Open peer commentary on the article “On Climate Change Research, the Crisis of Science and Second-order Science” by Philipp Aufenvenne, Heike Egner & Kirsten von Elverfeldt. Upshot: On an epistemological level, Aufenvenne, Egner and von Elverfeldt argue convincingly for an increasing role for second-order science in climate research. However, the authors partially underestimate the already increasing role of reflexive critique in climate discourse, and they do not yet fully take into account the radical changes in our conception of climate change (...) through the deployment of a second-order approach. (shrink)

Richard A. Posner's two books on the financial crisis focus on possible macroeconomic (Keynesian) causes of it, neglecting legal causes that would have had only microeconomic effects, yet could have been responsible for the crisis. Specifically, Posner accepts too readily the conventional wisdom that banks? leverage levels, hence their capital cushions, were deregulated; this ignores Basel I, Basel II, and the Recourse rule, which internationally and (in the last case) in the United States minutely regulated not only leverage levels but (...) the composition of banks? assets. These regulations penalized banks for making business loans in comparison to mortgage loans, and it further penalized them for keeping mortgage loans rather than selling them for securitization and then buying back the ?senior? tranches of the resulting mortgage-backed securities. These regulations may explain the overconcentration of mortgage risk in the banks, and thus the financial crisis. (shrink)

Richard A. Posner's two books on the financial crisis focus on possible macroeconomic (Keynesian) causes of it, neglecting legal causes that would have had only microeconomic effects, yet could have been responsible for the crisis. Specifically, Posner accepts too readily the conventional wisdom that banks’ leverage levels, hence their capital cushions, were deregulated; this ignores Basel I, Basel II, and the Recourse rule, which internationally and (in the last case) in the United States minutely regulated not only leverage levels but (...) the composition of banks’ assets. These regulations penalized banks for making business loans in comparison to mortgage loans, and it further penalized them for keeping mortgage loans rather than selling them for securitization and then buying back the “senior” tranches of the resulting mortgage-backed securities. These regulations may explain the overconcentration of mortgage risk in the banks, and thus the financial crisis. (shrink)