The main theorem says that a consequence operator is an effective part of the consequence operator for the classical prepositional calculus iff it is a consequence operator for a logic satisfying the compactness theorem, and in which every finitely axiomatizable theory is decidable.

Der Beitrag besteht aus zwei Teilen: der erste ist eine kurze Einführung in das Leben und das Werk der bedeutenden österreichischen Mittlerin der polnischen Literatur. Der zweite ist ein Interview mit Prof. Dr. Gerda Leber-Hagenau, die - geboren in Lodz am 11. Dezember 1918 - sich an ihre Heimatstadt und deren Eigentüm1ichkeiten erinnert. Gerda Leber-Hagenau nimmt auch Stellung zur Aufnahme der polnischen Literatur in Österreich.

Experiments with remote perception and Random Event Generators (REG) performed over the last decades show small but significant anomalous effects. Since these effects seem to be independent of spatial and temporal distance, they appear to be in disagreement with the standard scientific worldview. A very simple explanation of quantum mechanics is pre- sented, rejecting all unjustified claims about the world. A view of mind in agreement with cognitive neuroscience is introduced. It is argued that mind and consciousness are emer- gent (...) properties of the brain and are understandable without any nonphysical assumptions. A plausible explanation of the results of anomalous experiments, based on the concept of synchronicity, introduced by C.G. Jung and advocated by W. Pauli, is offered. A proof is given that strong correlations should exist between any systems that once interacted. Synchronicity events between parts of the brain and physical objects may be sufficient to explain the results of anomalous experiments. Standard physics is sufficient to understand these phenomena. Motto. (shrink)

W.E.B. Du Bois’s elegy for his infant son, “Of the Passing of the First-Born,” in The Souls of Black Folk, has received relatively scant attention from political theorists. Yet it illuminates crucial developments in Du Bois’s political thought. It memorializes a tragedy central to his turn from scientific facts to rhetorical appeals to emotion. Its rhetoric also exemplifies a broader tension in his writings, between masculinist and elitist commitments and more insurrectionary impulses. In its normalizing rhetorical mode, which dominates, the (...) elegy depicts an idealized patriarchal bourgeois household—potentially eliciting white readers’ sympathetic identification, but failing to displace the gendered and classed logic of racial exclusion. Its moments of transgressive rhetoric complicate or refuse such identification, celebrating Burghardt’s racial impurity and invoking a lineage of black maternal ambivalence. Though each is vexed and ephemeral, these moments of transgressive rhetoric reveal countervailing impulses that Du Bois would articulate in later writings. (shrink)

Neuronauki dokonały znacznego postępu w rozumieniu wyższych czynności poznawczych, w tym procesów decyzyjnych. Brakuje jednak zarówno prostych modeli, które pozwolą wyobrazić sobie te procesy, jak i głębszej refleksji nad wpływem tych wyników na zrozumienie natury umysłu, rozproszenia obaw, że nie jesteśmy tylko automatami. Płodny punkt widzenia na kwestię reprezentacji mentalnych daje próba zrozumienia, w jaki sposób informacja reprezentowana jest przez mózgi, jak w przybliżony sposób opisać stany mózgu tak, by można je było zinterpretować jako reprezentacje mentalne odnoszące się do umysłu. (...) Czym jest w nas to, co podejmuje decyzje? Jest to kluczowa kwestia dla zrozumienia wielu zagadnień klasycznej filozofii, od wolnej woli i problemu ciała i umysłu poczynając. Chociaż iluzja homunkulusa jest silna można się od niej uwolnić. Analiza procesów podejmowania decyzji wymaga zrozumienia w jaki sposób zakodowane są w mózgu najprostsze pojęcia. Jedynie przez aproksymację fizycznych stanów mózgu, zawierających znacznie więcej informacji niż stany mentalne, możemy dokonać istotnego postępu w rozumieniu i opisie reprezentacji mentalnych, przydatnych nie tylko filozofom, ale też mających zastosowania w analizie języka naturalnego, kategoryzacji pojęć w psychologii i architekturach kognitywnych w sztucznej inteligencji. Ucieleśnienie jak i enaktywizm są dla rozwoju reprezentacji pojęć bardzo istotne ale nie wystarczające. Po analizie współczesnej wiedzy o reprezentacji pojęć w mózgu zaprezentowano podejście oparte o język układów dynamicznych, które oferuje dość prosty język, pozwalający zrozumieć zaskakujące, często nieracjonalne decyzje podejmowane przez ludzi. Dzięki symulacjom komputerowym można się spodziewać znacznego postępu w rozumieniu reprezentacji mentalnych i wyższych czynności poznawczych, w szczególności procesów podejmowania decyzji. (shrink)

Artykuł przestawia dydaktykę KEN, koncentrując się na ukazaniu reform oświatowych charakterystycznych dla epoki oświecenia. W szczególności ukazuje specyfikę styku ówczesnej filozofii i nowożytnej nauki, stopniowo wyzwalającej się z hegemonii filozofii. Wskazuje na dominujący podówczas duch utylitaryzmu, a w warstwie metodologicznej - programowy eklektyzm. Postawa ta ujawniła się w całym szkolnictwie europejskim, a więc nie tylko we Francji, przodującej przynajmniej w zakresie deklaracji programowych, ale zwłaszcza w centralistycznie reformowanej oświacie w monarchii habsburskiej. Jest ona także właściwa tak reprezentacyjnemu świadectwu ówczesnej (...) kultury naukowej, jakim była Wielka Encyklopedia Francuska, do której nawiąże wprost KEN. W szkole europejskiej wzbogacano studium językowo-humanistyczne o kształcenie matematyczno-przyrodnicze, zachowując kurs filozofii w duchuphilosophia recen- tiorum, przynajmniej na poziomie uniwersyteckim. Filozofia ta krytycznie asymilowała elementy nowożytnej epistemologii, a zwłaszcza osiągnięcia nowożytnego przyrodoznawstwa. Podejście to było typowe dla szkolnictwa reformowanego w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów przez środowiska wyznaniowe, zwłaszcza zakon pijarów i jezuitów. Z czasem coraz bardziej upowszechni się empirystyczna epistemologia, owocująca fenomenalizmem kwestionującym możliwość uprawiania maksymalistycznie pojętej filozofii w formie nowożytnego arystotelizmu chrześcijańskiego funkcjonującego w szkole tradycyjnej. Mimo krytyki tego modelu kształcenia, presja tzw. długiego trwania tłumaczy zachowanie w szkole oświeceniowej elementów filozoficznych nawet w przyrodoznawstwie, w formie interpretacji korzystającej z kategorii substancji i jej właściwości, a nawet koncepcji duszy zwierzęcej. (shrink)

Moje zainteresowanie pracami i dziełem Michaiła Bachtina oraz Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy bierze swój początek z odkrycia, ze obaj myśliciele zgodnie twierdzili, iż religijna moc języka oraz mowy wyrasta z różnorodnych kryzysów życiowych. Theoria przez nich stworzona zbudowana jest na gruncie praxis i czerpie swą siłę ze zderzenia doświadczeń duchowych i intelektualnych obu filozofów z rewolucyjnym wrzeniem otaczającej ich współczesności. Wykład niniejszy to próba nawiązania dialogu z osobami podzielającymi podobne zainteresowania i troski. Pisząc go kierowałem się także pragnieniem zaabsorbowania uwagi moich słuchaczy (...) przedstawione w nim istoty metalingwistyki głoszonej przez „nieortodoksyjnego" prawosławnego teoretyka literatury i filozofa języka, Michaiła Bachtina, oraz znaczeniem metanomiki opracowanej przez „rewolucyjnie konserwatywnego" chrześcijańskiego myśliciela mowy i filozofa społecznego, Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy. Zamiarem moim jest przedstawienie roli, jaką społeczno-religijne modele filozofii i socjologii oparte na mowie i języku mogą^ odegrać w dążeniach do zaprowadzenia pokojowego współistnienia na całej naszej planecie. Ten właśnie obszar zainteresowań został określony przez Williama Jamesa, amerykańskiego filozofa pragmatyzmu, mianem „moralnego równoważnika wojny”. Przywołując na pamięć ogromną rzeszę myślicieli, których prace odnoszą się bezpośrednio do wyznaczonego tu obszaru – a w pewnych przypadkach noszą znamiona dzieła prekursorskiego – nie możemy poprzestać na wymienieniu tylko nazwiska Williama Jamesa. Inne wielkie postaci to: Charles Sanders Pierce, George Herbert Mead, a także myśliciele podejmujący zagadnienia, które później stały się treścią filozofii Rosenstocka-Huessy, tj. Giovanni Battista Vico, J. G. Hamann, Comte de Saint-Simon oraz Giuseppe Ferrari. (shrink)

Author: Mróz Tomasz Title: TWO IMAGES OF PLATO IN THE WORKS OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ (Dwa wizerunki Platona w twórczości Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 535-557 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, PLATO, NEO-KANTIAN, PAUL NATORP, RECEPTION OF THE PLATO IN POLAND, THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper discusses two different approaches of W. Tatarkiewicz to Plato and Platonism. As a (...) former student of the neo-Kantian school in Marburg he shared Paul Natorp’s reading of Plato’s theory of ideas. Tatarkiewicz expressed his agreement with Natorp’s interpretation of the ideas as laws and explanations, in a paper titled A Dispute about Plato (Spór o Platona, 1911). Twenty years later, however, while working on his academic textbook of the history of philosophy, Tatarkiewicz presented Plato’s philosophy in a more balanced manner. In his History of Philosophy two interpretations of the theory of ideas – traditional, Aristotelian and neo-Kantian – were both presented as well-founded. The differences between these two images of Plato in Tatarkiewicz’s works are emphasized. Moreover, some remarks on the reception of the neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato in Poland are presented, as well as the early reaction on the monumental Tatarkiewicz’s History of Philosophy. (shrink)

Author: Horecka Aleksandra Title: THE CONCEPT OF AESTHETICAL VALUE IN TATARKIEWICZ’S PAPERS (Pojęcie wartości estetycznej w pracach Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 601-615 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, AESTHETICAL VALUE, ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of this paper is to report and analyse the main theses of Tatarkiewicz’s theory of aesthetic value. We concentrate on ontological problems – what is aesthetical value and what (...) is the ontological category of valuable object. Tatarkiewicz claims, that: “The term ‘value’ refers to an abstract: property of thing, or to a concrete: to thing endowed with this property”. Many types of aesthetic value (aesthetic value in narrow sense, literary value and poetical value) exist. The only difference between using concept of aesthetic value only in positive sense and using concept of aesthetic value both – in positive and negative sense – is formal. Concerning thesis (1) we claim, that expression “thing” in Tatarkiewicz’s theory is the synonym for “physical object”; not only material objects, but also physical events and processes are Tatarkiewicz’s things as well. In our opinion the concept of aesthetic value proposed by Tatarkiewicz is objective, therefore formulation of thesis of aesthetic subjectivity, which Tatarkiewicz also did, is problematical. Using Tatarkiewicz’s terminology, we construct concept of value as a state of affairs (that some object is endowed with value-property) and we accept monocathegoriality of values (value is a property, a thing endowed with this property or a state of affairs). Concerning thesis (2) we divide all objects into semantic and asemantic and we claim, that in Tatarkiewicz’s theory, only asemantic objects or semantic but semantically uninterpreted object could be endowed with aesthetic value in narrow sense. The aesthetic value in narrow sense is its property considering its appearance or structure. As to the literary and poetical values – they are ascribed to semantic object in consideration of represented object. Concerning thesis (3) we argue, that it is significant whether we use concept of value only in positive sense or both – in positive and negative sense. Only in language with both expressions (“positive aesthetic value” and “negative aesthetic value”) we can formulate the theses about aesthetically neutral objects. (shrink)

Author: Nowik Andrzej Marek Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM THE METHODOLOGICAL POLEMICS POINT OF VIEW (Historiografia Władysława Tatarkiewicza w kontekście sporów metodologicznych) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 497-503 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, MODERN PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of this article is to show the main trends in philosophy that influenced Władyslaw Tatarkiewicz’s science research, with special consideration of neo-Kantianism (the Marburg (...) and the Baden Schools). Władysław Tatarkiewicz, one of the most significant polish historians of philosophy, rarely made comments on his preferred methods and on his concept of history of philosophy. Nevertheless, many of the methodological issues raised by Tatarkiewicz are focused on the problem of historical synthesis, at which the historian is obliged to make specific assessment concerning the subject matter of the research. Tatarkiewicz’s position on historiography indicates its relationship with remaining humanistic disciplines. (shrink)

Author: Szutta Artur Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S CONCEPT OF THE ‘THIRD STATES’ (Stany trzecie w ujęciu Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 617-627 Keywords: “THIRD STATES”, LEISURE, PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, INTELLECT, SENSE OF LIFE, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, JOSEPH PIEPER Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article treats on the concept of “third states” (as opposed to the other two kinds of states: those of work and entertainment) introduced by Władysław (...) Tatarkiewicz in his treatise On Happiness. A thorough analysis of the passage on “third states” as well as of the very concept allows to see its relevance to the considerations on such important philosophical questions as those of the nature of doing philosophy, the meaning of life, intellectual intuition, theoria or contemplation. The paper consists of five parts. The first part is focused on Tatarkiewicz’s understanding of “third states” as well as on a phenomenological analysis of the concept itself. The second part is a kind of extension of the analysis enriched by Josef Pieper’s interpretation of the idea of leisure which I find very close to what Tatarkiewicz means by “third states”. In the light of the analysis the concept of the ‘third states’ turns out to be very inspiring and useful in dealing with a number of philosophical questions, which is shown in the fourth part of the paper. The final step consists of questioning the above conclusion by short outlining a possible naturalistic interpretation of the ‘third states’ in the light of which the picture of philosophy, human life or human cognition, based on the concept of the ‘third states’ might turn out to be a mere illusion. I do not give a final answer to this question but treat the conclusion of the paper as an invitation to a deeper consideration of the matter. (shrink)

Author: Konstańczak Stefan Title: EXISTENTIAL MEANING OF SUFFERING IN AXIOLOGY OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ (Egzystencjalne znaczenie cierpienia w aksjologii Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 629-642 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, ETHICS, SUFFERING, HAPPINESS, INJUSTICE, MORAL COMPENSATION, MINIMIZING OF SUFFERING, HAPPINESS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The problem of human suffering was not the subject of a separate publication by Władysław Tatarkiewicz. However, such theme matter appeared in a few (...) of his important publications, including his post-doctoral thesis “On inexorability of the good”, after-war publication “On happiness” and a small treatise “Ethical bases of revindication and compensation” justifying Polish claims for reparations after the warfare. Tatarkiewicz made a distinction between physical and spiritual suffering, but each one was always considered as a bad thing. War experience changed his attitude in this matter and therefore he admitted that it is impossible to eliminate suffering from human life and hence he claimed that one can experience happiness even in spite of some negative sensations. Age is not an obstacle to feel it either. However, he pointed out that undeserved suffering justifiably demands a compensation and the lack of it or evasion from redressing the wrong are immoral. One cannot evade a duty of minimizing of suffering because even personal suffering cannot be the reason of drawing back from moral duties fulfillment. (shrink)

Decisions related to animal welfare standards depend on farmer’s multiple goals and values and are constrained by a wide range of external and internal forces. The aim of this paper is twofold, i.e., to develop a theoretical framework for farmers’ AW decisions that incorporates farmers’ goals, use and non-use values and to present an approach to empirically implement the theoretical framework. The farmer as a head of the farm household makes choices regarding production to maximize the utility of the household. (...) The overall utility of the farmer is determined by his multiple objectives. For the analysis of multi-objective problems, the multiple criteria decision - making paradigm provides an appropriate theoretical framework. However, theories from the field of social-psychology are needed to facilitate the identification of all relevant aspects in the decision making. The practical use of the conceptual framework is demonstrated using a simple numerical application of a multi-objective programming model. Two workshops were devoted to examining the scientific consistency and the practical usefulness of the approach. Implementing this approach will increase knowledge of the main factors and barriers that determine farmers’ decisions with regard to AW standards. This knowledge is relevant during the development of new AW concepts that aims to supply products that comply with above-legal AW standards for middle-market segments. (shrink)

“O, rocks!” Molly exclaims in impatience with Bloom’s first definition of metempsychosis, “tell us in plain words” . Looking forward, then, we remember that Bloom asks Murphy if he has seen the Rock of Gibraltar and asks further what year that would have been and if Murphy remembers the boats that plied the strait. “I’m tired of all them rocks in the sea,” replies Murphy . Bloom’s interest derives from Molly’s connection with Gibraltar, and Molly herself in her monologue remembers (...) the boats well and thinks of missing the boat at Algeciras , just before the book ends with her thoughts of the awful deepdown torrent,” the tide that moves like a river through the strait. Imaginatively she moves with that torrent, figuratively the torrent of time that plunges from the future to the past, which she accepts, with her yes, going deeply with the flow of life, and with her goes Murphy/Joyce, touching on Gibraltar at last. Molly remembers Ulysses S. Grant getting off a boat in Gibraltar, an occurrence that Adams sees as unduly stretching probability merely in order to bring Molly in incidental touch with a man named Ulysses.19 But remembering that Murphy is a “wily old customer,” we may remember also that the Ulysses of Joyce’s favorite Dante cannot rest with Penelope but, in search of knowledge and excellence, moves on through the two rocks of the straits of Gibraltar, the pillars of Hercules, to further adventure and also to destruction; and we may then think that with this reference, Joyce took pains to tell us that the Ulysses of this book here completes in hidden climax the design and purpose of his work, and sails on to oblivion, or rather to dispersion and reconstitution as everyone in the new adventure of Finnegans Wake. 19. See Adams, Surface and Symbol, p. 233. Ralph W. Rader, professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Tennyson’s “Maud”: The Biographical Genesis. He is currently working on a theoretical study of form in the novel and other genres. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Literary Theoretical Contribution of Sheldon Sacks” and “The Dramatic Monologue and Related Lyric Forms”. (shrink)

Artykuł jest poświęcony analizie przestrzeni Łodzi przedstawionej w powieści Reymonta. Autor koncentruje się na popularnej opozycji natura versus cywilizacja, która jest wyeksponowana w Ziemi obiecanej. Autor odwołuje się także do toksycznego dyskursu Laurence’a Buella. Reymont zdaje sobie sprawę, że przyspieszona urbanizacja zaburzyła równowagę ekologiczną w środowisku. Nowe fabryki, które pojawiły się na terenie Łodzi, zmniejszyły obszary dzikiej przyrody. Toksyczne opary z kominów stały się wyraźnym znakiem zbliżającej się katastrofy ekologicznej. Drzewa porównane do szkieletów i zapach zgnilizny są dowodem postępującej agonii (...) w krajobrazie miejskim. Problem zanieczyszczenia środowiska wydaje się ignorowany przez protagonistów Ziemi obiecanej. Wynika to z faktu, iż przyroda postrzegana jest jedynie jako pole ciągłego wyzysku człowieka. Jedyną wrażliwą osobą jest narrator, który podobnie jak kronikarz dokumentuje destrukcyjne zmiany w ekosystemie. Niewątpliwie głos Reymonta jest przejawem dojrzałej, nowoczesnej świadomości ekologicznej. (shrink)

RADOSŁAW ZENDEROWSKI, MIELIŚMY SWÓJ DOM, W KTÓRYM BYLIŚMY SZCZĘŚLIWI… KONFLIKTY ETNICZNE NA TERYTORIUM BYŁEJ JUGOSŁAWII W NARRACJACH MIGRANTÓW Z PAŃSTW POSTJUGOSŁOWIAŃSKICH MIESZKAJĄCYCH W AUSTRII, WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UKSW, WARSZAWA, 2019. Juraj Marušiak.

RADOSŁAW ZENDEROWSKI, MIELIŚMY SWÓJ DOM, W KTÓRYM BYLIŚMY SZCZĘŚLIWI… KONFLIKTY ETNICZNE NA TERYTORIUM BYŁEJ JUGOSŁAWII W NARRACJACH MIGRANTÓW Z PAŃSTW POSTJUGOSŁOWIAŃSKICH MIESZKAJĄCYCH W AUSTRII, WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UKSW, WARSZAWA, 2019. Juraj Marušiak.

RADOSŁAW ZENDEROWSKI, MIELIŚMY SWÓJ DOM, W KTÓRYM BYLIŚMY SZCZĘŚLIWI… KONFLIKTY ETNICZNE NA TERYTORIUM BYŁEJ JUGOSŁAWII W NARRACJACH MIGRANTÓW Z PAŃSTW POSTJUGOSŁOWIAŃSKICH MIESZKAJĄCYCH W AUSTRII, WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UKSW, WARSZAWA, 2019. Juraj Marušiak.

The article analyzes Henri Bergson’s understanding of human life in the light of his metaphor of life as “insinuation.” Comparing his ideas with the ideas of another original thinker of the age, George Santayana, allows shedding light on Bergson’s ontological strategy of making matter– as a threat to life –subject to mediation. Memory and imagination use matter to play out the past in the guise of the present–for the sake of life. The text also focuses on the formulas of freedom (...) arising out of both thinkers’ conceptions of conscious life – that of Bergson, for whom the horizon and the fulfillment can be found in the beginning, or the primary vital impulse, and that of Santayana, who sees fulfillment in the forms of finitude assumed by each particular life. Looking at humanity in terms of a spiritual challenge links both conceptions. The whole discussion responds to the need to return to such fundamental but sidestepped terms as “humanity” and “spirituality”. (shrink)

Let ≤r and ≤sbe two binary relations on 2ℕ which are meant as reducibilities. Let both relations be closed under finite variation and consider the uniform distribution on 2ℕ, which is obtained by choosing elements of 2ℕ by independent tosses of a fair coin.Then we might ask for the probability that the lower ≤r-cone of a randomly chosen set X, that is, the class of all sets A with A ≤rX, differs from the lower ≤s-cone of X. By c osure (...) under finite variation, the Kolmogorov 0-1 aw yields immediately that this probability is either 0 or 1; in case it is 1, the relations are said to be separable by random oracles.Again by closure under finite variation, for every given set A, the probability that a randomly chosen set X is in the upper ≤r-cone of A is either 0 or 1; let Almostr be the class of sets for which the upper ≤r-cone has measure 1. In the following, results about separations by random oracles and about Almost classes are obtained in the context of generalized reducibilities, that is, for binary relations on 2ℕ which can be defined by a countable set of total continuous functionals on 2ℕ in the same way as the usual resource-bounded reducibilities are defined by an enumeration of appropriate oracle Turing machines. The concept of generalized reducibility comprises a natura resource-bounded reducibilities, but is more general; in particular, it does not involve any kind of specific machine model or even effectivity. The results on generalized reducibilities yield corollaries about specific resource-bounded reducibilities, including several results which have been shown previously in the setting of time or space bounded Turing machine computations. (shrink)

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

Prasa mniejszości niemieckiej była w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej dość zróżnicowana, o czym świadczą liczne publikacje, choćby autorstwa Tadeusza Kowalska czy Wiesławy Kaszubiny. Sytuację taką można by wytłumaczyć faktem, iż ludność niemiecka, zróżnicowana pod względem społecznym, wyróżniała się znacznie wyższym niż przeciętny dla całego kraju poziomem świadomości czytelniczej. Znamienną cechą prasy niemieckiej była duża liczba gazet o charakterze politycznym, wśród których znajdowały się pisma o kierunku nacjonalistycznym, socjalistycznym oraz ugodowym. Na uwagę zasługują tu takie tytuły, jak: Lodzer Freie Presse, Lodzer Volkszeitung, (...) Neue Lodzer Zeitung, Der Deutsche Weg, Deutscher Volksbote czy Der Deutsche Wegweiser. Obok prasy politycznej ważne miejsce zajmowały wydawnictwa o charakterze wyznaniowym, które w wielu wypadkach miały za zadanie uzupełniać określone treści polityczne. W dalszej kolejności, również dużą popularnością wśród mniejszości niemieckiej w Łodzi cieszyła się prasa związków zawodowych, gospodarcza oraz kulturalno-oświatowa. Prasę dla kobiet, dzieci i młodzieży reprezentowały natomiast takie tytuły, jak: Jugendruf, Kinderfreund, Die Jugendwarte, Praktischer Vereinsleiter, Zeitschrift Jur Christliche Jugendführung. Zjawiskiem towarzyszącym rozwojowi prasy okresu międzywojennego - zarówno polskiej, jak i mniejszościowej - była trudna sytuacja finansowa wielu pism, które w wielu wypadkach przybrały charakter efemerydalny. Na brak środków nie narzekały natomiast gazety, takie jak narodowosocjalistyczna Freie Presse czy Der Deutsche Weg, które mogły liczyć na pomoc z Rzeszy. Były one redagowane na dość dobrym poziome, prowadziły stałe rubryki, jak wiadomości polityczne z kraju i ze świata, informacje lokalne czy sport, poza tym drukowały powieści w odcinkach, felietony oraz dodatki, mające rozszerzyć ofertę i zapewnić rozrywkę swojemu czytelnikowi. Również prasa ugodowa, reprezentowana przez dziennik Neue Lodzer Zeitung, oraz socjalistyczna, Die Volkszeitung, nie ustępowała swym poziomem innym gazetom łódzkim. (shrink)

Author: Siwiec Marek Kazimierz Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S VIEWS ON CREATIVITY WITH REGARDS to a Creative Source (Koncepcja twórczości Władysława Tatarkiewicza a twórcze źródło) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 573-590 Keywords: CREATIVITY, CREATIVE SOURCE, PLURALISTIC AESTHETICS, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, KARL JASPERS, BARBARA SKARGA, GEORG SIMMEL Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In the essay – which consists of the three parts – the author tries to show Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s views on (...) problems of the creativity as a basis to considerations on the creative source. In the first part the author outlines a point of view of a creator such as an artist, a poet, a composer. In the second part we can see the author sketching the problems of creativity and the creator itself. At the beginning he focuses on the Tatarkiewicz’s programme of pluralistic aesthetics with important discerning notions of aesthetics explicite and aesthetics implicite. The latter relates to works of art and the aesthetics views of the artists which can be found within. Afterwards he discusses main notions of the creator and the creativity i.e. poetic creativity, divine creativity, artistic creativity, human creativity. More carefully he examines contemporary approach of the creativity by Tatarkiewicz and analyses two criteria of it: high level of a novelty and a large outlay of an intellectual energy. The author notices a certain difficulty of the approach, namely a repetition of the intellectual energy in both criteria, yet he proposes a solution to the issue: first criterion relates to potential energy as a certain possibility, whereas the second relates to energy effectively implemented by the creator. He also discusses relation between the creativity and culture. In the third part the author approaches the problems of the creative source. He discusses views of Karl Jaspers, Barbara Skarga and Georg Simmel. In the conclusion the author defines the creative source as a task and a way of the creator. He points out that Tatarkiewicz’s view can be good groundwork to developing further considerations on the issue of the creative source. (shrink)

Author: Chlewicki Maciej Title: A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE DISPUTE ABOUT PLATO (Stulecie Sporu o Platona) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 559-571 Keywords: PLATO, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, MARBURG NEO-KANTIAN SCHOOL, THEORY OF IDEA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The aim of this paper is to present the main theses and the importance of Tatarkiewicz’s article The dispute about Plato (Spór o Platona) in polish reception of Plato’s philosophy. This (...) article – which was published by Tatarkiewicz a hundred yeas ago (1911) – was the first presentation of the new and interesting interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas which was inspired by Marburg neo-Kantian school. In Tatarkiewicz’s view the Plato’s philosophy is not some kind of metaphysics but it is generally the theory of knowledge. We can agree this is still unusual approach to Plato and we have a good reason to remind this early Tatarkiewicz’s essay. (shrink)

Author: Dembowski Bronisław Title: ABOUT PROFESSOR WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ. MEMOIRS OF A PUPIL (O profesorze Władysławie Tatarkiewiczu (1886–1980). Wspomnienia ucznia) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 433-450 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, MEMOIRS OF THE PUPIL Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In the context of his biography, the author presents memoirs about Tatarkiewicz. From the early years after World War II, he shows Tatarkiewicz’s work in Warsaw University, his philosophical seminar and (...) his firing from the University. He also describes further fortune of Tatarkiewicz’s pupils (mostly Marxists and others) in their academic career and personal life. (shrink)

Author: Czardybon Barbara Title: THE MARBURG EXPERIENCES OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ AND BORIS L. PASTERNAK (Doświadczenia marburskie Władysława Tatarkiewicza i Borysa L. Pasternaka) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 505-520 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, BORIS L. PASTERNAK, HERMANN COHEN, NEO-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article deals with the Marburg studies of Władysław Tatarkiewicz and Boris L. Pasternak, especially with the principles and the research practices prevailing at The (...) Philipps University of Marburg. The main bibliographic sources present the memoirs of Tatarkiewicz. When discussing Pasternak’s activities, plans and thoughts, is used of his Marburg correspondence and his autobiographical prose. The article shows Marburg’s influence on personality and views of both thinkers. There is Tatarkiewicz and Pasternak’s similarity of their experiences. This article takes up the problem of the defensive nature of the Marburg school of neo-Kantian philosophy, i.e. its doctrinal closure. In the case of Tatarkiewicz, his contact with the professors of the University of Marburg was conducived to working on his own, different philosophical outlook. It is surprising that Pasternak’s attitude as an artist was influenced by the Marburg philosophical thought. The Marburg studies have provided him an ease to use the philosophical vocabulary. (shrink)

Author: Bogusz-Bołtuć Ewa Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S DISJUNCTIVE DEFINITION OF ART. IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF ART (Władysława Tatarkiewicza alternatywna definicja sztuki a analityczna filozofia sztuki) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 591-600 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF ART, DISJUNCTIVE DEFINITION OF ART, BERYS GAUT Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:As a historian of ideas, Władysław Tatarkiewicz sought to introduce order to the meanders of philosophical debates of the past, (...) but as a philosopher, he tried to determine what a given thing is. In this essay I will attempt to show that the voice of Tatarkiewicz was significant for the philosophical debate about ‘what art is?’. In the fifties of the twentieth century, Morris Weitz concluded that defining art through describing the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a work of art, is unfounded. His thesis not only began the anti-essentialist trend in analytic aesthetics, but also prompted attempts to define art by drawing attention to its relational properties. In the disjunctive definition of art, which he formulated in the late 1960s, Władysław Tatarkiewicz opened a new option, where to get something regarded as a work; it is enough to set certain minimal sufficient conditions. What’s more, this way of defining art seems to be one of the more promising projects. The latest version of the disjunctive definition of art, the cluster definition of art by Berys Gaut, is also part of a trend set by the Tatarkiewicz’s definition. (shrink)

Author: Pepliński Marek Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S ANALYSIS OF MEANING OF “HAPPINESS” (Władysława Tatarkiewicza analiza terminu „szczęście”) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 633-674 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF HAPPINESS, EMOTION, PLEASURE, EUDAIMONIA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: marek[DOT]peplinski[AT]univ[DOT]gda[DOT]pl www:Władysław Tatarkiewicz work on philosophical and moral psychology, particularly on theory of happiness is still example of the best kind of analytical and close to phenomenological analysis of our speaking (...) and thinking about the topics in question. He distinguishes four main different meanings of Polish word ‘szczęście’ and present a new classification of them based on two principles: the opposition of subjective and objective and between ordinary and philosophical language. Accordingly we can speak about luck, positive psychological states like different kinds of good emotions or feelings and pleasure, Greek eudaimonia and specifically philosophical, a very correct concept of happiness as a rationally justified deep and comprehensive satisfaction of one’s life taken in its wholeness. In this paper I present critically his classification and argue that subjective meanings are always related to objective concepts. (shrink)

Author: Palacz Ryszard Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ AS A HISTORIAN OF PHILOSOPHY – A FEW REMARKS (Władysław Tatarkiewicz jako historyk filozofii. Kilka uwag) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 487-495 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980) was a versatile scholar, active and fertile in a number of fields: Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ethics, Aesthetics, and also History of Architecture. (...) Before World War One, Tatarkiewicz studied Philosophy in Berlin and in Marbourg with H. Cohen and P. Natorp. After the Great War, he was nominated Professor of Philosophy at the newly reorganized Warsaw University. In the area of History of Philosophy, his key accomplishments included his studies of Polish philosophical thought, and also a history of European philosophy before 1830, which he published in two volumes entitled ‘History of Philosophy’. After World War Two, Tatarkiewicz expanded the scope of the work to include 19t century and contemporary philosophy, publishing the third volume of his History in 1948. Tatarkiewicz’s History of Philosophy became very popular with readers, and saw no less than twenty four editions until 2004. There were a number of reasons for this popularity. One of Tatarkiewicz’s important tasks was the standardization of philosophical terminology in the Polish language and he succeeded admirably. The elegance of his writing style, clarity and order in the exposition of issues and concepts, made his work exceptionally useful for teaching; Tatarkiewicz provided his readers with an orderly picture of history of philosophy and motivated them for further studies. To his merit, Tatarkiewicz also included discussion of important results of the medieval philosophy in Poland. Another important facet contributing to the long-lasting popularity of his oeuvre were the ideological conditions that reigned in Poland after World War Two, a time marked by a promoting of different philosophical language and new research methods. In the paper, the author presents a critical assessment of the contemporary value of Tatarkiewicz’s magnum opus. Even though History has become over the years a monument to crisp style and clear exposition, the work shows its age, as its scope corresponds to the state of research in the 1920’s (in the first two volumes) and in the late 1940’s (in the third volume). In view of this, the author calls for starting a collective and (no doubt multi-year) effort on a new history of philosophy in Polish language, work that would include the research in the field since 1945. (shrink)

Author: Dziemidok Bohdan Title: AXIOLOGY OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ (Aksjologia Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 459-472 Keywords: AXIOLOGY, AESTHETIC THEORY, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, OLD AGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:Władysław Tatarkiewicz was not only a co-creator of Polish aesthetics (aside Roman Ingarden, Stanisław Ossowski and Mieczysław Wallis) but also, aside Henryk Elzenberg, a co-creator of Polish axiology. Main issues of Tatarkiewicz’s axiological development were: value and validation (...) theory and happiness and perfection theory. His undebatable achievement in axiological discourse is justification of the need to acknowledge relationism as a middle ground position between objectivism and subjectivism and axiological pluralism as a position different from absolutism and axiological relativism. The article presents not only axiology explicite, contained in his theoretical works, but also tries to reconstruct Tatarkiewicz’s personal axiology, which guided him throughout his long life. The personal axiology of his, I tried to reconstruct based on his memoirs, interviews he gave, letters and my personal contacts with him. (shrink)

Author: Lipski Dawid Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY SYSTEM (Władysława Tatarkiewicza analiza systemu filozofii Arystotelesa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 521-534 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE’S Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper attempts to present and critique the original analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy system, especially the layout and meaning of basic concepts in this system, which was performed by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his dissertation. (...) The author, trying to conceive the overall philosophy of Aristotle through analysis of its key concepts, advanced thesis that Aristotle’s philosophical views on the “science of being” do not form a single compact system, but rather a plural and multi-layered model, in which each of the individual “layers” has an appropriate system of concepts. Although this diversity causes certain pluralism of principles within the system, there is one point – νοũς, which remains the principle uniting the whole order. It is the guarantor of order, unity of the system, but at the same time it also allows differences of entities. Divine νοũς becomes the last word in metaphysics. Keywords: Władysław Tatarkiewicz, metaphysics of Aristotle’s. (shrink)

The history of Milton's reception in Poland suggests that he was mainly seen as a model practitioner of epic poetry, rather than as a political or religious thinker. This conclusion is borne out by comparing two of the three complete translations of Paradise Lost into Polish?the first by Jacek Przybylski (1791), the second by W?adys?aw Bartkiewicz (1902) (the third being Maciej S?omczy?ski's 1974 translation). The examination of a few crucial passages demonstrates that the earlier translation, Przybylski's, is more successful in (...) representing Milton's linguistic sophistication, theology, and attitude to the Roman Church, than Bartkiewicz's later translation, which, characterized above all by a concern with Catholic correctness, includes many omissions and distortions. S?omczy?ski's translation, criticized for its theological inaccuracies, is only briefly discussed, as are a few fragments of Milton's work that were translated by other Polish poets. (shrink)

My ultimate purpose here is to examine, discuss, and interpret a difficult excerpt in Stobaeus’ 5th c. AD anthology, alleging to report—uniquely, it appears—a distinction Chrysippus drew between three different applications of the term stoixe›on or element (i.e., physical element).1 Stobaeus lists this passage as giving opinions specifically of Chrysippus “about the elements out of substance” (per‹ t«n §k t∞w oÈs€aw stoixe€vn), though in holding them he says Chrysippus was following Zeno, the leader of his sect. Hermann Diels (1879) identified (...) this selection as an excerpt (his fr. 21) from Arius Didymus’ late first century BC Epitome of Physical Doctrines.2 I print a translation below, with the text in an Appendix, as it is given in von Arnim (1903). The text is not without its problems, and I indicate in footnotes to the text which of the principal editors’ textual interventions I accept and follow in my translation. Whether this text presents a single, continuous excerpt from Arius Didymus, or instead some compilation of Stobaeus (or an earlier anthologist whose work Stobaeus employed) from dispersed passages of.. (shrink)