I show that farming is a paradigmatic example. (shrink)