Using an apparatus in which two scalers register decays from a radioactive source, an observer located near one of the scalers attempted to convey a message to an observer located near the other one by choosing to look or to refrain from looking at his scaler. The results indicate that no message was conveyed. Doubt is thereby thrown upon the hypothesis that the reduction of the wave packet is due to the interaction of the physical apparatus with (...) the psyche of an observer.A. Einstein(1). (shrink)

We investigate the problem of “wave packet reduction” in quantum mechanics by solving the Schrödinger equation for a system composed of a model measuring apparatusM interacting with a microscopic objects. The “instrument” is intended to be somewhat more realistic than others previously proposed, but at the same time still simple enough to lead to an explicit solution for the time-dependent density matrix. It turns out that,practically, everything happens as if the wave packet reduction had (...) occurred. This is a consequence of the fact that the apparatus is made up of a very large number of microsystems interacting withs. More precisely, our model shows that the “macroscopic size” of a measuring apparatus can lead by itself to a density matrix for the systemM + s which is physically equivalent to the density matrix of a statistical mixture corresponding to the reduced wave packet. (shrink)

A practical experiment using coincidence techniques is suggested to test the validity of the following concepts:(1) wave packet reduction and(2) the measurement-uncertainty principle for position and momentum. The suggested experiment uses the time-of-flight method to determine an electron's momentum and a coincident photon, emitted from a system excited by the electron, to determine its initial position. It is shown that this method does constitute a simultaneous measurement of position and momentum for a single system. Also, it is (...) pointed out that the traditional statement of the measurementuncertainty principle must be slightly modified even within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Background: how mind functions is subject to continuing scientific discussion. A simplistic approach says that, since no convincing way has been found to model subjective experience, mind cannot exist. A second holds that, since mind cannot be described by classical physics, it must be described by quantum physics. Another perspective concerns mind's hypothesized ability to interact with the world of quanta: it should be responsible for reduction of quantum wave packets; physics producing 'Objective Reduction' is postulated to (...) form the basis for mind-matter interactions. This presentation describes results derived from a new approach to these problems. It is based on well-established biology involving physics not previously applied to the fields of mind, or consciousness studies, that of critical feedback instability. -/- Methods: 'self-organized criticality' in complexity biology places system loci of control at critical instabilities, physical properties of which, including information properties, are presented. Their elucidation shows that they can model hitherto unexplained properties of experience. -/- Results: All results depend on physical properties of critical instabilities. First, at least one feed-back or feed-forward loop must have feedback gain, g = 1: information flows round the loop impress perfect images of system states back on themselves: they represent processes of perfect self-observation. This annihilates system quanta: system excitations are instability fluctuations, which cannot be quantized. Major results follow: -/- 1. Information vectors representing criticality states must include at least one attached information loop denoting self-observation. -/- 2. Such loop structures are attributed a function, 'registering the state's own existence', explaining -/- a. Subjective 'awareness of one's own presence' -/- b. How content-free states of awareness can be remembered (Jon Shear) -/- c. Subjective experience of time duration (Immanuel Kant) -/- d. The 'witness' property of experience – often mentioned by athletes 'in the zone' -/- e. The natural association between consciousness and intelligence -/- This novel, physically and biologically sound approach seems to satisfactorily model subjectivity. -/- Further significant results follow: -/- 1. Registration of external information in excited states of systems at criticality reduces external wave-packets: the new model exhibits 'Objective Reduction' of wave packets. -/- 2. High internal coherence (postulated by Domash & Penrose) leading to a. Non-separable information vector bundles. b. Non-reductive states (Chalmers's criterion for experience). -/- 3. Information that is: a. encoded in coherence negentropy; b. non-digitizable, and therefore c. computationally without digital equivalent (posited by Penrose). -/- Discussion and Conclusions: instability physics implies anharmonic motion, preventing excitation quantization, and totally different from the quantum physics of simple harmonic motion at stability. Instability excitations are different from anything hitherto conceived in information science. They can model aspects of mind never previously treated, including genuine subjectivity, objective reduction of wave-packets, and inter alia all properties given above. (shrink)

The usual distinction in quantum mechanics between pure states and mixtures is shown not to be independent of the interpretation adopted. Thus, in a causal theory, certain states should be regarded as sharing the nature of both pure states and mixtures and, as a result, important questions in the theory of measurement must be considered in a different light.

The 'subjective reduction' interpretation of measurement in quantum physics proposes that the collapse of the wave-packet, associated with measurement, is due to the consciousness of human observers. A refined conceptual replication of an earlier experiment, designed and carried out to test this interpretation in the 1970s, is reported. Two improvements are introduced. First, the delay between pre-observation and final observation of the same quantum event is increased from a few microseconds in the original experiment to one second (...) in this replication. Second, rather than using the final observers' verbal response as the dependent variable, his early brain responses as measured by EEG are used. These early responses cover a period during which an observer is not yet conscious of an observed event. Our results support the 'subjective reduction' hypothesis insofar as significant differences in the brain responses of the final observer are found, depending on whether or not the pre-observer has been looking at the quantum event . Alternative 'normal' explanations are discussed and rejected. It is concluded that the present results do justify further research along these lines. (shrink)

In this paper we reconsider the constraints which are imposed by relativistic requirements to any model of dynamical reduction. We review the debate on the subject and we call attention on the fundamental contributions by Aharonov and Albert. Having done this we present a new formulation, which is much simpler and more apt for our analysis, of the proposal put forward by these authors to perform measurements of nonlocal observables by means of local interactions and detections. We take into (...) account recently proposed relativistic models of dynamical reduction and we show that, in spite of some mathematical difficulties related to the appearence of divergences, they represent a perfectly appropriate conceptual framework which meets all necessary requirements for a relativistic account of wave packet reduction. Subtle questions like the appropriate way to deal with counterfactual reasoning in a relativistic and nonlocal context are also analyzed in detail. (shrink)

This study attempts to spell out more explicitly than has been done previously the connection between two types of formal correspondence that arise in the study of quantum–classical relations: one the one hand, deformation quantization and the associated continuity between quantum and classical algebras of observables in the limit \, and, on the other, a certain generalization of Ehrenfest’s Theorem and the result that expectation values of position and momentum evolve approximately classically for narrow wave packet states. While (...) deformation quantization establishes a direct continuity between the abstract algebras of quantum and classical observables, the latter result makes in-eliminable reference to the quantum and classical state spaces on which these structures act—specifically, via restriction to narrow wave packet states. Here, we describe a certain geometrical re-formulation and extension of the result that expectation values evolve approximately classically for narrow wave packet states, which relies essentially on the postulates of deformation quantization, but describes a relationship between the actions of quantum and classical algebras and groups over their respective state spaces that is non-trivially distinct from deformation quantization. The goals of the discussion are partly pedagogical in that it aims to provide a clear, explicit synthesis of known results; however, the particular synthesis offered aspires to some novelty in its emphasis on a certain general type of mathematical and physical relationship between the state spaces of different models that represent the same physical system, and in the explicitness with which it details the above-mentioned connection between quantum and classical models. (shrink)

In this paper a nonspreading, unnormalizable wave packet satisfying the Schrödinger equation is constructed. A modification of the Schrödinger equation is considered which allows the normalization of the wave packet. The case is generalized for relativistic mechanics.

It is assumed that the motion of a particle in spacetime does not depend on the motion relative to it of any observer or of any frame of reference. Thus if the particle has an internal vibration of the type hypothesized by de Broglie, the phase of that vibration at any point in spacetime must appear to be the same to all observers, i.e., the same in all frames of reference. Each observer or reference frame will have its own de (...) Broglie wave for the particle. The phase of the particle's vibration must, by definition, be the same as that of all possible de Broglie waves at the point where the particle is. By superimposing all these possible de Broglie waves, a wave packet is formed centered in space on the particle. The formation of such a packet is discussed with the help of spacetime diagrams; the packet does not spread with time. The relevance of this packet to the wave mechanics of Schrödinger is discussed; it is also pointed out that any vibration can lead to such a packet. (shrink)

A one-dimensional scattering problem off a δ-shaped potential is solved analytically and the time development of a wave packet is derived from the time-dependent Schrödinger equation. The exact and explicit expression of the scattered wave packet supplies us with interesting information about the “time delay” by potential scattering in the asymptotic region. It is demonstrated that a wave packet scattered by a spin-flipping potential can give us quite a different value for the delay times (...) from that obtained without spin-degrees of freedom. (shrink)

A simple stationary state is set up by combining the two de Broglie waves from two particles traveling in one direction with equal and opposite velocities. By considering the waves forming this state from the point of view of all possible observers moving in the same direction, it is shown that the basic standing wave pattern does not alter, but that the particle will be confined to a small region stationary relative to this pattern. This region is similar in (...) extent to that confining a free particle, the natural internal frequency of the particle being raised. This agrees with previous suggestions that a particle in a stationary state without angular momentum is stationary. (shrink)

The concept of quantum transition is critically examined from the perspective of the modern quantum theory of measurement. Historically rooted in the famous quantum jump of the Old Quantum Theory, the transition idea survives today in experimental jargon due to (1) the notion of uncontrollable disturbance of a system by measurement operations and (2) the wave-packet reduction hypothesis in several forms. Explicit counterexamples to both (1) and (2) are presented in terms of quantum measurement theory. It is (...) concluded that the idea of transition, or quantum jump, can no longer be rationally comprehended within the framework of contemporary physical theory. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to show that, instead of quantum probabilities, wave packets are physically real. First, Cartwright's recent argument for the reality of quantum probabilities is criticized. Then, the notion of ‘physically real’ is precisely defined and the difference between wave functions and quantum probabilities clarified. Being thus prepared, some strong reasons are discussed for considering the wave packet to be physically real. Finding the reasons inconclusive, I explain how the Aharonov—Bohm effect delivers (...) the final punch. I conclude that wave packets are the quantum objects that underlie the indeterministic quantum processes and have the propensity of displaying probabilistic (or indeterministic) behavior. (shrink)

Trajectories along which phase-space points of the Wigner distribution function move are computed for a Gaussian wave packet moving under the influence of a weak perturbative potential. The potentials considered are a potential step, a potential barrier, and a periodic potential. Trajectories computed exhibit the complex, nonlocal nature of quantum dynamics. It is seen that quantum interference, which takes place in the time development of the wave packet, is taken care of in a simple way by (...) the Wigner trajectory method presented here. (shrink)

Cartwright's argument for the collapse of the wave-packet is criticised. This enables us to rescue realism from the pressure put on it by Cartwright in the context of Quantum Theory.

A compatible statistical interpretation of a wave packet is proposed. De Broglian probabilities which unite wave and particle features of quantons are evaluated for free wave packets and Jor a superposition of wave packets. The obtained expressions provide a very plausible and physically appealing explanation of coherence in apparently incoherent beams and of the characteristic modulation of the momentum distribution, found recently in neutron interferometry combined with spectral filtering. Certain conclusions about dualism and objectivity in (...) quantum domain are also derived. (shrink)

After a brief account of theway quantum theory deals with naturalprocesses, the crucial problem that such atheory meets, the measurement or, better, themacro-objectification problem is discussed.The embarrassing aspects of the occurrence ofentangled states involving macroscopic systemsare analyzed in details. The famous example ofSchroedinger's cat is presented and it ispointed out how the combined interplay of thesuperposition principle and the ensuingentanglement raises some serious difficultiesin working out a satisfactory quantum worldview, agreeing with our definiteperceptions. The orthodox solution to themacro-objectification problem, i.e. (...) thepostulate of wave packet reduction, isanalyzed and is proved to be inconsistent withthe assumption that the theory governes alsothe measurement process. After these premises,the rest of the paper is devoted to discuss arecent proposal of overcoming the difficultiesof the standard formalism by acceptingnonlinear and stochastic modifications of thequantum dynamics. The proposed theory is shownto agree with all known predictions of thestandard theory concerning microscopic systemsand to account, on the basis of a universaldynamics which is assumed to govern allnatural processes, for wave packet reductionin measurement processes and, more important,to eliminate all the difficulties concerningmacroscopic situations. Actually, the proposedtheory allows one to take consistently amacrorealistic position about natural processes and about our definite perceptions. (shrink)

The many-Hilbert-spaces theory of quantum measurements, which was originally proposed by S. Machida and the present author, is reviewed and developed. Dividing a typical quantum measurement in two successive steps, the first being responsible for spectral decomposition and the second for detection, we point out that the wave packet reduction by measurement takes place at the latter step, through interaction of an object system with one of the local systems of detectors. First we discuss the physics of (...) the detection process, using numerical simulations for a simple detector model, and then formulate a general theory of quantum measurements to give the wave packet reduction in an explicit form as a sort of phase transition. The derivation is based on the macroscopic nature of the local system, to be represented in a continuous direct sum of many Hilbert spaces, and on the finite-size effect of the local system, to give phase shifts proportional to size parameters. We give a definite criterion for examining any instrument as to whether it works well as a detector or not. Finally, we compare the present theory with famous measurement theories and propose a possible experimental test to discriminate it from others. A few solvable detector models are also discussed. (shrink)

It is shown that (a) both the dispersion relations between the mean frequency θ0 and the mean wave number k 0 are invariant under the Lorentz transformation; and (b) the relativistic Doppler effects on θ 0 and k 0 differ. In the suboptic packet there is anomalous red shift in the mean wave number k' 0 received from a source receding with speed v: k′ 0 changes sign through zero as v goes through the value vg, the (...) mean group velocity in the packet. In the superoptic packet the anomalous red shift is in the mean frequency θ′ 0 which reverses sign through zero as v goes through the value vp, the mean phase velocity in the packet. This last finding indicates a blackout of the superoptic signal when propagated toward a receiver moving away from the source at a speed greater than vp. There is no violation of causality involved, and the final conclusion of the paper is that it is not a fundamental axiom of “special relativity,” as usually believed, to deny that information can be transmitted at speeds greater than c. (shrink)

Agedanken electromagnetic device is described which permits the transfer of information at speeds faster than light without violating the principle of causality.

We critically analyze a recent paper by D. Mermin and we compare his statements with Bell’s position on the problems he is discussing.

If the energy-absorbing radio-frequency spin-flipping device used in perfect crystal neutron interferometry is an intermediate measuring device, then the experimental results contradict the associated wave packet collapse and support the real existence of the de Broglie pilot waves in both arms while the neutron travels in only one.

This paper addresses the doubts voiced by Wigner about the physical relevance of the concept of geometrical points by exploiting some facts known to all but honored by none: Almost all real numbers are transcendental; the explicit representation of any one will require an infinite amount of physical resources. An instrument devised to measure a continuous real variable will need a continuum of internal states to achieve perfect resolution. Consequently, a laboratory instrument for measuring a continuous variable in a finite (...) time can report only a finite number of values, each of which is constrained to be a rational number. It does not matter whether the variable is classical or quantum-mechanical. Now, in von Neumann’s measurement theory (von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, [1955]), an operator A with a continuous spectrum—which has no eigenvectors—cannot be measured, but it can be approximated by operators with discrete spectra which are measurable. The measurable approximant F(A) is not canonically determined; it has to be chosen by the experimentalist. It is argued that this operator can always be chosen in such a way that Sewell’s results (Sewell in Rep. Math. Phys. 56: 271, [2005]; Sewell, Lecture given at the J.T. Lewis Memorial Conference, Dublin, [2005]) on the measurement of a hermitian operator on a finite-dimensional vector space (described in Sect. 3.2) constitute an adequate resolution of the measurement problem in this theory. From this follows our major conclusion, which is that the notion of a geometrical point is as meaningful in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as it is in classical physics. It is necessary to be sensitive to the fact that there is a gap between theoretical and experimental physics, which reveals itself tellingly as an error inherent in the measurement of a continuous variable. (shrink)

One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents (...) a new type of reductionism, one that is stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that sank classical reductionism. Although he makes some concessions to classical antireductionism, he argues for a relationship between psychology and neurobiology that shares some of the key aims, features, and consequences of classical reductionism. Parts of Bickle's "new wave" reductionism have emerged piecemeal over the past two decades; this is his first comprehensive statement and defense of it to appear. (shrink)

A class of retrospective measurements analogous to the “delayed choice experiments” of Wheeler and Greenberger is considered. A new argument shows that the reduction of the wave packet must affect the past states of the system. As a side product, our argument implies that the axiom about the reduction of the wave packet in relativistic space-time cannot be consistently introduced.

In his 1939 Lectures, the prominent Soviet physicist L. I. Mandelstam proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that was understood in different ways. To assess Mandelstam's interpretation, we classify contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics and compare his interpretation with others developed in the 1930s. We conclude that Mandelstam's interpretation belongs to the family of minimal statistical interpretations and has much in common with interpretations developed by American physicists. Mandelstam's characteristic message was his theory of indirect measurement, which influenced his discussion (...) of the "reduction of the wave packet" and the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen argument. This article also reconstructs what lay behind Mandelstam's interpretation of quantum mechanics. This was his operationalism, by virtue of which his interpretation resembled Kemble's, in which the statistical and Copenhagen views had been combined. Like Popper and Margenau, Mandelstam followed R. von Mises's empirical conception of probability. Mandelstam, like the other proponents of the statistical approach to quantum mechanics, was affected by the culture of macroscopic experimentation with its emphasis on statistical measurement. (shrink)

David Albert and Barry Loewer have proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which they call the Many Minds interpretation, according to which there are infinitely many minds associated with a given (physical) state of a brain. This interpretation is related to the family of many worlds interpretations insofar as it assumes strictly unitary (Schrödinger) time-evolution of quantum-mechanical systems (no reduction of the wave-packet). The Many Minds interpretation itself is principally motivated by an argument which purports to (...) show that the assumption of unitary evolution, along with some common sense assumptions about mental states (specifically, beliefs) leads to a certain nonphysicalism, in which there is a many-to-one correspondence between minds and brains. In this paper, I critically examine this motivating argument, and show that it depends on a mistaken assumption regarding the correspondence between projection operators and yes/no questions. (shrink)

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Introduction; de Broglie's paradox.; Quantum theory of distant particles; The EPR paradox; Einstein locality and Bell's inequality; Recent research on Bell's inequality; General consequences of Einstein locality; Nonloeality and relativity; Time-symmetric theories; The Bohm-Aharonov hypothesis; Experiments on Einstein locality; Reduction of the wave packet; Measurements, reality and consciousness; Conclusions.

In philosophy /ontology/ as well as in physics one deals with various kinds of ESSE. Quantum objects do not obey the Bell inequalities, which are natural for macroscopic objects. Some beings may be real but not actual. Actual beings are those which show up NOW. For a physicist this seems to correspond to a reduction of the wave packet. Existence in an atractor.

In philosophy /ontology/ as well as in physics one deals with various kinds of ESSE. Quantum objects do not obey the Bell inequalities, which are natural for macroscopic objects. Some beings may be real but not actual. Actual beings are those which show up NOW. For a physicist this seems to correspond to a reduction of the wave packet. Existence in an atractor.

A cluster of problems — the “quantum mechanical measurement problem”, the “problem of the reduction of the wave packet”, the “problem of the actualization of potentialities,” and the “Schrödinger Cat problem” — are raised by standard quantum dynamics when certain assumptions are made about the interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism. Investigators who are unwilling to abandon these assumptions will be motivated to propose modifications of the quantum formalism. Among these, many (including Professor Ghirardi and Professor Pearle) (...) have felt that the most promising locus of modification is quantum dynamics, and in their presentations (this Volume) they have suggested stochastic modifications of the standard deterministic and linear evolution of the quantum state. (shrink)

The goal of the dissertation is, first, to develop in the tradition of conventional quantum mechanics what I call a propensity view of quantum properties, and to examine its coherence. Conventional quantum mechanics assumes the completeness of quantum mechanics. Taking the ontic version of the completeness assumption, which says that a state vector completely describes an individual quantum system as it is, I argue that the propensity view of quantum properties, i.e., the attribution of certain irreducible propensities to a quantum (...) system, is not only demanded but also can be coherently maintained. ;Second, I evaluate the relation between a propensity view of quantum properties and the demands of Einstein's program of realism, the backbone of which is the requirement that physical systems, as described by a theory, have properties independently of measurement. In doing so, I argue for a non-relational version of the quantum propensity view, which amounts to attributions propensities to individual quantum systems, and claim that conventional quantum mechanics together with the non-relational propensity view of quantum properties realizes physical realism, which is a particular version of Einstein's realist thesis and which reads that a physical system, as described by a theory, has at least some of its extrinsic properties independently of measurement. ;Third, quantum mechanics, in spite of its empirical success, has suffered from certain well-known conceptual puzzles, viz., the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocality as it arises in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. So we ask whether the propensity view of quantum properties can help us the resolve these problems. I argue that the so-called reduction of the wave packet is the source of both problems and suggest that there is a sense in which the propensity view of quantum properties explains the reduction of the wave packet and its nonlocal nature. On the other hand, the propensity view by itself fails to resolve the question of when or in what circumstances the reduction of the wave packet occurs, indicating that we do not as yet possess a complete understanding of quantum propensities. (shrink)

This paper explores the consequences of the orthodox resolution of the measurement problem for the axiomatic base of non-relativistic elementary quantum mechanics. It is argued that the standard resolution of the measurement problem generates a paradox whose dissolution may be achieved through an enrichment of the axiomatic foundations of quantum mechanics. These results are also linked to some recent creative proposals by Nancy Cartwright concerning the nature of the so-called reduction of the wave packet.

An expression of the Lindbladian form is proposed that ensures an unambiguous time-continuous reduction of the initial system-pointer wave-packet to one in which the readings and the observable’s values are aligned, formalized as the transition from an outer product to an inner product of the system’s and apparatus’ density matrices. The jump operators are in the basis of the observables, with uniquely determined parameters derived from the measurement set-up (thereby differing from S. Weinberg’s Lindbladian resolution of (...) class='Hi'>wave-packet formalism) and conforming to Born’s probability rules. The novelty lies in formalising the adaptability of the surroundings (including the measuring device) to the mode of observation. Accordingly, the transition is of finite duration (in contrast to its instantaneousness in the von Neumann’s formulation). This duration is estimated for a simple half-spin-like model. (shrink)

I critically evaluate Bickle’s version of scientific theory reduction. I press three main points. First, a small point, Bickle modifies the new wave account of reduction developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker by treating theories as set-theoretic structures. But that structuralist gloss seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, namely, that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms and concepts drawn from the basic reducing theory. Set-theoretic structures are not terms or (...) concepts but the structures that they describe. Second, and more serious, a familiar problem for classical positivist account of reduction resurfaces within this newest wave of thinking, namely, commitment to property identities and inter-theoretic bridge laws (a problem I discussed at more length in "Collapse of the New Wave"). Indeed, this problem is exacerbated by Bickle’s conciliatory treatment of property plasticity, since he is willing to grant that a large number of special science terms denote multiply realized properties, at least if realistically construed. Still, in the end, Bickle sidesteps the reduction of properties by appealing to Hooker’s "function-to-structure token reduction." This is an interesting move with an intriguing concept of reduction. But problems remain. For, third, Bickle and Hooker's function-to-structure token reduction is actually a guised form of eliminative materialism. But that should be unacceptable since the position extends well beyond any modest revisionism for suspect items from a folk theory, say, in folk psychology or folk biology. Instead, it applies to functional terms and concepts employed throughout well-developed and explanatorily successful sciences. (shrink)

"New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new (...) wave predicts that reductions of folk psychology to neuroscience will be located in the middle of this continuum; as neuroscientific evidence about mental states checks in, theoretical folk psychology will therefore be moderately revised. However, the model has conceptual problems which preclude its success in reviving reductionism, and its commitment to a syntactic approach wrecks its attempt to rescue folk psychology. Moreover, the architecture of the continuum operates on a category mistake that sneaks in an eliminativist conclusion. I argue that new wave reductionism therefore tends to be eliminativism in disguise. (shrink)

Image denoising is one of the important problems in the research field of computer vision, artificial intelligence, 3D vision, and image processing, where the fundamental aim is to recover the original image features from a noisy contaminated image. The camera sensor additive noise present in the holographic recording process reduces the quality of the retrieved image. Even though various techniques have been developed to minimize the noise in digital holography, the noise reduction still remains a challenging task. This article (...) presents a compressive sensing technique to minimize the additive noise in the digital holographic reconstruction process. We demonstrate the reduction of additive noise using complex wave retrieval method as a sensing matrix in the CS model. The proposed CS method to suppress the noise during the reconstruction process is illustrated using numerical simulations. Only 50% of the pixel measurements are considered in the noisy hologram, which is far less than the original complex object pixels. The impact of additive gaussian noise in the recording plane on the reconstruction accuracy of both intensity and phase distribution is analysed. The CS method denoises and estimates the complex object information accurately. The numerical simulation results have shown that the proposed CS method has effectively minimized the noise in the reconstructed image and has greatly improved the quality of both intensity and phase information. (shrink)

The strength and defects of wave mechanics as a theory of chemistry are critically examined. Without the secondary assumption of wave–particle duality, the seminal equation describes matter waves and leaves the concept of point particles undefined. To bring the formalism into line with the theory of special relativity, it is shown to require reformulation in hypercomplex algebra that imparts a new meaning to electron spin as a holistic spinor, eliminating serious current misconceptions in the process. Reformulation in the (...) curved space–time of general relativity requires the recognition of nonlinear effects that invalidate the practice of linear combination of atomic orbitals, ubiquitous in quantum chemistry, and redefines the electron as a nondispersive wave packet, or soliton. (shrink)

University Abstract Philosophers have sought to improve upon the logical empiricists’ model of scientific reduction. While opportunities for integration between the cognitive and the neural sciences have increased, most philosophers, appealing to the multiple realizability of mental states and the irreducibility of consciousness, object to psychoneural reduction. New Wave reductionists offer a continuum of comparative goodness of intertheoretic mapping for assessing reductions. Their insistence on a unified view of intertheoretic relations obscures epistemically significant crossscientific relations and engenders (...) dismissive conclusions about psychology. Richer, more sensitive accounts of explanatory pluralism and mechanistic explanation in science advocate multi-level approaches in cross-scientific settings and criticize the distance of the standard philosophical objections from working scientists’ practices and discoveries. The Heuristic Identity Theory, a new, scientifically informed version of the psycho-physical identity theory, incorporates these insights, showing how multiple realizability is an argument for (not against) identities in science and why, therefore, consciousness is not irreducible. (shrink)

New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis (...) that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism, Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that ALL a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology. (shrink)

I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is (...) in fact too restrictive for scientific practice and should be rejected. Basic theories co-evolve with nonbasic theories in a mutually interactive way, and thus the basic theories incorporate the concepts and concerns of nonbasic theories. Third, I show that once its ontological consequences are duly noted, the reductive part the new wave account collapses into the classical theory developed within the logical empiricist tradition. As such, it still falls prey to standard anti-reductionist argument based upon multiple realizability and the cross-classification of special science and physical science terms. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to develop a pluralist interpretation of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS). My starting point is Horgan and Tienson's deconstructive argument according to which proponents of PCS face the following dilemma: either phenomenal concepts or physical concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves. If phenomenal concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves, then phenomenal states are non-physical states and physicalism is wrong. If physical concepts allow (...) us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves, then phenomenal concepts are derivative and PCS is wrong. While Horgan and Tienson assume that their argument shows that PCS leads to dualism, I argue that one can also adopt an ‘epistemic pluralism’ that rejects the idea of only one fundamental way of conceiving phenomenal states as they are in themselves. However, I also argue that epistemic pluralism eventually leads to a position that is compatible neither with dualism nor physicalism. Instead of justifying a non-reductive ‘new wave materialism’, PCS may therefore lead to a ‘new wave pluralism’ that is at odds with all mainstream positions in philosophy of mind. (shrink)

We argue in this paper that so-called new wave reductionism fails to capture the nature of the interlevel relations between psychology and neuroscience. Bickle (1995, Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: some accomplished facts, Philosophical Psychology, 8, 265-285; 1998, Psychoneural reduction: the new wave, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) has claimed that a (bottom-up) reduction of the psychological concepts of learning and memory to the concepts of neuroscience has in fact already been accomplished. An investigation of (...) current research on the phenomenon of long-term potentiation reveals that this claim overstates the facts. Both the psychological and the neural concepts involved have not yet stabilized and face further correction under the influence of both bottom-up and top-down selection pressures. In addition, psychological concepts often refer to functions, and functions are indispensable and irreducible. Function ascriptions pick out objective patterns involving historical factors and distal goals. This view of functions implies that psychological facts cannot be simply read off from the neurophysiological facts. Although psychological theorizing is constrained by neurophysiology (and vice versa), psychology remains distinct at least to some degree. (shrink)