The confounding effects of heterogeneity in biological psychiatry and psychiatric genetics have been widely discussed in the literature. We suggest an approach in which heterogeneity may be put to use in hypothesis testing, and may find application in evaluation of the Crespi & Badcock (C&B) imprinting hypothesis. Here we consider three potential sources of etiologic subtypes for analysis.

The final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is generally considered by interpreters to inaugurate an absolute knowing that eliminates any significant opposition between subject and object. Such an understanding of Hegel, however, fails to do justice to the numerous passages in the Phenomenology in which Hegel criticizes just such a reduction of the opposed moments of spirit. In this essay, I argue for an alternative to this traditional interpretation of absolute knowing.

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents the course through which consciousness must pass as it progresses toward true self-knowing. This process consists in consciousness’ self-examination in which its self-knowing is repeatedly compared with the object or standard of this knowing - namely, the nature or concept of spirit. Hegel presents this process, which is the very method of the Phenomenology, in the second part of the Introduction. In this paper, I will argue that only a reinterpretation of absolute knowing provides the (...) key to unlocking the secret of this method. (shrink)

This marvelous and insightful work on James’s philosophy of religion draws its interpretation principally from The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious Experience. In chapters 3 and 4, Suckiel shows that James affirms the primacy of religious experience in the analysis of religious belief, eschewing the traditional intellectual approach. She argues that James holds that religious experience cannot be dismissed offhand as noncognitive; it may in fact constitute a preconceptual knowledge of an objective divine entity. The many varieties (...) of religious experience might, therefore, serve as empirical evidence to support the truth of religious belief. Suckiel is, of course, quick to add that there must be criteria to distinguish veridical from non-veridical religious experience. And in an extension of James’s argument, she contends that if religious experience does not provide conclusive empirical confirmation of religious belief, it at least renders the latter probable. (shrink)

This is a masterful and insightful book written by an author well versed in both the history of philosophy and the analytic tradition. Indeed, one of Westphal’s aims is to reintegrate Hegel’s theory of knowledge into main stream epistemology. Westphal intends to study the aim and method of the Phenomenology of Spirit by means of a complete and detailed analysis and reconstruction of its introduction; however, his work is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the entire Phenomenology. Westphal’s (...) contention is that Hegel’s position is one of “epistemological realism,” and that “this view involves both an ontological thesis - there is a way the world is which does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity - and an epistemological thesis - we can know the way the world is”. Hegel thus rejects both skepticism and “subjectivism”. According to Westphal, Hegel “defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account of empirical knowledge”. (shrink)

This is a masterful and insightful book written by an author well versed in both the history of philosophy and the analytic tradition. Indeed, one of Westphal’s aims is to reintegrate Hegel’s theory of knowledge into main stream epistemology. Westphal intends to study the aim and method of the Phenomenology of Spirit by means of a complete and detailed analysis and reconstruction of its introduction; however, his work is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the entire Phenomenology. Westphal’s (...) contention is that Hegel’s position is one of “epistemological realism,” and that “this view involves both an ontological thesis - there is a way the world is which does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity - and an epistemological thesis - we can know the way the world is”. Hegel thus rejects both skepticism and “subjectivism”. According to Westphal, Hegel “defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account of empirical knowledge”. (shrink)

According to Flay, the theme of Hegel's Phenomenology is a quest for warranted certainty of access to reality, a quest separate from, and yet essential to, the science which will "articulate the ultimate truth about ultimate reality". Such a quest requires a presuppositionless beginning, one that cannot be questioned by either the philosophical tradition or consciousness in its natural attitude. Flay proposes that Hegel achieves such a beginning, first, by not assuming absolute access to reality as an answer already given, (...) but as a problem inherited from the philosophical tradition. Flay maintains that the natural attitude has a natural certainty of access to reality. Hegel's second requirement for a presuppositionless beginning, then, consists in critically accepting the natural attitude's certainty. The quest for certainty will simply involve determining the self-warranting grounds for this certainty. (shrink)

Verene's book reveals an intriguing view of the Phenomenology which should be welcomed by serious students of Hegel. As the title indicates, Verene focuses primarily on the role of recollection and imagery in the Phenomenology. He argues that there is a dialectical tension in Hegel's book between Bild and Begiff. By Bild, Verene means any thought or language based on images or tropes, as opposed to the discursive thought and language of speculative knowing through which alone the Begriff can be (...) adequately comprehended. Recollection functions solely in the medium of Bild; and such imagistic presentation, Verene maintains, provides the indispensable initial access to the Begriff which is subsequently grasped by speculative knowing. (shrink)

The studies contained in this book "investigate the nexus of problems presented by the relationship between philosophical theology and philosophy of religion from the time of the first sweeping critique of speculative theology, through Hegel's attempt to restore the problem of God to a place in theoretical philosophy, down to the second effective critique of speculative theology and, at the same time, philosophy of religion". Jaeschke argues that Hegel's system unites philosophy of religion and philosophical theology; for the former presupposes (...) the existence of God, which can only be proved by the latter. Unless philosophy of religion is based on philosophical theology, religion comes to be treated merely as a manifestation of the human. Furthermore, Jaeschke claims that it is only on the basis of the philosophy of religion, the final discipline of the system, that the Logic can be viewed as philosophical theology. For it is solely in the philosophy of religion that the absolute idea, the object of the Logic, is explicated in the only form appropriate to God--namely, as the self-consciousness of absolute spirit. (shrink)

This book is an excellent collection of essays ranging over nearly every significant area of James’s thought. The following is a brief statement about each essay.