This chapter is an investigation into G. E. M. Anscombe's suggestion that there can be cases where belief takes a personal object, through an examination of the role that the activity of teaching plays in Anscombe's discussion. By contrasting various kinds of ‘teachers’ that feature in her discussion, it is argued that the best way of understanding the idea of believing someone personally is to situate the relevant encounter within the social, conversational framework of ‘engaged reasoning’. Key features of this (...) framework are highlighted, and are used to characterise the distinctive kind of teaching and learning germane to Anscombe's suggestion. (shrink)

This essay attempts to extend the exercise in normative pragmatics undertaken by Robert Brandom to include consideration of the logical relations between the practices of making of claims involving the use of the first-person-singular pronoun (‘I-talk’) and the making of claims involving the second-person-singular pronoun (‘You-talk’). The first part of the essay makes the case that the implicit response found in Brandom’s work affirms the pragmatic independence of I-talk from You-talk, such that it is possible to conceive of a discursive (...) practice involving people using the first person-singular pronoun but not the second-person. The second part argues this response is mistaken, as there are reasons internal to Brandom’s own project that require pragmatic interdependence of I-talk and You-talk. The upshot of this exercise is normative pragmatics is thus that there can be no ‘I’ without a ‘You’. (shrink)

I examine a distinctive kind of injustice which arises when people are maltreated in their capacity as potential conveyors of knowledge. Extant discussions of testimonial injustice usually assume that the injustice occurs when an audience ignores the claims made by a testifier. This assumption obscures the fact that there are occasions where the best framework for thinking about testimonial injustice is that of inappropriately rejecting, not ignoring, those claims; the injustice differs in these two kinds of case. Light is thrown (...) on the injustice involved in inappropriate rejection by examining the epistemic import of the distinctive second-person interrelations in play in such testimonial interactions. (shrink)

"Robert Brandom" is one of the most significant philosophers writing today, yet paradoxically philosophers have found it difficult to get to grips with the details and implications of his work. This book aims to facilitate critical engagement with Brandom's ideas by providing an accessible overview of Brandom's project and the context for an initial assessment. Jeremy Wanderer's examination focuses on Brandom's inferentialist conception of rationality, and the core part of this conception that aims to specify the structure that a set (...) of performances within a social practice must have for the participants to count as sapient beings by virtue of their participation in the practice, and for the performances within the practice to have objective semantic content by virtue of their featuring within the practice. Wanderer's exploration of these two goals forms the structure to the book. It Includes: Part I that provides a structural model of linguistic practice and considers various groups of potential participants in terms of their relationships to this practice; and, Part II that examines the meaning of the performances that are caught up in this gameplaying practice. Brandom's approach to semantics is outlined and the challenge such an approach has in allowing for a representational dimension of language and thought is explored. Wanderer offers readers a valuable framework for understanding the Brandomian system and helps situate Brandom's systematic theorizing within contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. This book will be a sought after aid to reading Brandom for advanced students and philosophers engaging with his challenging body of work. (shrink)

It is common in popular depictions to portray the attitude of trusting and the norms associated with rationality as standing in some kind of tension. In this article, we suggest a way of capturing this tension, and explore some recent attempts at resolving it.

Resumo: Arthur Schopenhauer ficou conhecido como o pensador do “pessimismo filosófico”. Tratase de uma doutrina que, em linhas gerais, apresenta uma determinada interpretação acerca do valor do mundo, mas que, em seu sentido ainda mais básico, questiona a possibilidade de atribuição de valor ao todo da existência: há “justificação” para a existência? A partir da resposta a essa pergunta, o filósofo alemão desenvolve sua “metafísica da vontade” e, como seu desdobramento, sua teoria da “redenção”, ou soteriologia. Entretanto, o “filósofo do (...) pessimismo” também afirma, em sua obra, que há uma “ordenação moral de mundo” e um “significado moral da existência”, o que parece ir na direção oposta ao “pessimismo”. O presente artigo analisa o significado das noções de ordenação moral de mundo e justificação da existência no pensamento de Schopenhauer, a fim de demonstrar em que medida significado moral da existência e pessimismo filosófico se relacionam no pensamento do autor.: Arthur Schopenhauer is known as the thinker of “philosophical pessimism”. It means, in general lines, the doctrine that presents a certain worldview, but in its more basic sense, it questions the possibility of giving a meaning to the whole of existence: is there “justification” for the existence? By answering this question the German philosopher develops his “metaphysics of the will” and, as its unfolding, his theory of “redemption”, or soteriology. However, the “philosopher of pessimism” also asserts in his work that there is a “moral ordinance of world” and a “moral meaning of existence”, which seems to go on the opposite direction of what is claimed by the “pessimism”. The present paper analyses the sense of the notions of moral ordinance of world and justification of existence in Schopenhauer’s thought, in order to demonstrate how far moral meaning of life and philosophical pessimismo interact in his thought. (shrink)

Abstract The distinction between thick and thin concepts has been a central part of recent discussion in metaethics. Whilst there is a debate regarding how best to characterise the distinction, it is commonly accepted that ethical theorising traditionally focuses on the thin, leading some to contend that moving from considering thin to thick concepts leads to a very different, and preferable, conception of ethics. Not only does a similar distinction between thick and thin concepts suggest itself within epistemology, traditional discussion (...) within epistemology also seems to focus on the thin in a similar manner. The question of a possible parallel beckons: Is there a comparable distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts? Would a move from thin to thick lead to an alternative and/or preferable epistemology? (shrink)

Critical notice of Paul Faulkner, "Knowledge on Trust" (OUP 2011) and Benjamin McMyler, "Testimony, Trust, and Authority" (OUP 2011).

This article is an investigation into G. E. M. Anscombe's suggestion that there can be cases where belief takes a personal object, through an examination of the role that the activity of teaching plays in Anscombe's discussion. By contrasting various kinds of ‘teachers’ that feature in her discussion, it is argued that the best way of understanding the idea of believing someone personally is to situate the relevant encounter within the social, conversational framework of ‘engaged reasoning’. Key features of this (...) framework are highlighted, and are used to characterise the distinctive kind of teaching and learning germane to Anscombe's suggestion. (shrink)

An alethic holding is any speech act that functions to hold another person to acting for reasons that they already had prior to the performance of a speech act with this function. Although it is tempting to think of such acts as either informing another person of extant reasons for acting or as creating new reasons for that person to so act, a central goal of this paper is to suggest that this temptation should be resisted. First, alethic speech acts (...) are situated within the broader terrain of performances that strive to hold others responsible. Second, the precise sense of ‘holding’ to reason that characterizes an alethic speech act is explicated, in a manner that distinguishes such acts from either those designed to inform one of extant norms or to add new norms. Third, an account that attempts to explain how a speech act can achieve this holding function is offered, one based on the idea of a self-conscious interpersonal, transaction. Finally, it is suggested that the terrain of holding other’s responsible sketched at the outset looks different once this account of alethic holdings is in view. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is on the practice of clarifying illocutionary force, the social activity of asking for and providing descriptions that make explicit what kind of act what done in speaking. Two forms of this practice are distinguished, one that takes place as part of the speech encounter that is the target of the practice, and one that takes place subsequent to that speech encounter. It is argued that the function of the practice differs between these forms, and (...) that this yields two very different ways of responding to a clarificatory query. The paper concludes by considering some implications of this difference in function for understanding of the character of illocutionary force itself, with a focus on its repercussions for understanding the possible role of the stance of participant, as opposed to theorist, in determining what was done in speaking. (shrink)

Midway through How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays an (...) instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of How to Do Things With Words is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction. (shrink)

In this paper I direct attention to one feature of Hacking’s recent work on styles of reasoning and argue that this feature is of far greater philosophical significance than Hacking’s limited discussion of this suggests. The feature in question is his use of ‘legendary beginnings’ in setting out a given style, viz. the method of introducing a style of reasoning by recounting a popular and quasi-mythical narrative that ties the crystallisation of that style to a particular person in a particular (...) place and at a particular time. Whilst Hacking both deploys and discusses this method, his comments suggest that this is primarily a stylistic device employed for reasons of expedience. In contrast, it is argued here that recounting the legendary origins of a style of reasoning affords a distinctive way of vindicating that style, a vindication from within the style itself. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo problematizar o enunciado que diz da importância de ensinar matemática usando jogos. O material de pesquisa abrange todos os exemplares da Educação em Revista (ER), periódico do Sindicato do Ensino Privado do RS. Servindo-se de ferramentas teóricas oriundas do pensamento de Foucault, o artigo examina entrelaçamentos do enunciado estudado com outros do campo educacional, que geram efeitos de verdade no discurso da educação matemática contemporânea. O trabalho investigativo permitiu identificar: a) os vetores de sustentação do (...) referido enunciado encontram-se nas produções acadêmicas da área da Educação Matemática e em documentos oficiais; b) uma reatualização do enunciado evidenciando fortes aproximações entre os jogos escolares para ensinar matemática e as tecnologias digitais. As considerações finais apontam para a constituição de uma narrativa vitoriosa sobre o uso de jogos nas aulas de matemática, capturando professores e alunos. Palavras-chave: Educação Matemática. Escolas privadas. Jogos. Enunciado. Michel Foucault. The use of games in Mathematics classes: problematizing the truths of contemporary pedagogical discourse Abstract: The article aims to problematize the statement about the importance of teaching mathematics using games. The research material covers all the copies of Educação em Revista (ER), a periodical of the Private Teaching Union of RS. Using theoretical tools derived from Foucault's thought, the article examines the intertwining of the studied utterance with others in the educational field, which generate real effects in the discourse of contemporary mathematics education. The investigative work allowed us to identify: a) the support vectors of that statement are found in academic productions in the area of ​​Mathematics Education and in official documents; b) a re-updating of the statement showing strong similarities between school games to teach mathematics and digital technologies. The final considerations point to the constitution of a victorious narrative about the use of games in math classes, capturing teachers and students. Key-words: Mathematics Education. Private schools. Games. Statement. Michel Foucault. El uso de juegos en las clases de Matemáticas: problematizando las verdades del discurso pedagógico contemporáneo Resumen: El artículo tiene como objetivo problematizar la afirmación que dice sobre la importancia de enseñar matemáticas mediante juegos. El material de investigación cubre todos los ejemplares de Educação em Revista (ER), publicación periódica de la Unión de Docentes Privados de RS. Utilizando herramientas teóricas derivadas del pensamiento de Foucault, el artículo examina el entrelazamiento del enunciado estudiado con otros en el ámbito educativo, que generan efectos reales en el discurso de la educación matemática contemporánea. El trabajo investigativo permitió identificar: a) los vectores de apoyo de ese enunciado se encuentran en producciones académicas en el área de Educación Matemática y en documentos oficiales; b) una actualización de la declaración que muestra fuertes similitudes entre los juegos escolares para enseñar matemáticas y tecnologías digitales. Las consideraciones finales apuntan a la constitución de una narrativa victoriosa sobre el uso de juegos en las clases de matemáticas, capturando a profesores y alumnos. Palabras-clave: Educación Matemática. Escuelas privadas. Juegos. Enunciado. Michel Foucault. Data de registro: 05/09/2021 Data de aceite: 16/02/2022. (shrink)

(1994). From Cassandra to Gaia: The limits of civic humanism in a post‐ecological world. Social Epistemology: Vol. 8, Public Indifference to Population Issues, pp. 243-259.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Increasingly through the 1990s, tobacco control advocates questioned the practice of public institutions investing in tobacco company stocks. The questioning was framed in at least three ways. First, is it ethical to fund public expenditures with profits from a product that causes addiction and disease? Second, is it sound social policy to derive public income from a product that increases healthcare costs and reduces worker productivity? Finally, is it sound fiscal policy to invest in an historically profitable industry facing multiplying (...) legal and regulatory challenges? While the tobacco industry preferred to restrict discussion to the fiscal question, and offered an affirmative answer, its position was weakened by depressed stock prices brought on by actions of the industry as much as by tobacco control activism. As part of a campaign to restore its credibility as an investment vehicle with public fund managers, Philip Morris (PM) commissioned a report from the influential investment managers/advisors Wilshire Associates. However, Wilshire had only recently conducted such a study for the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB), assuring the board that the value tobacco stocks added to an investment portfolio – if any – was too small to be measured. Nonetheless, within a year, Wilshire produced a report for PM which appeared to laud the investment value of tobacco and to dismiss tobacco-excluded investment alternatives. This paper examines how Wilshire produced apparently diametrically opposed reports for clients with different interests. It reveals a pattern of potential conflicts of interest among tobacco companies, financial analysis firms, investment authorities, and institutional fund managers. It demonstrates substantial violations of two generally accepted ethical principles of business consulting: veracity and transparency. (shrink)

Philosophical writing in the advocatorial mode aims to advance a given position by reasoned argument designed to rationally persuade anyone of its veracity. Philosophical writing in the confessional mode uses theoretical reasoning and critical rigour in the course of arriving at a specific kind of philosophical self-judgment with therapeutic intent. Here I suggest that the best way to read Samantha Vice’s paper (‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’) is to treat it as written in the confessional, and not (...) the advocatorial, mode, and that this way of reading the paper provides an alternate way of reflecting on some of the contentious claims Vice makes. (shrink)

Essential reading for students and scholars of philosophy of language and mind, Reading Brandom is also an excellent companion volume to Reading McDowell: On ...

According to a dominant understanding, the illocutionary domain is a bifurcated one, an amalgam containing both communicative speech acts (such as requesting and promising) and ceremonial speech acts (such as saying ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony and naming a ship). Bifurcating the domain in this manner is commonly taken to be a primary lesson of Austin’s “How To Do Things With Words’, alongside that of according communicative speech acts a far greater prominence in terms of our core understanding of (...) illocution. In contrast, we draw on the resources provided by Austin’s work to provide a more unified conception of the illocutionary domain, one in which differences between communicative and ceremonial acts are themselves understood to emerge from a broader understanding of the illocutionary character of speech. (shrink)

It is common in popular depictions to portray the attitude of trusting and the norms associated with rationality as standing in some kind of tension. In this article, we suggest a way of capturing this tension, and explore some recent attempts at resolving it.

GALIMBERTI, Umberto. Rastros do Sagrado: o Cristianismo e a dessacralização do Sagrado. Wander Moreira da Costa KONINGS, Johan S. J. Ser cristão: fé e prática. Paulo Agostinho Nogueira Baptista KONINGS, Johan S. J. Liturgia dominical: mistério de Cristo e formação dos fiéis (anos A-B-C) Victor René Villavicencio Matienzo.

O presente artigo tem por pretensão central discutir alguns aspectos fundamentais da crítica de Nietzsche à metafísica, já nas suas primeiras reflexões filosóficas. Para tanto, serão mobilizados alguns de seus principais argumentos contra o estabelecimento da vontade como coisa em si no pensamento de Arthur Schopenhauer, e, por conseguinte, contra o próprio estatuto da metafísica nesta filosofia, de tal modo que se possa demonstrar as soluções encontradas pelo próprio autor a favor da possibilidade da metafísica. O artigo conta ainda, desse (...) modo, poder contribuir para as discussões em torno da relação entre reflexões privadas e textos publicados do filósofo alemão, na medida em que defende a tese de que a partir de uma análise da crítica à metafísica em suas anotações pessoais se pode compreender os germes da mudança de postura em relação à mesma em seus textos publicados. (shrink)

Dando continuidade às discussões iniciadas em “O ‘sentido da vida’ em Schopenhauer e Nietzsche”, o presente artigo analisa o problema do “sentido da vida” na filosofia contemporânea, tomando como referência sobretudo o pensamento de um autor pouco debatido no Brasil: Thomas Nagel. Inicia-se com uma breve retomada do tema em Schopenhauer e Nietzsche (1); indica-se em que medida ele surge apenas nas últimas décadas como uma preocupação da filosofia contemporânea de língua inglesa (2); analisa-se como Nagel trata do mesmo em (...) seu pensamento, sobretudo na obra Visão a partir de lugar nenhum(3); conclui-se comparando as posições de Nagel, Schopenhauer e Nietzsche (4). (shrink)

O presente artigo visa discutir o papel desempenhado pelo sofrimento nas reflexões culturais de Nietzsche e Freud. Para tanto, 1) indicarei o contexto filosófico em que o tema ganha notoriedade, no pensamento de Arthur Schopenhauer; 2) investigarei, especialmente a partir de passagens selecionadas de Para além de bem e mal e Genealogia da moral, como a origem da cultura é vinculada por Nietzsche aos perigos do desejo humano de fazer sofrer; 3) examinarei, sobretudo a partir de O mal-estar na cultura, (...) a concepção freudiana de que o “mal-estar” (Unbehagen) na cultura é fruto da renúncia pulsional, característica da formação e do desenvolvimento psíquico do indivíduo; e, por fim, 4) analisarei comparativamente o pensamento dos dois autores, buscando enfatizar sobretudo em que medida o sofrimento constitui, do ponto de vista teórico, um dos principais conceitos de suas reflexões sobre a origem da cultura. (shrink)

The theme of nihilism has been the object of interpreters’ reflections since Nietzsche’s works were first published, and recent work has placed nihilism at the center of Nietzsche’s philosophical project. João Constâncio’s Arte e niilismo. Nietzsche e o Enigma do Mundo sheds new light on the problem of nihilism by relating it to many key concepts and themes in Nietzsche’s thought. The author starts from the Schopenhauerian perspective according to which what really matters to philosophy is giving an answer to (...) the “riddle of the... (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo discutir o conceito de transfiguração (Transfiguration / Verklärung) nas primeiras formulações nietzscheanas do estatuto da filosofia, sobretudo em sua função de crítica ao pessimismo de Arthur Schopenhauer. Para tanto, analisa duas obras de seu período de juventude, O nascimento da tragédia e Schopenhauer como educador, enfatizando especialmente os capítulos 3 e 4 da primeira e as seções 3, 4 e 5 da segunda. Espera-se demonstrar que, para além de sua importância na crítica ao pessimismo, (...) a transfiguração desempenha um papel central na tentativa de resposta ao problema do “sentido da vida” e, por isso, delimita o escopo do uso nietzscheano da metafísica. (shrink)

This article presents the results of a qualitative study on the ethical aspects of inclusion practice for radiotherapy patients taking part in clinical research. The study focused on the standards and values of this process. Patients and physicians were interviewed about their views and experiences. Analysis of these interviews showed that candidate research participants need better protection from unwanted factors that could influence their choice about participation. Researchers need proper education about regulation, codes and directives in the field of research (...) ethics, and they should be aware of the underlying ethical concepts of these regulations. A sound institutional ethics policy is necessary in order to guide medical staff in decisions about the inclusion of patients in trials. (shrink)

Wandering in Darkness reconciles the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God with suffering in the world. Eleanore Stump presents the moral psychology and value theory within which the theodicy of Thomas Aquinas is embedded. She explicates Aquinas's account of the good for human beings, including the nature of love and union among persons, and then argues that some philosophical problems are best considered in the context of narratives. In the context of famous biblical stories and against the (...) backdrop of Aquinas's other views, Stump argues that Aquinas's theodicy gives a powerful explanation for God's allowing suffering. This explanation constitutes a consistent and cogent defense for the problem of suffering. (shrink)

Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone’s attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are (...) unguided. One motivation for my theory is what I call the “Puzzle of the Purposeful Wanderer”. On the one hand, mind-wandering seems essentially purposeless; almost by definition, it contrasts with goal-directed cognition. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that our minds frequently wander to our goals. My solution to the puzzle is this: mind-wandering is purposeless in one way—it is unguided—but purposeful in another—it is frequently caused, and thus motivated, by our goals. Another motivation for my theory is to distinguish mind-wandering from two antithetical forms of cognition: absorption and rumination. Surprisingly, previous theories cannot capture these distinctions. I can: on my view, absorption and rumination are guided, whereas mind-wandering is not. My paper has four parts. Section 1 spells out the puzzle. Sections 2 and 3 explicate two extant views of mind-wandering—the first held by most cognitive scientists, the second by Thomas Metzinger. Section 4 uses the limitations of these theories to motivate my own: mind-wandering is unguided attention. (shrink)

Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves (...) this tension, presenting a model that aligns the roles of mind‐wandering in planning with empirical evidence and the sustained stability of intentions. (shrink)