In this paper I discuss Kant's and Bolzano's differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls 'propositions in themselves'. This contrast in views is used to explain Bolzano's criticism of Kant's belief (...) that definition is impossible for philosophical concepts. It is also used to explain Bolzano's criticism of Kant's methods of exposition of philosophical concepts. (shrink)

Wie verhalten sich Geist und Leben in unserem menschlichen Dasein zueinander? Ist der Geist des Lebens Feind? Ausgehend von den philosophischen Ansätzen von Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) und Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) diskutiert Alfred Rohloff die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Geist und Leben in unserer menschlichen Wirklichkeit wie auch, vor diesem Hintergrund, die Möglichkeit einer zivilen Weltgesellschaft, die sich in seinen Augen als die einzig mögliche Antwort ergibt auf die Frage nach der Überlebenschance der Menschheit auf diesem Planeten. Die Diskussion (...) um die Friedfertigkeit einer solchen Weltgesellschaft mündet zuletzt in dem Vorschlag eines Konkordats der Weltreligionen. (shrink)

In this article I would like to express my personal ideas and points of view about strike action, which I think many colleagues will share. I am a qualified paediatric nurse, currently working in the central operating theatre of a university hospital in Germany. At the same time, I am also finishing my studies in health care sciences. Apart from two short protest strikes, I have not taken part in any strike, because there have not been any during my whole (...) professional career at the hospitals where I have worked. I am personally deeply convinced that strikes are important and are a good and useful tool, in particular to protest against ‘rationalizations’, which so far have led only to lower salaries and fewer jobs for nurses, and have brought no improvement in the conditions for staff or patients. (shrink)

In the study of special languages and translation, the legal field is often insulated from other domains. This is primarily due to the extreme system dependence of the terminology of law, which results from a lack of a common legal system of reference throughout the world. The abstract nature of this human-made field and its dynamicity in view of the continuously evolving case law and constant changes in legislation make it difficult to illustrate its complex ontology through traditional terminology management (...) techniques. Therefore, this paper argues for an interdisciplinary approach to constructing the ontology of legal concepts based on structural constituents from frame semantics and comparative law. Frames allowing for the representation of interconnected knowledge segments evoked by legal concepts and the distinction between micro- and macro-dimensions in legal comparison research make it possible to capture the complex ontology of legal terminology evoked in a specific point in time and a determined legal context. The ontological knowledge structure will be exemplified by terms from German social, commercial, employment, and tax law. (shrink)

In this article I would like to express my personal ideas and points of view about strike action, which I think many colleagues will share. I am a qualified paediatric nurse, currently working in the central operating theatre of a university hospital in Germany. At the same time, I am also finishing my studies in health care sciences. Apart from two short protest strikes, I have not taken part in any strike, because there have not been any during my whole (...) professional career at the hospitals where I have worked. I am personally deeply convinced that strikes are important and are a good and useful tool, in particular to protest against ‘rationalizations’, which so far have led only to lower salaries and fewer jobs for nurses, and have brought no improvement in the conditions for staff or patients. (shrink)

Books 31 to 40 of Livy's history chart Rome's emergence as an imperial nation and the Romans tempestuous involvement with Greece, Macedonia and the near East in the opening decades of the second century BC; they are our most important source for Graeco-Roman relations in that century. Livy's dramatic narrative includes the Roman campaigns in Spain and against the Gallic tribes of Northern Italy; the flight of Hannibal from Carthage and his death in the East; the debate on the Oppian (...) law; and the Bacchanalian Episode. (shrink)

Many anglophone scholars take the early Confucians to be virtue ethicists of one kind or another. A common virtue ethical reading of one of the most influential early Confucians, namely Mengzi, ascribes to him the view that moral actions are partly (or entirely) moral because of the state from which they are performed, be it the agent’s motives, emotions, or their character traits. I consider whether such a reading of the Mengzi is justified and I argue that it is not. (...) I argue that there is no reason to believe that Mengzi distinguishes the moral value of actions that are performed from virtuous and non-virtuous states. Given this, virtue (as a feature of agents) is normatively posterior to virtuous actions. I conclude, first, that this poses a challenge to a wide range of common interpretations of the Mengzi, be they virtue ethical or otherwise, and second, that there might be conceptual space for an account of virtue ethics that rejects the normative priority of virtue over virtuous actions. (shrink)

Die philosophischen Essays, hier erstmals gesammelt veröffentlicht, beschäftigen sich sowohl mit Ereignissen der Gegenwart – Politische Wende, Raketenschild, Studentenrevolte, Globalisierung, Bankenkrise – als auch mit neueren Ansätzen im Denken – Heidegger, Kritische Theorie, Foucault. Dabei unterzieht der Autor von seinem sprachphilosophischen Ansatz her die Politik des Westens – aufgrund ihres immanenten Sendungsbewußtseins – einer nachdrücklichen Kritik.

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472 – 1529) is famously associated with the view that knowledge and action are unified (zhī xíng hé yī 知行合一). Call this the Unity Thesis. Given standard assumptions about what it means for a person to know, it may seem that the Unity Thesis is clearly false: I can know that p without currently acting in p-related ways, and I can know how to φ without currently φ-ing. My aims in this paper are, first, to draw on (...) recent work in epistemology to explain and defend the Unity Thesis and, second, to argue that it offers us an attractive conceptual alternative to a standard way of thinking about the nature of intentional action. The first step of my argument draws on the idea that what distinguishes intentional actions from bodily events is the presence of knowing-to – that is, an agent is φ-ing intentionally if and only if she is currently doing something because she knows to do it as a way for her to φ. Such a notion of knowing-to allows us to explain otherwise puzzling features of the Unity Thesis, including the claim that knowing and acting occur simultaneously. In the second step, I argue that the Unity Thesis can help us avoid various long-standing issues in the philosophy of action, including the problem of deviant (formal) causation. (shrink)

In this chapter I give an account of the epistemology underlying the concept of “extension” in the Mengzi, an early Confucian text written in the fourth century BCE. Mengzi suggests in a conversation with King Xuan of Qi that a solution to the King’s problem of how one comes to act in a kingly manner is that one engages in “extension”. I argue that a long-standing scholarly debate on the exact nature of Mengzian “extension” can be resolved by closely investigating (...) the epistemological assumptions that must be in place for “extension” to be a viable solution to King Xuan’s problem. More specifically, my argument is that knowledge of a certain kind, namely knowing-to, is both necessary and sufficient for extension to take place. In other words, for a person S to extend X, where X is a capacity for action, S at least needs to have knowing-to. (shrink)

The Confucian philosopher Mengzi believes that ‘extending’ one's kindness facilitates one's moral development and that it is intimately tied to performing morally good actions. Most interpreters have taken Mengzian kindness to be an emotional state, with the extension of kindness to centrally involve feeling kindness towards more people or in a greater number of situations. I argue that kindness cannot do all the theoretical work that Mengzi wants it to do if it is interpreted as an emotion. I submit that (...) Mengzi's notion of extending kindness is best understood as the exercise of a capacity for intelligently performing kind actions. (shrink)

The introduction of the modern diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to the medical practice provided a new challenge for the medicine. The art of medicine, with its default purpose of acting for the benefit of health, is therefore required to derive from technological progress effectively and rationally. As a result, the medical ethics has been engaged with the rules of economy and management of deficit medical procedures as well as their rational and fair distribution. The above suggests, that medics, given these (...) recourses, should approach each patient with a consideration to their therapeutic rights. However, the physicians cannot just concentrate on the good of one particular patient, but must take into account joint responsibility for the good of a potential patient. This makes medical ethical dilemmas similar to the ethical issues of business. The notion of responsibility is the key for discriminating these two kinds of ethics. (shrink)

This chapter examines Mencius’s views on knowledge and how they might contribute to contemporary debates in epistemology. For this purpose, I focus on three features that I take to be characteristic (although not exhaustive) of Mencian epistemology: first, Mencius’s views on knowing things; second, the role that wisdom or intellectual virtue plays in acquiring knowledge; and third, Mencius’s views on “knowing-to”, a kind of knowledge conceptually distinct from knowing-that and knowing-how. I argue that the views we find in the Mencius (...) on these matters are relevant to contemporary debates on the nature of objectual knowledge, on the role of intellectual virtue in knowing, and on the relation between know-how and intelligent action. (shrink)