In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that exploitation is unjust; some think it is part of the very meaning of the word ‘exploitation’ that it is unjust. Those who think this will suppose that the just society has to be one in which people do not exploit one another, at least on a large scale. I will argue that exploitation is not unjust by definition, and that a society might be fundamentally just while nevertheless being pervasively exploitative. I do think that exploitation (...) is nearly always a bad thing, and wul try to identify the moral belief which makes most of us think it is. But I will argue that its badness does not always consist in its being unjust. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the study of minerals from the Renaissance to the early nineteenth century in the light of the work of Michel Foucault on the history of systems of thought. In spite of a certain number of theoretical problems, Foucault's enterprise opens up to the historian of science a vast terrain for exploration. But this is the place neither for a general exegesis nor for a general criticism of his position; our aim here is the more modest (...) one of taking certain points from Foucault's study,The order of things, and seeing how far they can be extended into an area not explicitly considered in that work. (shrink)

In this study of how we know what we know, W. Jay Wood surveys current views of foundationalism, epistemic justification and reliabilism.

W. Kneale; VI—Time and Eternity in Theology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 87–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

There is a compassion crisis in healthcare negatively impacting patient outcomes. Little is known about the relationship of love as a motivating factor in healthcare. Our research exploring physician and nurse perspectives on what it means to love their patients elucidated substantive themes. Here we report findings from an exploratory follow-up qualitative study exploring patient perspectives on what it means to be loved by the healthcare team. Through convenience sampling, we conducted 21 structured interviews of patients exiting a family medicine (...) clinic. Nineteen of 21 patients unreservedly thought healthcare professionals should love their patients. Common themes emerged, which included being caring, trustworthy, empathetic, compassionate, conscientious, and a concern for the patient’s well-being. The characteristics and actions that reflect love were remarkably consistent with physician and nurse descriptions in our prior study. The nature of love described by patients, physicians and nurses could serve as a basis for high quality, compassionate, ethically sound healthcare. (shrink)

One way of increasing the supply of organs for transplantation is to adopt a policy giving the sick a right to cadaveric organs. Such a right would entail the coercive transfer of organs from the dead without their previous consent. Because this policy would violate individual autonomy and the special relation between humans and their bodies, it would be morally unjustifiable. Although a rights-based non-consensual model of salvaging cadaveric organs would be medically desirable, a communitarian-based consensual model would be a (...) morally justifiable alternative way of addressing the problem of organ scarcity. (shrink)

The statement of Donatus that Vergil wrote the Culex at the age of sixteen seems to be regarded by most scholars as too good to be true. It is a very long time since it was first suggested that XXVI. should be read for XVI., and the proposal has not yet fallen from favour. The apparent justification of this view is found in a passage of Statius' Genethliacon Lucani , where Calliope is represented as foretelling the literary achievements of Lucan. (...) It is the purpose of the present paper to examine this supposed evidence. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The paper examines some of S. J. Schmidt’s key concepts from a semiotic perspective. It argues that not all of them are as incompatible with key notions of semiotics as the author claims and that, even though others remain indeed irreconcilable, some of the latter may contribute to extending radical constructivism beyond its own new horizons.

In this paper, I defend H. L. A. Hart against two prevalent criticisms of his views on social rules and the obligations with which these rules are often associated. These criticisms, I argue, rely on misunderstandings ormischaracterizations of what Hart actually intended. These misunderstandings are plausibly explained by a failure on the part of his critics to appreciate fully two of the valuable lessons Hart sought to communicate in his inaugural lecture. First, words like ‘rule’ and ‘obligation’ should not be (...) removed from their various contexts of use and subjected to abstract philosophical definition and analysis. Second, when analyzing assertions in which such words figure in both legal practice and theory, it is crucial to bear in mind the different functions these assertions can be made to serve and the different purposes to which they can be putResumen:En este ensayo el autor defiende a H. L. A. Hart de dos críticas recurrentes a su teoría de las normas sociales y a las obligaciones que regularmente acompañan a estas normas. Ambas críticas, sostiene el autor, descansan sobre malos entendidos o caracterizaciones equivocadas de lo que Hart en realidad se propuso. Estos malentendidos son explicados plausiblemente a través de la falta de capacidad de los críticos de apreciar plenamente dos de las valiosas lecciones que Hart deseaba expresar en su lectura inaugural. En primer lugar, palabras como “norma” y “obligación” no deberían ser sacadas de sus distintos contextos de uso para someterlas a definiciones abstractas y al análisis filosófico. En segundo lugar, cuando se analizan enunciados en los cuales figuran tales palabras, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica del derecho, resulta primordial tener en mente las diversas funciones que esos enunciados puedan tener y los diferentes propósitos para los cuáles esos enunciados fueron proferidos. (shrink)