Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self -consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self - reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.

While articulating a philosophy of ecology which reconciles deep ecology with ecofeminism may be a laudable project, it remains at best unclear whether this attempt will be successful. I argue that one recent attempt, Carol Bigwood 's feminized deep ecology, fails in that, despite disclaimers, it reproduces important elements of some deep ecologist's essentializing discourse which ecofeminists argue are responsible for the identification with and dual oppression of women and nature. I then propose an alternative model for conceiving and describing (...) human and nonhuman nature modeled on Wittgenstein's remarks concerning anthropomorphizing which I argue is immune to this criticism. (shrink)

While Sarah Hoagland's conception of a lesbian ethic offers a promising route toward articulating an ethics of resistance, her notion of self in community does not provide a conception of "subject" capable of both embracing political action as fundamental to personal life and explicitly recognizing cultural, ethnic, and sexual multiplicity as central to ethical decision-making. Such a notion can be found, however, in the remarks of later Wittgenstein concerning the "language games" of describing.

The aim of the following paper is, firstly, to provide the reader with a brief exposition of the critical response offered by some current french feminists of the largely American, compensatory approach to feminist historiography. Secondly, I wish to show why the french feminist alternative itself provides an inadequate methodology for the resolution of the problems that it raises in its critique. Lastly, I shall suggest that the Wittgensteinian concept of ‘family resemblance’ contains the seeds of a plausible alternative to (...) either the compensatory or the french structuralist approach to feminist historiography. The upshot of this latter claim is that the historical subject may be most fruitfully conceived genealogically, that is, as the dynamic product of an inexhaustible complex of historical and contextual resemblances constructed on the behalf of a specific interpretational task. (shrink)

The aim of the following paper is, firstly, to provide the reader with a brief exposition of the critical response offered by some current french feminists of the largely American, compensatory approach to feminist historiography. Secondly, I wish to show why the french feminist alternative itself provides an inadequate methodology for the resolution of the problems that it raises in its critique. Lastly, I shall suggest that the Wittgensteinian concept of ‘family resemblance’ contains the seeds of a plausible alternative to (...) either the compensatory or the french structuralist approach to feminist historiography. The upshot of this latter claim is that the historical subject may be most fruitfully conceived genealogically, that is, as the dynamic product of an inexhaustible complex of historical and contextual resemblances constructed on the behalf of a specific interpretational task. (shrink)

Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.

: I argue for a Wittgensteinian reading of Judith Butler's performative conception of identity in light of Marilyn Frye's analysis of lesbian as nonexistent and Butler's analysis of abject. I suggest that the attempt to articulate a performative lesbian identity must take seriously the contexts within which abjection is vital to maintaining gender, exposing the intimate link between context and the formulation of intention, and shedding light on possible lesbian identities irreducible to abjection.

I argue for a Wittgensteinian reading of Judith Butler's performative conception of identity in light of Marilyn Frye's analysis of lesbian as nonexistent and Butler's analysis of abject. I suggest that the attempt to articulate a performative lesbian identity must take seriously the contexts within which abjection is vital to maintaining gender, exposing the intimate link between context and the formulation of intention, and shedding light on possible lesbian identities irreducible to abjection.

I argue for a Wittgensteinian reading of Judith Butler's performative conception of identity in light of Marilyn Frye's analysis of lesbian as nonexistent and Butler's analysis of abject. I suggest that the attempt to articulate a performative lesbian identity must take seriously the contexts within which abjection is vital to maintaining gender, exposing the intimate link between context and the formulation of intention, and shedding light on possible lesbian identities irreducible to abjection.

I argue for a Wittgensteinian reading of Judith Butler's performative conception of identity in light of Marilyn Frye's analysis of lesbian as nonexistent and Butler's analysis of abject. I suggest that the attempt to articulate a performative lesbian identity must take seriously the contexts within which abjection is vital to maintaining gender, exposing the intimate link between context and the formulation of intention, and shedding light on possible lesbian identities irreducible to abjection.

The problem that this essay will address is that of devising a viable use for psychological and intentional terms, in short, discourse concerning what-it-is-to-be-a-subject or "subjecthood" in light of, first, Derrida's deconstruction of the transcendental subject and, second, the materialist claim that recent advances in science effectively antiquate any viable role in empirical psychology for the use of terms traditionally associated with mind. I will argue that Wittgenstein's remarks concerning, among other things, the use of psychological terms, private mental objects (...) and the application of psychological terms to non-humans not only provides a clear and important connection between Derrida and contemporary materialism but that, supplemented by Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, offers an alternative model for the use of such terms in empirical psychological investigation. I will call this model a 'grammar of subjecthood'. ;Central to my argument is the claim that, as opposed to being conceived as names for mental objects or states, psychological terms are best understood as descriptive metaphors for the relationship between an organism and its bio/socio/historical context. That is, the Wittgensteinian notion of subjecthood describes a heuristic that, applied to behavior, provides information to empirical psychologists unavailable on a materialist model of explanation. A grammar of subjecthood, then, is both openly anthropomorphic, yet consistently naturalist, enlisting Dennett's intentional stance as an expansion of Wittgenstein's basic strategy. ;The success of such a strategy cannot be measured by showing in what way human beings are to be essentially distinguished from other organisms, but by how much more sense can be made out of something's behavior by speaking of it in terms of, for example, beliefs and intentions. Anything could be treated as a subject; the issue here is to what it is useful to apply such attributes. (shrink)