Resenha de: Hegel, G. W. F. Ciência da lógica: 1. A doutrina do ser. Tradução deChristian Iber, Marloren L. de Miranda, Federico Orsini e Agemir Bavaresco. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Bragança Paulista, SP: Ed.Universitária São Francisco, 2016. 464 p. ISBN 9788532653086.************************************************************************************** ************************************ Com a tradução, os falantes da língua portuguesa têm em mãos uma obra filosófica estruturante do pensamento moderno e uma das mais importantes da História da Filosofia. Temos agora e nossas mãos, em língua portuguesa, uma obra de difícil acesso do (...) pensamento hegeliano e que um filósofo de língua portuguesa leria com muita dificuldade. A tradução, ora disponibilizada, tenta conciliar a difícil linguagem hegeliana escrita em alemão com a fluência típica do nosso português, permitindo uma compreensão mais ou menos fácil por parte do falante da língua portuguesa. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend H. L. A. Hart against two prevalent criticisms of his views on social rules and the obligations with which these rules are often associated. These criticisms, I argue, rely on misunderstandings ormischaracterizations of what Hart actually intended. These misunderstandings are plausibly explained by a failure on the part of his critics to appreciate fully two of the valuable lessons Hart sought to communicate in his inaugural lecture. First, words like ‘rule’ and ‘obligation’ should not be (...) removed from their various contexts of use and subjected to abstract philosophical definition and analysis. Second, when analyzing assertions in which such words figure in both legal practice and theory, it is crucial to bear in mind the different functions these assertions can be made to serve and the different purposes to which they can be putResumen:En este ensayo el autor defiende a H. L. A. Hart de dos críticas recurrentes a su teoría de las normas sociales y a las obligaciones que regularmente acompañan a estas normas. Ambas críticas, sostiene el autor, descansan sobre malos entendidos o caracterizaciones equivocadas de lo que Hart en realidad se propuso. Estos malentendidos son explicados plausiblemente a través de la falta de capacidad de los críticos de apreciar plenamente dos de las valiosas lecciones que Hart deseaba expresar en su lectura inaugural. En primer lugar, palabras como “norma” y “obligación” no deberían ser sacadas de sus distintos contextos de uso para someterlas a definiciones abstractas y al análisis filosófico. En segundo lugar, cuando se analizan enunciados en los cuales figuran tales palabras, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica del derecho, resulta primordial tener en mente las diversas funciones que esos enunciados puedan tener y los diferentes propósitos para los cuáles esos enunciados fueron proferidos. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se presenta, desde la filosofía, primeramente la tesis de L. Zea, según el cual la universidad del hombre americano, se halla en la aceptación de la diversidad concreta de las pluriformes maneras de ser de los americanos. Europa recién ahora se pone filosóficamente el problema de la pluralidad cultural. Se analiza luego la forma de considerar el gobierno y las leyes tanto de los americanos sajones como de los americanos latinos, cuando construyen sus propias formas de (...) ser. Se considera el intento y el fracaso al querer éstos imitar a aquéllos. Trata, además, la hipótesis de L. Zea según el cual la identidad de los pueblos latinoamericanos está en no tener ninguna que lo marque como pueblo y hombre común a toda América Latina, salvo ciertos rasgos de conducta común, derivados del talante conquistador español. Ortega y Gasset prolonga este análisis y lo centra en las influencias de la inmigración en Argentina, de lo que -entre otras causas- surge una explicación para ciertas conductas que dan forma a la identidad de los argentinos. Algo no ha cambiado en el modo de ser argentino: éste no se dedica primeramente a vivir la vida, sino a hacer fortuna y defenderse. Se identifica por lo que posee o desea poseer.This article presents, from a philosophical stand, firstly Leopoldo Zea's thesis according to which the American man's universality resides in his acceptance of the concrete diversity of the various ways of being American. Only now Europe is starting to consider philosophically the problem of cultural pluralism. Secondly, we analyze the way the Saxon Americans and the Latin Americans consider government and laws during their respective processes of becoming their own selves. We examine the intent and subsequent failure of the latter at trying to imitate the former; also, Zea's thesis according to which the identity of Latin American peoples lies precisely in not having a unique identity that define them as a man and people common to all Latin America, except for some behavioral traits deriving from the Spanish conqueror temper. Ortega y Gasset extends this analysis focusing on Argentina's immigration and concluding that this partially accounts for the Argentinean behavior and identity, their priority being to make a fortune and to defend themselves. Their identity rises from what they have or what they want to have. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno construeix la modernitat com la fase final d'un procés d'emancipació que ha conduït justament al contrari del que es pretenia. L'alliberament del mite ha portat a una situació històrica en la qual l'encobriment ideològic del món és total. Això té conseqüències per a un pensament que vol ser crític, ja que haurà de trobar un lloc des d'on es pugui interpretar la història per tal de salvar la veritat d'un possible món diferent. En el moment de màxima (...) ocultació ideològica i de màxim absurd -és conegut que Adorno es refereix al món contemporani com al temps després d'Auschwitz- Adorno intentarà entendre què ha passat amb aquest subjecte que s'ha preocupat excessivament per la seva identitat. Mitjançant l'aplicació del model psicoanalític d'interpretació a textos de Beckett i Kafka reconstruirà la història de l'emancipació fallida del subjecte modern. Amb aquestes interpretacions Adorno se situa no només molt a prop de la pràctica psicoanalítica, sinó també de la tradició hermenèutica clàssica. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno construeix la modernitat com la fase final d'un procés d'emancipació que ha conduït justament al contrari del que es pretenia. L'alliberament del mite ha portat a una situació històrica en la qual l'encobriment ideològic del món és total. Això té conseqüències per a un pensament que vol ser crític, ja que haurà de trobar un lloc des d'on es pugui interpretar la història per tal de salvar la veritat d'un possible món diferent. En el moment de màxima (...) ocultació ideològica i de màxim absurd -és conegut que Adorno es refereix al món contemporani com al temps després d'Auschwitz- Adorno intentarà entendre què ha passat amb aquest subjecte que s'ha preocupat excessivament per la seva identitat. Mitjançant l'aplicació del model psicoanalític d'interpretació a textos de Beckett i Kafka reconstruirà la història de l'emancipació fallida del subjecte modern. Amb aquestes interpretacions Adorno se situa no només molt a prop de la pràctica psicoanalítica, sinó també de la tradició hermenèutica clàssica. (shrink)

May discovered Diderot's copiously annotated copy of this anti-materialist tract by Hemsterhuis, known to many contemporaries as "the Dutch Plato"; this edition contains May's interesting introduction, a facsimile of the original text, and a transcription of all of Diderot's comments. The comments bear on infelicities of style as well as of thought, though the latter preponderate: the Lettre is not, alas, the product of a first-rate philosophical intellect. Diderot's strong objections to Hemsterhuis' crude theory of a moral organ can be (...) taken as complementing his Refutation of Helvetius, which dates from the same period.—W. L. M. (shrink)

Admitting to some departure from the Aristotelian classification, Jolivet divides human activities into three sorts: labor, play, and contemplation. He warns against the naturalizing effect of the Marxist notion of labor, defends play as the essentially superfluous, and argues for including art in his third category. A proper conception of human wisdom involves all three activities, although the speculative remains the highest, and the love of God is wisdom's fullest perfection. Based on a lecture series, the book is a clear, (...) rather non-technical, and contemporary re-working of some venerable ideas.--W. L. M. (shrink)

For Brun, the separation of men from existence, which expresses itself in various forms of anxiety, is the central concern of philosophy. While the separation of men from one another can be partly overcome by language and by modern technology's "conquests," the ontological separation cannot, the philosophic attitude of wonder can never be entirely replaced by nihil mirari. He takes issue with the philosophies of praxis which regard human action as the potential remedy for all separation. The thesis is defended (...) capably and passionately.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Pucelle tries to show how the idea of personal liberty is central to Green's ethics. Green's criticisms of other philosophers and the historical context of his philosophy are especially well handled. --W. L. M.

Pucelle tries to show how the idea of personal liberty is central to Green's ethics. Green's criticisms of other philosophers and the historical context of his philosophy are especially well handled. --W. L. M.

In C.Q. xliii , p. 126, Messrs. Klos and Minio-Paluello write: ‘Burnet's and Robin's collations of W… differ for the text of the Phaedo in about 130 readings of a more than orthographical interest. A new inspection of the manuscript has shown that Robin very often corrected Burnet, but added some twenty mistakes.’ As this may give a false impression of Burnet as a collator, it will be well to recall Burnet's own statement in C.Q. xiv , p. 132: ‘He (...) [Wilamowitz] says that my collations of W are inadequate, and have been shown to be so by Schoene for the Symposium, and by Hensel for the Theaetetus and Politicus. As he refers his readers to my Prefaces , he has presumably read them, and ought to have known that I never collated W at all or even saw it.’. (shrink)

Artiklen præsenterer i første del det pædagogiske stof fra Platons Staten og Lovene, som Rousseau har læst og fundet inspiration i. Der plæderes for, at Rousseau optager og transponerer såvel principper som konkrete overvejelser uanset den forskelige historiske kontekst og de dermed sammenhængende forskellige udformninger og mål for opdragelsen. I anden del diskuteres Rousseaus ’platonisme’ i mere overordnet filosofisk sammenhæng, og der argumenteres for, at Rousseaus utraditionelle, pædagogisk-filosofiske Platon-læsning dels kan ses at fremdrage underbelyste centrale tematikker i Platons filosofi, dels (...) understreger deres stadige aktualitet. (shrink)

This book's fourteen short essays are neither very technical nor definitive, as Schaff warns in his forward. They do, however, reveal the struggle of a sincere philosopher, who happens also to be a high official of the Polish Communist Party, against the absolutes that plague him—absolute determinism, total party discipline, the definitive revolution. Schaff here continues his debate with the existentialists, notably Sartre, and contributes some clarification to the problem of "Marxist ethics."—W. L. M.

This is a nonsense book. It summarizes essential tenets of Pölätüöism, which is the definitive reconciliation of modern science and Roman Catholicism, and chronicles the long and eventful life of its founder. Although neither the cleverness nor the taste maintains a uniform excellence, there is much delightful satire on recent philosophy and religion. Pölätüö's interview with Russell, and his paper "On the Reality of the Soul and on the Reality of Onion," are two of the highlights.--W. L. M.

The relevance of utopian speculation to the social sciences is Krysmanski's central concern. Through an analysis of eight 20th century German utopian novels and a briefer examination of related literary forms, he tries to determine the peculiar features of the modern utopian method. He finds it to be of value in uncovering new possibilities for altering society on the basis of new technology.--W. L. M.

Zitta once attended a course given by Lukács in Budapest. He has prepared an impressive partial bibliography of Lukács' pre-1958 writings, and he liberally scatters the sometimes erratic, often interesting notes of an undisciplined but voracious reader throughout his text. The book-beautifully printed, promising insight into a great but much-neglected thinker, its title replete with four of the most emotion-charged words in contemporary philosophical vocabularies—appears on the surface to emanate intellectual respectability. In fact, it is a clearer candidate than most (...) of those chosen by Lukacs himself to illustrate "die Zerstörung der Vernunft." Zitta's method takes its cue from an early phase in Harold Lasswell's thought, in which literary psychoanalysis was regarded as the key to scholarship concerning political writers. Zitta concentrates almost exclusively on Lukács' works through 1923, and devotes much of this "analysis" to expressing his profound personal contempt for his subject. In short, this book abounds with bad grammar and worse scholarship.—W. L. M. (shrink)

An attempt to develop some "valuationally neutral" definitions of freedom in the interest of a more rigorous vocabulary in the social sciences. For his analytic purposes, Oppenheim takes as basic "social freedom," a behavioral, relational concept holding between "actors." Within his self-imposed limitations--of analyzing and clarifying, rather than contributing a new theory--Oppenheim has succeeded in dissecting one of political theory's most crucial but emotively colored words. --W. L. M.

A series of lectures which critically examines neo-Thomist and existentialist currents and concludes by advocating "the reasonableness of personalistic theism." The meaning and justification of this theism is barely treated.--W. L. M.