Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 contends that Confucianism is an ethics of autonomy. It is maintained that Mou’s version of ethics of autonomy differs from Kant’s in that Mou comprehends subjectivity differently than Kant in such a way that he, unlike Kant, locates the ethical a priori in moral feelings instead of reason. This paper will explore Mou’s metaphysical grounding of morality to show that Kant’s notions of autonomy and subjectivity undergo more radical modifications in Mou’s contention.

In this paper, Mou Zongsan’s (牟宗三, 1909–1995 CE) Kantian interpretation of Confucianism will be surveyed with a focus on Mou’s ideas of moral metaphysics and autonomy. After a brief account of the development of Confucianism up to the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) and Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE) (§1) and some initial attempts to articulate Confucian ideas in terms of Western philosophy (§2), Mou’s Kantian interpretation of Confucianism will be presented in §3 and criticized in §4. It is argued that Mou (...) uses the Kantian dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy to describe the traditional rivalry between two primary schools of Neo-Confucianism. While Mou neglects Kant’s claim that the autonomy of the will gives the principle by means of which it is to determine the content of the moral law, he appeals to Kant’s idea that human beings as free agents are members of the intelligible world to propose a Confucian moral metaphysics. In §5, Mou’s Confucianism’s metaphysical and religious characteristics are further criticized. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is well known for his Kantian interpretation of Confucianism, while his understanding of Kant’s ethics is itself colored very much by Confucianism. Mou not only coined the idea “heteronomous morality” ; he also maintained that Kant’s ethics actually espouses heteronomous morality. In this essay, I will first analyze Mou’s idea of heteronomy and his criticism of heteronomous morality and point out that, characterizing Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 philosophy as ethics of heteronomy, Mou gives up a fundamental element in (...) Kant’s idea of heteronomy, according to which heteronomous principles are all principles of self-love. I will then expound Mou’s ideas of moral feelings and moral acts presupposed in his idea of heteronomy and criticism of heteronomous morality and contrast my interpretation with two important interpretations, those of Lee Ming-huei 李明輝 and Sébastien Billioud. (shrink)

This paper traces Hegel’s conception of consciousness back to Hölderlin and argues accordingly that the structure of judging, which Hegel links to an attitude of knowing, determines the standpoint of consciousness to be overcome through the Phenomenology of Spirit. Taking Hegel’s texts into consideration comprehensively, it is then argued that a shape of consciousness is concerned withadvancing its own nominal definition of the concept “Truth,” which is a concept reflecting a culture’s way to organize its life. The Phenomenology, accordingly, should (...) be understood as an enterprise demonstrating that, though advancing their own definitions, shapes of consciousness nonetheless participate in the development of one single concept of the Truth. (shrink)

This paper traces Hegel’s conception of consciousness back to Hölderlin and argues accordingly that the structure of judging, which Hegel links to an attitude of knowing, determines the standpoint of consciousness to be overcome through the Phenomenology of Spirit. Taking Hegel’s texts into consideration comprehensively, it is then argued that a shape of consciousness is concerned withadvancing its own nominal definition of the concept “Truth,” which is a concept reflecting a culture’s way to organize its life. The Phenomenology, accordingly, should (...) be understood as an enterprise demonstrating that, though advancing their own definitions, shapes of consciousness nonetheless participate in the development of one single concept of the Truth. (shrink)