The present study was designed to verify hypothesized predictor effects for five anger-related variables, i.e. trait anger, anger expression-out, anger expression-in, anger control-out, and anger-control-in. A sample of 138 students completed measures for FFM personality traits, self-esteem, shyness, and anger. The study confirmed the effects of neuroticism and agreeableness as being the chief personality predictors of anger; however, for the domain of anger expression-in, an unexpected role of extraversion was revealed. Furthermore, introducing self-esteem and shyness changed some effects of FFM (...) traits. Entering self-esteem as an additional predictor improved the predictability of anger control-in. Additionally, a mediation effect of shyness was revealed for the relation between extraversion and anger expression-in. (shrink)

The authors present the conceptual and system-theoretical model of human motor behaviour. The main assumption is that movement is the only observable manifestation of all psychical processes, thus, it is the only phenomenon enabling the creation of hypotheses concerning the psychological conditioning of human behaviour. They pointed to the fact that in the field of biology, and all the more, in psychology, mathematical descriptions are hardly eligible. In this respect, a system-theoretical approach seems to be appropriate. The authors present two (...) systems: information processing modalities in the human mind, based on Nikolai Bernstein’s theory, and the series of processes from stimuli reception to motor response execution. Both these sub-systems make up a super-system. Its simplified graphical representation may be termed “Column Diagram.” The authors analyse the functioning of this super-system in various intellectual-motor purposeful operations. The system-theoretical perspective enables clear categorisation of various human motor operations, their “driving” mechanisms, internal patterns, and their superficial physical and/or mathematical “appearance.” The stream of consciousness in a human motor operation joins the various psychological constructs, which are reception, perception, attention, motivation, intellect, memory, etc., into one coherent, inseparable system. (shrink)

Ontology is a burgeoning field, involving researchers from the computer science, philosophy, data and software engineering, logic, linguistics, and terminology domains. Many ontology-related terms with precise meanings in one of these domains have different meanings in others. Our purpose here is to initiate a path towards disambiguation of such terms. We draw primarily on the literature of biomedical informatics, not least because the problems caused by unclear or ambiguous use of terms have been there most thoroughly addressed. We advance a (...) proposal resting on a distinction of three levels too often run together in biomedical ontology research: 1. the level of reality; 2. the level of cognitive representations of this reality; 3. the level of textual and graphical artifacts. We propose a reference terminology for ontology research and development that is designed to serve as common hub into which the several competing disciplinary terminologies can be mapped. We then justify our terminological choices through a critical treatment of the ‘concept orientation’ in biomedical terminology research. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiono jednostkę ludzką, społeczeństwo jako układy dynamiczne rządzące się prawami narzuconymi przez naturę. Naturę potraktowano jako gigantyczny fraktal tworzący na swym brzegu struktury samopodobne w dowolnej skali. Pokazano analogie między zachowaniami społecznymi a zjawiskami fizycznymi oraz opisano przebieg procesów twórczych zachodzących w umyśle. Artykuł jest próbą unifikacji opisu rzeczywistości widzianej oczami przedstawiciela nauk ścisłych.

In 1956, I decided to apply my experience in microbial genetics to developing analogous systems for human cell lines, including the selection of mutants with either a loss or gain of a biochemical function. For instance, mutants resistant to azahypoxanthine showed a loss of the HPRT enzyme (hypoxanthine phosphoribosyl transferase), whereas gain of the same enzyme was accomplished by blocking de novo purine biosynthesis with aminopterin, while supplying hypoxanthine and thymine (HAT selection). Using HAT selection, we: (i) genetically transformed HPRT− (...) mutant cells to HPRT+ wild type by using DNA extracted from HPRT+ cells, and (ii) selected HPRT+ hybrid cells by fusing HPRT− D98/AH2 cells with skin cells. These approaches, which we dubbed in 1962 as a [first step toward gene therapy], contributed to the later development of (i) cell fusion techniques, (ii) the development of monoclonal antibodies, (iii) routine transformation of mammalian cells with cloned genes, and (iv) methods for creating transgenic organisms. (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule omawiam koncepcję zdań normatywnych Johna R. Searle’a. Przeprowadzona analiza ma służyć wykazaniu jej wiarygodności. Również jej autor w 2021r., po ponad pół wieku od jej pierwszego sformułowania, mimo bardzo licznych dyskusji prowadzonych w przeciągu tego czasu, stwierdza, że podtrzymuje twierdzenie o ważności i trafności tej koncepcji, a w szczególności także słynną już tezę o możliwości dokonania inferencyjnego przejścia od zdań o faktach do zdań o powinnościach (Searle 2021, 3–16). Twórca powszechnie znanej teorii czynności mowy przekonuje, że niektóre (...) zdania normatywne wynikają pojęciowo ze zdań faktualnych (opisowych). Analizuję szczegółowo jego argumentację, usiłując wyjaśnić, jak należy rozumieć jego tezę, że mówienie o tzw. błędzie naturalistycznym samo w sobie może być błędem. Skupiam się przy tym na istocie wynikania (poprawnych inferencji) oraz warunkach prawdziwości zdań normatywnych. Rozważenie różnych możliwości interpretacji tezy i argumentów Searle’a jest zarazem uzasadnieniem twierdzenia, że są one poprawne i zachowują swoją aktualność. Wyjątkowym elementem koncepcji Searle’a, z którym polemizuję, jest jego twierdzenie o rzekomo samoistnie motywującej mocy aktów mowy, np. dokonywania obietnicy. (shrink)

This article shows that Christianity in its perception of eschatological events has early on given up the concept of therapeutic and corrective punishment, turning to the idea of vindictive and retributive punishment. Similarly to other Churches, the Roman Catholic Church in its teachings does not officially support the hope for universal salvation. Pope John Paul II developed his eschatological thinking in a careful way; he did not close the way to further search. The Pope reminded that former councils discarded the (...) theory of apokatastasis (teaching that all creature would be saved), but admitted that “the problem remains”. He attempted at retaining the tension existing between the New Testament statement on the general intention of God to save all humankind and Christ’s words on the “eternal punishment” awaiting people lost through their own egoism and insensitivity to others. In the Pope’s teachings, traditional concepts are interwoven with new accents which correct the false idea of God as the cause of damnation and the creator of eternal hell. Hell is not a punishment imposed by God, but a state of final self-exclusion from communion with God. According to Pope, hell is above all a moral postulate, a requirement of justice in view of terrible human crimes which must not go unpunished. A final punishment is to serve the retention of moral balance in the history of humanity.The author of this article argues that all those in favor of the hope for universal salvation do not, by any means, preach impunity or mandatory amnesty. One has to bear the consequence of one’s evil actions. Moral consciousness is saved. Salvation is not a necessity or a compulsion but a God’s gift that has to be accepted freely. God does not remain entirely helpless in view of human freedom. He can attract it to Himself, purify it and transform it through His patient and boundless love. This can happen only through unimaginable suffering and terrible torment which, in human terms, can be even called eternal, taking whole centuries due to their quality and intensity, as suggested by the very Greek term aiōnios. It is a torment directed at correction and healing, which is prompted by the Greek term kólasis in Christ’s parable on the final judgment. The position of John Paul II betrays his internal split between the hope for universal salvation and the reality of eternal damnation. The studies instigated by the Church’s great minds caused also his anxiety, but as a pope and a teacher he wanted to keep faith with the teachings of councils and the traditional interpretation of biblical texts. The author of the article is convinced that the Christianity of the future will at some pointachieve greater courage in its attitude to eschatological issues. The pedagogics of hope and mercy might then take the place of pedagogics of fear of God and eternal hell. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

Author of "Truth of analytic statements in a radically empiricist theory of meaning" answers to a critical essay written by Maciej Witek. He clarifies the metaphysical assumptions and implications of proposed conception, dealing with such issues as: sense/reference distinction; methodological versus realistic approach to theory of meaning; inferential/causal relations among meaningful items; mental aspect of meanings. Next, he makes explicit a view on the concept of truth to which this theory is committed. In addition, he formulates ways of sociolinguistic operationalization (...) of concepts of 'platitude' and 'meaning'. (shrink)

We wspołczesnej metaetyce terminami „internalizm” i „eksternalizm” oznacza się wiele rożnych tez, tak rożnych, że „internalizm” w jednym sensie może niemal pokrywać się z „eksternalizmem” w innym sensie, i odwrotnie. Definiuję siedem rodzajów internalizmu/eksternalizmu etycznego: 1) internalizm/eksternalizm racjonalności praktycznej; 2) internalizm/eksternalizm treści; 3) internalizm/eksternalizm sądu; 4) internalizm/eksternalizm oceny; 5) internalizm/eksternalizm w sensie niedookreślonym; 6) internalizm/eksternalizm uznania i 7) internalizm/eksternalizm poznania. Klasyfikacja ta jest jasna i użyteczna. Ilustruję jej stosowalność poprzez ustalenie konkretnego zestawu internalistycznych/eksternalistycznych tez, które powinniśmy przyjąć na gruncie eudajmonistycznego (...) utylitaryzmu reguł. Okazuje się, że aby to uczynić, musimy rozróżnić dwa rodzaje powinności moralnej: czysto hipotetyczną i aktualną. W rezultacie mamy utylitarystyczne uzasadnienie osiemnastu internalistycznych/eksternalistycznych tez. (shrink)

The author presents his own conception of semantic analyticity accounted for from a thoroughly empiricist perspective on (descriptive) meaning. This conception includes the following theses. Meanings as entities constituted in social interactions should be investigated empirically by sociolinguistic methods. Each meaning is determined by a cluster of platitudes, i.e. sentences held as true or known in a given form by all (or almost all) competent language users. Each such sentence can be equivalently expressed in a form of conditional inference, or (...) just possess this form. All these inferences are held, by competent language users, as connected to others, thus building a global semantic space. A sentence is accepted as meaningful only if it is inferentially connected to other sentences so that together they, at least hypothetically, relate to some determinate experiences. Hence all meaningful sentences are a posteriori true. Analyticity/syntheticity of proposition is relative to a degree and scope of being accepted or known in a given form of sentence expressing it. Evidently analyticity/syntheticity is a psycho-social matter. Sufficient degree of analyticity is called 'platitudiness'. Analytic/synthetic distinction comes in degrees, is not strict, and a sentence's being analytic/synthetic may change over time. There are many cases in which we cannot determine whether a sentence is more analytic than synthetic, or conversely. (shrink)