Weber argues that causal modelers face a dilemma when they attempt to model systems in which the underlying mechanism operates according to some set of differential equations. The first horn is that causal models of these systems leave out certain causal effects. The second horn is that causal models of these systems leave out time-dependent derivatives, and doing so distorts reality. Either way causal models of these systems leave something important out. I argue that Weber’s reasons for thinking causal modeling (...) is limited in this domain are lacking. (shrink)

Brandon claims that to explain adaptation one must specify fitnesses in each selective environment and specify the distribution of individuals across selective environments. Glymour claims, using an example of the adaptive evolution of costly plasticity in a symmetric environment, that there are some predictive or explanatory tasks for which Brandon’s claim is limited. In this paper, I provide necessary conditions for carrying out Brandon’s task, produce a new version of the argument for his claim, and show that Glymour’s reasons for (...) making his claim are problematic. I provide a few interpretations of Glymour’s argument but ultimately raise worries for what I take to be the key premises. (shrink)

Part of Allen et al.’s criticism of Hamilton’s rule makes sense only if we are interested in social adaptation rather than merely social selection. Under the assumption that we are interested in casually modeling social adaptation, I illustrate how graphical causal models of social adaptation can be useful for predicting evolution by adaptation. I then argue for two consequences of this approach given some of the recent philosophical literature. I argue Birch’s claim that the proper way to understand Hamilton’s rule (...) is as providing an organizational framework for causal models is incorrect. I provide an account of a causally adequate decomposition of evolutionary change due to social adaptation and show that my account is superior to Okasha’s. (shrink)

Sober develops an account of adaptations on which they must have been positive causal factors for reproductive success. Glymour defends an account of a proper subset of adaptations—adaptations to particular environmental conditions—on which traits must interact in a special way with adapting conditions to cause reproductive success. These theories render conflicting judgments about which traits count as adaptations in some interesting cases. In this article I explore one such case and argue that we ought to replace the notion of adaptation (...) qua positive causal factor with a novel notion of adaptation. (shrink)