John W. Danfor's position in David Hume and the Politics of Reason is refreshing and insightful but may be disturbing to those holding a more traditional view of Hume. The approach taken is highly accessible to those outside of the narrower circle of Humean scholarship; as well it is challenging to those who specialize in Hume's philosophy. I find that I am in general agreement with the overall thrust of Danford's work, which puts Hume's epistemological interests in the context of (...) his political and ethical ones. Hume is cast in a conservative light, as reviving ancient philosophical attitudes to counter the brashness and thoughtlessness of the modern revolutionary thought of Descartes and Hobbes and the traditions following them. (shrink)
In Hume’s Of Miracles the person movecl by faith is put in a dilemma between faith and reason. Can one resolve this dilemma as a compleat Humean? The answer is yes. Within the Humean context different approaches can be developed ta overcome Hume’s dilemma. One uses Hume’s theory of utility to defend the belief in the afterlife. The other requires Hume to place faith on a par with beauty and therefore among the passions to which reason must be a slave. (...) Historically there was at least one compleat Humean who was also moved by faith --- Johann Georg Hamann [1730- 1788]. (shrink)
This article offers a critical review of various ontological-relativist arguments, mostly deriving from the work of W. V. Quine and Thomas K hn. I maintain that these arguments are (1) internally contradictory, (2) incapable of accounting for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge, and (3) shown up as fallacious from the standpoint of a causal-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and interpretation. Moreover, they have often been viewed as lending support to such programmes as the 'strong' sociology (...) of knowledge and the turn towards wholesale cultural-relativist doctrines, whether of the Wittgensteinian ('language-games') or Heideggerian (depth-hermeneutic) varieties. Thus Richard Rorty recommends that we should henceforth drop all that old-fashioned talk of 'truth', 'knowledge', or 'reality', since whatever warrants those descriptions from time to time is just the product of some currently favoured language-game or range of elective metaphors. Such ideas have little in common with Quine's general outlook of robust physicalism, nor again - though the case is less clear - with Kuhn's reconsidered approach to these issues as set forth in his 1969 Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . However, both thinkers have left themselves open to misconstrual by adopting a sceptical-relativist fallback position in response to the well-known problems with logical empiricism. This essay therefore reviews those problems with reference to alternative, more adequate accounts of what is involved in the process of scientific discovery and theory-change. (shrink)
Barrett has given a brief account of the affiliations of Hn with the manuscripts which he has collated. He derives his information about the readings of Hn from the reports of nineteenth-century editors, and he does not report this manuscript in his apparatus criticus. He concludes that ‘In three instances Haun. has the truth, or an approximation to it, where the rest of our tradition is at fault … in each case the reading can be accounted for as a lucky (...) accident, and so I judge it in fact to be.’ Of the other four manuscripts, which editors have not collated, he gives no account. ‘From a number of readings cited by Turyn it appears that they are all more or less closely related to Haun.’ K. Matthiessen has voiced a mild regret that Barrett did not settle the question by collation. I have collated these five manuscripts from photographs or microfilms. (shrink)
In this paper we introduce a notation system for the infinitary derivations occurring in the ordinal analysis of KP + Π₃-Reflection due to Michael Rathjen. This allows a finitary ordinal analysis of KP + Π₃-Reflection. The method used is an extension of techniques developed by Wilfried Buchholz, namely operator controlled notation systems for RS∞-derivations. Similarly to Buchholz we obtain a characterisation of the provably recursive functions of KP + Π₃-Reflection as <-recursive functions where < is the ordering on Rathjen's (...) ordinal notation system J(K). Further we show a conservation result for $\Pi _{2}^{0}$-sentences. (shrink)
David Hilbert was one of the great mathematicians who expounded the centrality of their subject in human thought. In this collection of essays, Wilfried Sieg frames Hilbert's foundational work, from 1890 to 1939, in a comprehensive way and integrates it with modern proof theoretic investigations.
In his historical novel from 1835, Prince Otto of Denmark and his Time, the poet Bernhard Severin Ingemann established the unknown, yet historical character, Prince Otto of Denmark as the hero of the novel. This choice has puzzled critics ever since, due to the fact that Prince Otto seems less a potential king than his brother Valdemar IV who actually became a king of Denmark. Georg Brandes claimed that Otto mirrored Ingemann’s persona as weak and feminine, a “monk” not suited (...) for kingship. In his ridicule of Prince Otto and Ingemann, Brandes reveals his ideas about gender, masculinity and femininity, but as this article seeks to show, such ideas are tied to time and place. Read from the distance of 2019, Ingemann’s feminine medieval hero might seem more modern and progressive than Brandes would have him. In this sense, the article is a piece of “queer medievalism”. (shrink)
In the fall of 1985 Carnegie Mellon University established a Department of Philosophy. The focus of the department is logic broadly conceived, philos ophy of science, in particular of the social sciences, and linguistics. To mark the inauguration of the department, a daylong celebration was held on April 5, 1986. This celebration consisted of two keynote addresses by Patrick Sup pes and Thomas Schwartz, seminars directed by members of the department, and a panel discussion on the computational model of mind (...) moderated by Dana S. Scott. The various contributions, in modified and expanded form, are the core of this collection of essays, and they are, I believe, of more than parochial interest: they turn attention to substantive and reflective interdis ciplinary work. The collection is divided into three parts. The first part gives perspec tives on general features of the interdisciplinary enterprise in philosophy, and on a particular topic that invites such interaction, namely computational models of the mind. The second part con tains reports on concrete research done within that enter prise; the research topics range from decision theory and the philosophy of economics through foundational problems in mathematics to issues in aes thetics and computational linguistics. The third part is a postscriptum by Isaac Levi, analyzing directions of work from his perspective. (shrink)
This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins ‘the imaginary texture of the real’. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it (...) will be suggested, following both Kant and Strawson, that there is a more fundamental working of the imagination, present in both perception and the constructions of fictions. What Kant and Strawson failed to make clear, however, was that the workings of the imagination within the perceived world, gives that world, an affective logic. The domain of affect is that of emotions, feelings and desire, and to claim such an affective logic in the world we experience, is to point out that it has salience and significance for us. Such salience suggests and demands the desiring and sometimes fearful responses we make to it; the shape of the perceived world echoed in the shapes our bodies take within it. (shrink)