Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)

The paper has two main aims. The first is to reformulate Hempel's version of the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction, as regards the deductive covering-law model, so as to generalise it and make it no longer subject to some of the criticisms which have been directed at it (Section II). The second aim is to consider, with special critical reference to Hempel's recent treatment in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York and London, 1965), some central criticisms of (...) both the constituent parts of the above symmetry thesis, viz. that adequate explanations are potentially predictive (Section III), and that adequate predictive arguments are potentially explanatory (Section IV). (shrink)

There is a widespread belief, more often implied than explicitly asserted, that Hume considered all necessary propositions to be analytic.Of course Hume did not use the analytic-synthetic distinction explicitly. This only come to the forefront with Kant; and it is Kant who is probably the main source of the above-mentioned belief. Kant ascribed to Hume the view that mathematical propositions are, in his terminology, analytic. If this is correct, then since mathematics was for Hume the paradigm of a body of (...) necessary truths, it is plausible to infer that he considered necessary propositions to be one and all analytic. The absence in Hume's writings of the analytic-synthetic terminology is by no means decisive: though he did not have the terms he may well have possessed the concepts, as evidenced by his use of them. (shrink)

According to Sir Karl Popper, there is a harmful approach to the social sciences called 'historicism'. This takes their principal aim to be historical prediction of an unconditional sort and the chief means to this the discovery of laws of historical development. The chief exemplar is held to be Marx. This paper distinguishes two possible sorts of laws of historical development. Popper's arguments against each are rejected. Which sort it is most plausible to ascribe to Marx is considered. Four models (...) of historical determinism are distinguished and the question of Marx's view or views on the question is discussed in terms of them. (shrink)

This paper has two interrelated aims. One is a criticism of the recent book by Eric Olin Wright, Andrew Levine and Elliott Sober, "Reconstructing Marxism". It is argued that many of the book's key concepts and premises are obscure; sometimes, when clear enough for logical relations to be established, inconsistent with one another; and nearly always open to objections. The same is true of the arguments (where they can be identified) to the conclusions. The book's basic philosophical stance is, in (...) regard to its combination of essentialism and empiricism, Aristotelian. The second aim is to sketch an alternative view of the general character of historical materialism, based closely on Marx's "mature" practice as theoretician, and on many of his key statements of principle. This view involves a sharp distinction between the context of theory and the context of the real (the understanding and change of the latter being the point of the former), and, in the theoretical domain, a distinction among levels of abstractness or generality. (shrink)

These notes comment on two claims in Paul Feyerabend's reply to a critique of his Against Method published in Inquiry, Vol. 20 (1977), Nos. 2?3. One of these is that this critique did not adequately deal with scepticism. The other is that it contained a radical misunderstanding of his basic argument regarding critical rationalism/ Methodism. Some mainly elucidatory remarks are offered on the first point, and the original position maintained on the second, making use of what Feyerabend says in his (...) reply. (shrink)

This paper criticises the view that, according to Marx, “productive forces” determine “relations of production” and that the growth of the former basically determines the course of history. The particular version of this account discussed is that to be found in G.A. Cohen’s Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. The main part of this criticism in:-volves a presentation of what, it is suggested, was in fact Marx's conception of "productive forces", "relations of production" and their relations, and an identification (...) of class-struggle as the primary factor at least for the historically significant periods with which Marx was concerned. (shrink)