The close of an era.--The shifting of the centre of significance in the evolutionary hypothesis. The principle of projected efficiency.--The position in modern thought.--The phenomenon of western liberalism.--The problem.--The ascendency of the present.--The passing of the present under the control of the future.--The development of the great antinomy in western history.--The modern world-conflict.--Towards the future.--Appendix.

A population of breakthrough scientists is considered to trace the development of science in both old Arabic-Islamic and Western civilisations. A statistical method is used to trace variation in the scientist population over several centuries. The analysis shows that the following: 1) There has been growth in Arabic-Islamic sciences for a period of three centuries, which was then followed by a period of decline. The decay time is approximately eight centuries. 2) The growth of science in Western (...) class='Hi'>civilisation started in approximately 1200 AD and continues to grow. The behaviour of the curve can be attributed to different historical events, particularly those events that may have affected scientific development. (shrink)

This book argues that R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy is best understood as a diagnosis of and response to a crisis of Western civilisation. The various and complementary aspects of the crisis of civilisation are explored and Collingwood is demonstrated to be working in the traditions of Romanticism and ‘historicism’. On these subjects, the theories of Collingwood and Ortega y Gasset are contrasted with those of Nietzsche and Weber.

Spengler’s work is typically represented as speculative philosophy of history. However, I argue that there is good reason to consider much of his thought as preoccupied with existential and phenomenological questions about the nature and ends of human existence, rather than with history per se. In this paper I consider Spengler’s work in comparison with Heidegger’s history of Being and analysis of technological modernity. I argue that Spengler’s considerable proximity to much of Heidegger’s thought compels us to reconsider the nature (...) and scope of Spengler’s philosophical project. (shrink)

Published in 1936, the author predicts that marriage will eventually die out in western civilization. Includes the meaning and origin of marriage, matrimonial unhappiness, sexual maladjustment, adultery, jealousy, concubinage, free love, monogamy, polygamy, divorce, morality and more.

War has been conceptualised from a military perspective, but also from ethical, legal, and philosophical viewpoints. These different analytical perspectives are all necessary to understand the many dimensions war, the continua on which war is situated - from small-scale to large-scale, from limited in time or long, from less to extremely destructive, with varying aims, and degrees of involvement of populations. Western civilisations have conceptualised war in binary ways denying the variety of manifestations of war along these continua. While (...) binary definitions are necessary to capture different conditions legally, they hamper analysis. The binaries include inter-State and intestine war, just war and unjust war, citizen-soldiers and professionals, civilians and combatants. Yet realities have mostly straddled such demarcations. Even citizen-armies have usually included professionals, civilians have been treated as enemies and sometimes even formally defined as enemies, and rules have not conformed with binary distinctions, if they were respected at all. While customary rules governing the conduct of war have been turned into International Law, this is the only aspect of war that has developed in a fairly linear way, while the rise, disappearance, and renaissance of the just war tradition has been anything but linear. This non-linearity also applies to the brutality with which war has been fought, especially towards civilians, who for long stretches of European history must have been the main victims of war, notwithstanding increasing protection they were afforded in theory by customary law. To understand war, we must shed some of these binaries. (shrink)

Panic buying of toilet rolls in Australia began in early March 2020. This was related to the realisation that the novel coronavirus was spreading across the country. To the general population the impact of the virus was unknown. Gradually the federal government started closing the country’s borders. The panic buying of toilet rolls was not unique to Australia. It happened across all societies that used toilet paper rather than water to clean after defecation and urination. However, research suggests that the (...) panic buying was most extreme in Australia. This article argues that the panic buying was closely linked to everyday notions of Western civilisation. Pedestal toilets and toilet paper are key aspects of civilisation and the fear of the loss of toilet paper is connected to anxiety about social breakdown, the loss of civilisation. This is the fear manifested in the perceived threat posed by the virus. (shrink)

Notice --- Hobbes and Adams as Thucydideans --- Ancient Greece --- Alternative Concepts of the Human Condition --- Medieval Monarchy --- Renaissance Republics --- Founding Fathers --- The Moral Recuperation of Self-Interest --- Other Human Worlds --- Now is the Whimper of Our Self-Contempt --- Culture is the Human Nature.

Commodity fetishism and the fetish of capital as an effect of western civilisation. Marx was aware that economic categories do not live an autonomous conceptual life, that they presuppose, in particular, the material and practical relations which humanity, as an organic living species, establishes with non-human nature. Such relations are to be examined in terms of their development in various historical and geographical milieus. The aim of the article is to highlight the importance of such variable conditioning. To (...) do so, it addresses the categories of fetishism and value, looking at the quantitative orientation of the production of material goods which has developed in western-type civilisation over the last 5,000 years. (shrink)

The idea of ‘Western Philosophy’ is the product of a legitimation project for European colonialism, through to post-second world war Pan-European identity formation and white supremacist projects. Thus argues Ben Kies (1917-1979), a South African public intellectual, schoolteacher, trade unionist, and activist-theorist. In his 1953 address to the Teachers’ League of South Africa, The Contribution of the Non-European Peoples to World Civilisation, Kies became one of the first people to argue explicitly that there is no such thing as (...) ‘Western philosophy’. In this paper, I introduce Kies as a new figure in the historiography of philosophy with important insights, relevant today. I outline his three key arguments: that ‘Western Philosophy’ is the product of political mythmaking, that it is a recent, largely mid-twentieth century fabrication, and that there is an alternative to ‘Histories of Western Philosophy’, namely ‘mixed’ or entangled histories. I show that Kies’ claims are supported both by contemporary scholarship and bibliometric analysis. I thus argue that Kies is right to claim that the idea of a distinctive, hermetically sealed ‘Western Philosophy’ is a recent, political fabrication and should be abandoned. We should instead develop global, entangled historiography to make sense of philosophy and its history today. (shrink)

The concept of civilisation is a controversial one because it is unavoidably normative in its implications. Its historical associations with the effort of Western imperialism to impose substantive conditions of life have made it difficult for contemporary liberalism to find a definition of “civilization” that can be reconciled with progressive discourse that seeks to avoid exclusions of various kinds. But because we lack a way of identifying what is peculiar to the relationship of civilisation that avoids the (...) problem of domination, it has tended to be conflated with other ideas. Taking Samuel Huntington's idea of a “Clash of Civilisations” as a starting point, this article argues that we suffer from a widespread confusion of civilisation with “culture,” and that we also confuse it with other ideas including modernity and technological development. Drawing on Thomas Hobbes, the essay proposes an alternative definition of civilisation as the existence of limits on how we may treat others. (shrink)

Since the 1990’s the rise of China provokes heated debates in the West. Numerous politicians and scholars, who study contemporary political affairs, pose the question, which will be the new role of China in international affairs? Many Western observers presume that China will act as the Western powers did in the past, promoting policy of domination, enslavement and gaining profits at all costs. The Chinese declarations on peace, co-operation, mutual interests, and harmony are often considered empty words, a (...) certain decorum of “real politics”, as it had been often practised in the West. An inquiry into the Chinese political and intellectual traditions, almost unknown in the West, challenges such widespread opinions and fears. Of course, it is an open question to which degree the traditional Chinese concepts will determine contemporary policy, since China had been westernised in enormous degree.Nevertheless, attitude to war, struggle, and competition constitutes one of the principal characteristics of each culture and appears closely related to its structure of values. Such attitudes determine political concepts and systems, foreign relations, norms of social life, etc. The analysis of Western and Chinese civilisations demonstrates that in this respect they represented divergent orientations. In Erich Fromm’s typology of societies, the Chinese culture could be considered non-destructive but aggressive, whereas Western civilisation could be called aggressive and destructiveOf course, there were great differences both within Chinese and within Western civilisations. Local/regional cultures belonging to each of them had their own characteristics in respect to struggle, and one could also notice great changes in the course of their histories. In general, at the dawn of these two civilisations, both of them were more or less bellicose, although in the cultures of the Chinese Central Plain “avoiding struggle” traits could be detected quite early. Appreciation of peace and harmony eventually prevailed with the predomination of the Confucian ideology, although Taoism and other schools of thought also condemned struggle and war. On the other hand, in the Mediterranean the bellicose cultures and war-mongering states prevailed. The beginning of this “great divergence” could approximately be dated for the middle of the 1st millennium BC, and the civilisations of East Asia and Europe took the opposite courses in theirsocial and political development. Struggle constituted a fundamental principle in the Western vision of the world-order, and its crucial archetype constituted the eternal struggle of Evil against Good, with the eventual triumph of God, who embodies Good and forces of Light. The Chinese tradition promoted instead the vision of the universe as one giant organism based on the principle of harmony, where Yin complements Yang. Hence both civilisations adopted the dualistic concepts, but one was antagonistic, and the second—complementary.In the 19th century, when Asian nations faced the colonial conquests, many of them tried to protect their independence and modernise themselves. For this end they tried to adopt not only Western armaments and military skills, but also Western bellicose ideology and values. Japan was obviously the champion of such a militarist course, but there were similar tendencies in China as well. Such bellicose ideology reached its apex there during the famous Maoist Cultural Revolution, when class struggle and bellicosity was exalted. The triumph of the Western bellicose approach and rejection of the traditional native heritage marked the century 1860’s–1960’s in China. However, after the unimaginable sufferings of the World War I and II, of Nazism and of communism, the West started to revalidate its traditions condemning war and violence. People started to appreciate peace and co-operation within and among nations. The United Nations and the European Union had been founded for such purposes: to promote peace and co-operation. However, the condemnation of wars did not halt military confrontation of the states, and the West still cultivates political ideologies, which propagate the “proper order” based on competition and struggle. Hence the concepts of multi-party democracy and of free market could serve as hallmarks of the West. In China, since the end of the 1970’s step by step the ancient ideological traditions have been appreciated again and the new concepts of peaceful and harmonious development evolved. At the beginning of the 21st century the Chinese leaders elaborated a new ideology of both harmonious domestic and international order aiming at peaceful development based on co-operation. Of course, there are still vivid the remnants of the previous Western-type approach of the brutal competition and of aggressive foreign policy.Notwithstanding divergent tendencies inside each of these civilisations, in general they both approach each other again, but this time in a common search for peace, cooperation and harmonious development. Their interpretations obviously differ, since in China such concepts are traditional, but rather new in the West, and in various respects both sides have different values and ideals. (shrink)

In this paper, author deals with Heidegger's account of the modern age as the epoch based on Western metaphysics. In the first part of the paper, he shows that, according to Heidegger, modern interpretation of the reality as the world picture, is essentially determined by Descartes' philosophy. Then, author exposes Heidegger's interpretation of the turn which already took place in Plato's metaphysics and which made possible Descartes' metaphysics and modern epoch. In the second part of the paper, author explores (...) Heidegger's interpretation of science and technology as shoots of very metaphysics. Heidegger emphasizes that the essence of technology corresponds to the essence of subjectivity and shows how the metaphysics of subjectivity subsequently finds its end in Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power, as the last word of Western philosophy. In the concluding part, author argues that the contemporary processes of globalization can be just understood as processes of completion of metaphysics. They can be identified as a global rule of the essence of technology. On the basis of Heidegger's vision of overcoming metaphysics, author concludes that it opens the possibility of a philosophy of finitude which points to dialogue with the Other as a way of resolving the key practical issues of the contemporary world. U ovom clanku autor se bavi Hajdegerovim shvatanjem moderne kao epohe zasnovane na zapadnjackoj metafizici. U prvom delu rada, autor pokazuje da je, prema Hajdegeru, novovekovno shvatanje stvarnosti kao slike sveta sustinski odredjeno Dekartovom filozofijom. Potom izlaze Hajdegerovu interpretaciju preokreta koji se vec dogodio u Platonovoj metafizici a koji je omogucio Dekartovo utemeljenje moderne filozofije i moderne epohe. U drugom delu rada, autor istrazuje Hajdegerovu interpretaciju nauke i tehnike kao izdanke same metafizike. Hajdeger pokazuje da sustina moderne tehnike odgovara sustini modernog subjekta i pokazuje kako se metafizika subjektivnosti konsekventno dovrsava u Niceovoj metafizici volje za moc, kao poslednjoj reci zapadnjacke filozofije. U poslednjem delu rada, autor ukazuje na to da se savremeni procesi globalizacije mogu razumeti upravo kao procesi dovrsavanja metafizike. Oni se mogu prepoznati kao planetarna vladavina sustine tehnike. Na osnovu Hajdegerovog vidjenja prevladavanja metafizike, autor zakljucuje da ono otvara mogucnost za jednu filozofiju konacnosti koja upucuje na dijalog sa Drugim kao nacin resavanja kljucnih prakticnih pitanja savremenosti. (shrink)

In the postcolonial world, and particularly after September 11, a liberal Western norm updates human rights with « sexual democracy » . Intertwined with the norm of antiracism, this « sexual democracy » functions as a formidable trap to those postcolonial subjects who have the misfortune to overstep it : accused of complicity with racism, they are called barbarians and pushed into the background. Zacarias Moussaoui was well aware of this, and played on it; French girls from the North (...) African immigration are equally well aware, and they negotiate from day to day. (shrink)

Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation. Foundations and Specific Problems. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co. 2009.

The ecological crisis is related to religion that shapes the values, but its decisive factor is the inherent contradiction between the selfish logic of capital proliferation and the social public nature of the environment. The fundamental way to solve the ecological crisis is the domestic social reform, the coordination of international relations and the continuous development of science and technology. Guided by the social public agencies and scientific methods, religion can play a secondary constructive role in building the pro-ecological humanistic (...) environment. Contribution: It is as I have known perhaps the initial attempt to deal with the question between religion and conservation from the perspective of Marxism, as a response to the colleagues from the West. (shrink)

David Garland's The Culture of Control provides a powerful analysis of trends in crime and criminal justice policy over the last 30 years. This note re?examines two parts of the Garland thesis. First, it argues that punitive criminal justice policy is rooted in an authoritarian neoconservative politics that shares little with free?market ideology. Second, research on the collateral consequences of incarceration suggests that the penal system, at least in America, has become a significant influence on, rather than just a product (...) of, the social structure of late modernity. (shrink)

The growth of penal population through the last decades of the twentieth century reshaped the institutional landscape of American poverty and inequality. The effects of rising incarceration rates have been especially large for young minority men with little schooling. This paper charts the extent of incarceration among young disadvantaged men and describes the effects of the prison boom on American economic inequality.In this paper I will argue that we are currently living in an era of "mass imprisonment." Under mass imprisonment, (...) the experience of incarceration is so pervasive among some social groups as to be a defining feature of their collective experience_incarceration characterizes the group and influences their life chances. I provide evidence for this claim with estimates of incarceration rates and lifetime risks of imprisonment for recent birth cohorts of white and black men at different levels of schooling. These statistics show that young black men with little schooling became pervasively involved with the criminal justice system by the late 1990s.This historically novel and highly concentrated rate of incarceration has two profound effects on American economic inequality. First, mass imprisonment generates invisible inequality. Our official statistics and data sources that measure the economic well_being of the population do not count those who are institutionalized. The large labor force surveys that measure the unemployment rate, for example, are drawn from samples of households. Be cause prison inmates are not included in these surveys, employment rates are significantly over_stated among people most likely to go to prison. Once we factor in the effects of invisible inequality through the late 1990s, we see that the economic expansion did very little to improve the economic status of young black men with no college education.In addition to invisible inequality, incarceration reduces the life chances of ex_inmates after they are released. Through the stigma of a criminal conviction, the diminished human capital from time out of the labor force, and the weakened social connections to legitimate employment opportunities, incarceration reduces the wages and employment of those serving time in prison. Not only does incarceration reduce pay and employment, it also limits the kinds of jobs that are available to formerly_incarcerated workers. Career jobs requiring a high level of trust, skill, credentials, or well_placed social connections are largely out of reach for those with prison records. As a result, incarceration channels ex_inmates into the secondary labor market in which employment is precarious and there are few prospects for mobility. In this way, the growth of the American penal system has hardened the lines of social disadvantage. We usually study prisons and jails in the context of their effects on crime. By calculating the scope of mass imprisonment, the penal system becomes important not chiefly for its effects on crime, but for its effects on social inequality. (shrink)

La construcci n de la naci n nasserista tiene varios niveles de explicaci n. La autora otorga especial importancia a la construcci n del poder y al uso de la reflexi n hist rica como medios para cambiarla. Los ejes elegidos son la selecci n cuidadosa del pasado para formular el futuro y para desautorizar las resistencias y oposiciones, el ejercicio meton mico de la revoluci nnaci n, las pol ticas concretas de identidad y la constituci n de los sujetos (...) en diferentes planos de la vida p blica como instancias de regulaci n de las conductas sociopol ticas. La naci n egipcia poscolonial se utiliza en este libro como prisma para examinar un conjunto de problemas relacionados con la modernidad, la descolonizaci n y las caracter sticas de los reg menes poscoloniales. (shrink)

Pornography is no longer an activity confined to a small group of individuals or the privacy of one’s home. Rather, it has permeated modern culture, including the work environment. Given the pervasive nature of pornography, we study how viewing pornography affects unethical behavior at work. Using survey data from a sample that approximates a nationally representative sample in terms of demographics, we find a positive correlation between viewing pornography and intended unethical behavior. We then conduct an experiment to provide causal (...) evidence. The experiment confirms the survey—consuming pornography causes individuals to be less ethical. We find that this relationship is mediated by increased moral disengagement from dehumanization of others due to viewing pornography. Combined, our results suggest that choosing to consume pornography causes individuals to behave less ethically. Because unethical employee behavior has been linked to numerous negative organization outcomes including fraud, collusion, and other self-serving behaviors, our results have implications for most societal organizations. (shrink)