Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Georg Curtius' Griechische Schulgrammatik, achtzehnte wesentlich veränderte Auflage bearbeitet von Dr Wilhelm von Hartel. Leipzig. 1888. Mk. 2.40.Methodik des Grammatischen Unterrichtes im Griechischen im Anschlnsse an W. v. Hartel's Neubearbeitung der Griechischen Sehulgrammatik von Georg Curtius, verfasst von Dr August Scheindler. Leipzig. 1888.Abriss der Grammatik des homerischen nnd herodotischen Dialekts, im Anschlusse an die 18 Auflage, von Dr. Curtius' Griechischen Schulgrammatik bearbeitet von Dr Wilhelm Von Hartel. 60 pf.Kurzgefasste griechische Schulgrammatik bearbeitet von Dr Bernhardt Gerth. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig. C. (...) F. Winter. 1 Mk. 60. (shrink)

I explore three points about the relationship between C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and W.V. Quine’s naturalized epistemology inspired by Robert Sinclair’s Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. First, I highlight Lewis’s long-standing commitment to Platonism about meaning and its connection to his reflective philosophical method and rejection of a linguistic account of analyticity. Second, I consider Sinclair’s claim that “Lewis’s epistemology provides no indication concerning how, despite different sensory experiences, we still come to agree on what we are talking (...) about and what counts as evidence” (2022, 113). I find more hints, especially in Lewis’s account of how we verify that two people share meaning in common. However, some of the pragmatic and broadly empirical factors Lewis appeals to are not part of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Finally, I relate these points to Quine’s (1953/1980) claim to advance a more “thorough pragmatism” than Lewis. Quine does not say much about action, value, and ethics, but these are central parts of Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and a source of his reluctance to abandon those parts of his epistemology that Sinclair argues Quine found dispensable. (shrink)