Calhoun, W.C., Incomparable prime ideals of recursively enumerable degrees, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 63 39–56. We show that there is a countably infinite antichain of prime ideals of recursively enumerable degrees. This solves a generalized form of Post's problem.

Levin and Schnorr (independently) introduced the monotone complexity, Km(α), of a binary string α. We use monotone complexity to define the relative complexity (or relative randomness) of reals. We define a partial ordering ≤Km on 2ω by α ≤Km β iff there is a constant c such that Km(α ↾ n) ≤ Km(β ↾ n) + c for all n. The monotone degree of α is the set of all β such that α ≤Km β and β ≤Km α. We (...) show the monotone degrees contain an antichain of size 2N0, a countable dense linear ordering (of degrees of cardinality 2N0), and a minimal pair. Downey, Hirschfeldt, LaForte, Nies and others have studied a similar structure, the K -degrees, where K is the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. A minimal pair of K -degrees was constructed by Csima and Montalbán. Of particular interest are the noncomputable trivial reals, first constructed by Solovay. We define a real to be (Km, K)-trivial if for some constant c, Km(α ↾ n) ≤ K(n)+c for all n. It is not known whether there is a Km-minimal real, but we show that any such real must be (Km, K)-trivial. Finally, we consider the monotone degrees of the computably enumerable (c.e.) and strongly computably enumerable (s.c.e.) reals. We show there is no minimal c.e. monotone degree and that Solovay reducibility does not imply monotone reducibility on the c.e. reals. We also show the s.c.e. monotone degrees contain an infinite antichain and a countable dense linear ordering. (shrink)

The chapters progress from theoretical foundations to more applied investigations, with more detailed film analysis occurring in the later chapters. In Chapter 1, the focus is on establishing a conception of life narratives that will be used throughout the remainder of the book. It begins with a discussion of the original theories of narrative identity as they were developed by philosophers, and here I lay out the basic mechanics of narrative construction: namely, the process of selecting, connecting, and interpreting narrative (...) elements to form narrative structures. I also discuss how the meaning of life is constituted in large part through this narrative process and how that sort of meaning squares with the views of philosophers who investigate the meaning of life more generally. The original theories of narrative identity have been subject to a variety of criticisms, however, so much of this chapter also explores the debate about the adequacy of narratives as a way of accounting for lived experience. I conclude with a qualified account of narratives, opting for the more general reference to "life narratives" rather than "narrative identity," given the latter term's problematic emphasis on identity and the perennial philosophical questions surrounding it. Having accounted for life narratives, Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of film narratives, shifting to work by film theorists and philosophers of film. The second half of the chapter provides an overview of the ways in which life narratives impact film narratives and vice versa, particularly with respect to the meaning of life. It introduces how we can experience a film as meaningful, how movies can sustain problematic stereotypes in our life narratives, and how films can provide resources for exploring new avenues of meaning in our lives. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overall sense of a new perspective on film and spectator experience, setting the stage for more detailed investigations in later chapters. Chapter 3 completes the theoretical groundwork while simultaneously offering an example of what can be done with this new perspective by investigating an approach to film realism. Specifically, after canvasing some pertinent existing theories of realism, I argues for what I refer to as "narrative realism,"the view that a film, or at least an aspect of a film, is realistic when it depicts narratives that could be possible life narratives - that the actual world, as narrated by us, could be like the world of the film in some relevant way. This will be important, because for a film to impact our life narratives, it must be possible for the film narratives to be substantively like our life narratives, or vice versa. Chapters 4 through Six provide more detailed and complete investigations of the connections between life and film narratives begun in the previous chapters. Chapter 4 investigates the experience of finding a film meaningful, a kind of spectator activity that hasn't been directly investigated in film scholarship. Viewer responses to The Seventh Seal provide an example of what this chapter is about. Chapter 5 looks at the tendency of films to limit our narratives or impose oppressive perceptions and attitudes. It therefore explores some negative effects of film's impact on the meaning of life. And Chapter 6 shows that cinema can have the opposite effect too, broadening our ability to make a meaningful life narrative by expanding or introducing new perspectives and new ways of being in the world and by giving more agency to underrepresented groups by combating oppressive stereotypes. I also consider how some narrative structures, like open narratives, can make us aware of the contingent nature of life narratives and our ability to rewrite them. (shrink)

William C. Olsen, Walter E. A. van Beek, and the contributors to this volume seek to understand how Africans have confronted evil around them. Grouped around notions of evil as a cognitive or experiential problem, evil as malevolent process, and evil as an inversion of justice, these essays investigate what can be accepted and what must be condemned in order to evaluate being and morality in African cultural and social contexts. These studies of evil entanglements take local and national (...) histories and identities into account, including state politics and civil war, religious practices, Islam, gender, and modernity. (shrink)

Many individuals domestically and internationally who strive for peace and justice are concerned about the new National Security Strategy issued by the George W. Bush Administration in September 2002. 1 William Galston, for example, writes in a recent issue of Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly: A global strategy based on the new Bush doctrine of preemption means the end of the system of international institutions, laws and norms that we have worked to build for more than a half a (...) century. To his credit, Kissinger recognizes this; he labels Bush’s new approach “revolutionary” and declares, “Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system.” 2 Does the new Bush doctrine end the international legal system? Is the new Bush doctrine making policy declarations that are unprecedented in United States history? While I share many of the concerns critics are expressing about the new national security strategy, I contend that the more serious issue is not the ways in which this strategy represents a departure from those of prior United States presidential administrations but the actual practices of the Bush administration that appeal to this strategy. I will indicate how this new national security strategy does not represent much of a shift in policy, capability, or practice. Instead, this strategy Bush is using the strategy as an enabling device for a disturbing resurgence of United States global imperialism that serves interests that are actually opposed to the political rhetoric of the value of nations aiming for democracy and a market economy. I conclude by commenting on pursuing genuinely democratic values. I suggest that if the United States were truly committed to democratic values, then any military interventions would require the prior consent of the people. Otherwise what the United States refer to as “bringing democracy” to a people will be more like a militarily enforced authoritarianism that too closely resembles old-style exploitive imperialism. (shrink)

The use of multiple means of determination to “triangulate” on the existence and character of a common phenomenon, object, or result has had a long tradition in science but has seldom been a matter of primary focus. As with many traditions, it is traceable to Aristotle, who valued having multiple explanations of a phenomenon, and it may also be involved in his distinction between special objects of sense and common sensibles. It is implicit though not emphasized in the distinction between (...) primary and secondary qualities from Galileo onward. It is arguably one of several conceptions involved in Whewell’s method of the “consilience of inductions” (Laudan 1971) and is to be found in several places in Peirce. (From M. Brewer and B. Collins, eds., (1981); Scientific Inquiry in the Social Sciences (a festschrift for Donald T. Campbell), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 123–162.). (shrink)

This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world.

“It was the best of times. It was the worst of times.” So begins Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities. While he was writing about London and Paris during the turbulent times associated with the rise of the British Industrial Revolution and the French Political Revolution, these lines express the current sentiments of many Americans. Before 11 September 2001, many people thought we were living in the best of times. Baby boomers were relishing in the prospects that through inheritance (...) they would be the beneficiaries of the greatest transfer of wealth in United States history. After 11 September, even more citizens were psychologically shattered when they realized that the terrorist strikes showed that the United States, the most powerful nation on Earth, is still quite vulnerable. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 301-320.

Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...) poor performance in the World Cup, or angry with her errant child. Although the ways we find natural to talk in such situations can alter (afraid of, sad about, angry with, and so on), in each case the emotion has what Ronald de Sousa, following Wittgenstein, calls a target---“an actual particular to which that emotion relates.” (de Sousa, 1987, p.116). (shrink)

What does it mean to be human? This book explores that age-old question and provides a basis for rethinking the nature of all living beings. This book will leave you with a new understanding of yourself and your existence in the world as well as the nature of all beings.

William C. Dell teaches us to move our imaginations beyond the bounds of ordinary space time into the realm of eternal Zen consciousness, of the endless process of Zen deconstructing.

Volume 39 of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values includes lectures initially scheduled during the academic year 2019-2020. Owing to the global coronavirus pandemic, some were delivered at a later date. The Tanner Lectures are published in an annual volume. In addition to permanent lectures at nine universities, the Tanner Lectures on Human Values funds special one-time lectures at selected higher educational institutions in the United States and around the world.

The various models of chromatin fiber folding that have been proposed over the years are considered and evaluated. It is concluded that the radial loop / scaffold model is strongly supported by the available evidence, although the term ‘scaffold’ may be an unfortunate one. The scaffold is not a solid rod running the length of the chromatid but rather appears to be an aggregation of discrete anchoring complexes for the loops of the fiber. Despite support for this model, there is (...) a need for more evidence to resolve the questions that remain. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The evolutionary background Genes: Selfish? Altruistic? Or both? The hunter‐gatherer mind and before Nature's moral sentiments Nature in the workplace The rest of the story and more.

Although genocide—a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves—remains a sickeningly frequent phenomenon in the twenty‐first century, it is not an immutable aspect of the human condition. Genocide is a choice, and the civilized world must choose its demise. The unique experience of American Indians—a group subjected to genocide in the process of the creation and expansion of the United States—presents a (...) logical heuristic through which to assess more broadly the requirements of redress for historical episodes of genocide and, even more important, the means to prevent its recurrence. (shrink)