This is a study of Aristotle's moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.

Aristotle maintains that every man has, or should have, a single end, a target at which he aims. The doctrine is stated in E.N. I 2. ‘If, then, there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall (...) we not, like archers who have a mark to aim t, be more likely to hit upon what is right?’. Aristotle does not here prove, nor need we understand him as claiming to prove, that there is only one end which is desired for itself. He points out correctly that, if there are objects which are desired but not desired for themselves, there must be some object which is desired for itself. The passage further suggests that, if there were one such object and one only, this fact would be important and helpful for the conduct of life. (shrink)

Does Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics give one consistent answer to the question what life is best or two mutually inconsistent answers? In the First Book he says that we can agree to say that the best life is eudaimonia or eupraxia but must go on to say in what eudaimonia consists. By considering the specific nature of man as a thinking animal he reaches a conclusion: eudaimonia, the human good, is the activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and (...) if there are more than one virtue in accordance with the best and most complete, and in a complete life. Aristotle states that his formula is no more than a sketch or outline, but that a good sketch is important since, if the outline is right, anyone can articulate it and supply details. He seems to be thinking here not just of the rest of his own treatise but of the work of pupils and successors; he speaks, as at the end of the Topics, of progress in a science. (shrink)

W. F. R. Hardie; X—Aristotle's Doctrine that Virtue is a “Mean”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 65, Issue 1, 1 June 1965, Pages 183–204, https.

Lvcilivs, fr. 965 :quaenam uox ex te resonans meo gradu remoram facit ?Mr. Housman in the first number of the Classical Quarterly refuted and pulverized the attempt of Marx to emend this passage by writing quoia nam. ‘ Ex tecto ’ and ‘ ex aede’ have been suggested; but it is obvious that if ‘ ex aede’ is to be contemplated, emendation may go on S0009838800019431_inline1—scores of words could be found that would make sense. There is no context. If the (...) passage is to be emended at all, I suggest that Lucilius wrotequaenam uox EXTVOORERESONANS. (shrink)

Lvcilivs, fr. 965 :quaenam uox ex te resonans meo gradu remoram facit?Mr. Housman in the first number of the Classical Quarterly refuted and pulverized the attempt of Marx to emend this passage by writing quoia nam. ‘ Ex tecto ’ and ‘ ex aede’ have been suggested; but it is obvious that if ‘ ex aede’ is to be contemplated, emendation may go on S0009838800019431_inline1—scores of words could be found that would make sense. There is no context. If the passage (...) is to be emended at all, I suggest that Lucilius wrotequaenam uox EXTVOORERESONANS. (shrink)

There has been much discussion in recent years regarding the date and authorship of the poems included in the Appendix Vergiliana, and about the Civis and the Culex in particular. Evidence of very various kinds has been brought to bear on the question. My chief aim in this paper is to propound a criterion which as far as I know is new—though it seems to me a fairly conspicuous thing, and I do not know why it has not been investigated (...) —and to examine certain criteria which seem to me to have been treated quite wrongly—treated in a way which could lead to no conclusion—even by so distinguished a scholar as Norden. I propose in a second paper to examine the argument from diction, especially in regard to the Culex, and to try to show that the evidence adduced for Virgilian authorship by Miss Jackson is not so conclusive as it has been supposed to be; and, next, to point out certain features or mannerisms in the Culex which seem to me to be on the whole against authorship by Virgil. I have hardly any doubt that both the Ciris and the Culex were written before 44 B.C., and the Lydia and Dirae only two or three years later; but, while the evidence for the early date of some of the Vergiliana grows stronger on further examination, the evidence for Virgilian authorship seems to me to grow weaker, even in the case of the well-attested Culex. (shrink)

‘After it, the philosophy of perception cannot be discussed in ways it usually was discussed before.’ This is said about Sense and Sensibilia by Mr Bernard Williams in an article, ‘J. L. Austin's philosophy’, published in the Oxford Magazine of 6 December 1962. It is not quite clear what Mr Williams means by the remark. It might be understood as an endorsement of Austin's insistence that philosophers have lapsed into crudity and error through their neglect of distinctions marked by the (...) rich variety of linguistic expressions in ordinary use. But Mr Williams himself in his article makes some effective criticisms of Austin's opinion that ordinary language is a reservoir of philosophically significant distinctions, and points out also that Austin's own practice in these lectures did not exhibit any close connection between his survey of the variety of the uses of such words as ‘look’, ‘seem’, ‘appear’, and his criticism of theories of perception. (shrink)

The Hercules Oetaeus, whatever be its authorship, is closely related to the other plays, and often has what seem to be reminiscences of them, not always felicitous reminiscences. Often, of course, they are reminiscences of the other Hercules, and may supply a clue to the text of that play. Many of them were pointed out by Leo, but there is room for further investigation.

The Hercules Oetaeus, whatever be its authorship, is closely related to the other plays, and often has what seem to be reminiscences of them, not always felicitous reminiscences. Often, of course, they are reminiscences of the other Hercules, and may supply a clue to the text of that play. Many of them were pointed out by Leo, but there is room for further investigation.

There has been much discussion in recent years regarding the date and authorship of the poems included in the Appendix Vergiliana, and about the Civis and the Culex in particular. Evidence of very various kinds has been brought to bear on the question. My chief aim in this paper is to propound a criterion which as far as I know is new—though it seems to me a fairly conspicuous thing, and I do not know why it has not been investigated (...) —and to examine certain criteria which seem to me to have been treated quite wrongly—treated in a way which could lead to no conclusion—even by so distinguished a scholar as Norden. I propose in a second paper to examine the argument from diction, especially in regard to the Culex, and to try to show that the evidence adduced for Virgilian authorship by Miss Jackson is not so conclusive as it has been supposed to be; and, next, to point out certain features or mannerisms in the Culex which seem to me to be on the whole against authorship by Virgil. I have hardly any doubt that both the Ciris and the Culex were written before 44 B.C., and the Lydia and Dirae only two or three years later; but, while the evidence for the early date of some of the Vergiliana grows stronger on further examination, the evidence for Virgilian authorship seems to me to grow weaker, even in the case of the well-attested Culex. (shrink)

The ancient evidence about the Culex is collected by Miss Jackson in her article in the Classical Quarterly . There seems no reason to doubt that Lucan said ‘et quantum mihi restat ad Culicem!’; and, whatever Lucan meant by it, Statius turned it into a compliment for the poet by making Calliope predict the various works he would produce ‘ante annos Culicis Maroniani’ . In the Neronian age, we may take it, it was not an obscure or conjectural matter, but (...) one of common knowledge or belief, that a certain known poem, the Culex, was the work of Virgil. About the other opuscula there is no evidence as early as that. The Aetna and Moretum are ascribed to him dubiously; the Ciris, Dirae, Epigrammata, Priapea, Catalepton are attributed to him with more confidence, but not so confidently as the Culex. It almost looks as if the belief in the Virgilian authorship spread from the Culex to certain other poems which were in some way or other connected with it. Here there is admittedly a great difficulty for those who are inclined to deny or to doubt that it is Virgil's. Are not the facts most easily explained by supposing that it was Virgil's ? At all events it is in various ways improbable that it was written, and produced as Virgil's, at some time between Virgil's death and the youth of Lucan. It is difficult to imagine who would have a motive for doing such a thing, or who could do it successfully. So it is incumbent upon the sceptic to produce some plausible view of what may have happened. (shrink)

The dream related by Ennius in the first book of his Annales, in which the ghost of Homer appeared to him, has been the subject of much discussion. There are various pieces of evidence about it from which inferences can be drawn; sometimes, I think, too much has been inferred, sometimes too little. My chief object in this paper is to consider what exactly was the view held or expounded by Ennius regarding the nature of the soul and the conditions (...) under which a ghost appears. But I propose in the first place to review the evidence and to contemplate the dream as a poetic product, a thing which has its place in the history of poetry and its affinities with similar passages in other authors. (shrink)

The dream related by Ennius in the first book of his Annales, in which the ghost of Homer appeared to him, has been the subject of much discussion. There are various pieces of evidence about it from which inferences can be drawn; sometimes, I think, too much has been inferred, sometimes too little. My chief object in this paper is to consider what exactly was the view held or expounded by Ennius regarding the nature of the soul and the conditions (...) under which a ghost appears. But I propose in the first place to review the evidence and to contemplate the dream as a poetic product, a thing which has its place in the history of poetry and its affinities with similar passages in other authors. (shrink)

The words “free will” have uses in ordinary talk as in “free will offering” and, most commonly, in the expression “of my own free will.” We all know what states of affairs make this expression applicable, and its standard use is defined by this application. Yet philosophers discuss, or used to discuss, whether the will is free, libertarians saying that it is and determinists denying this. Are they, or were they, asking whether anyone ever acts of his own free will? (...) If so, the question asked was absurd. (shrink)