ABSTRACTIn Democracy for Realists, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels argue provocatively that the public falls far short of ideals of democratic citizenship, and they turn to political psychology to explain the empirics of mass political behavior. But their model of group identity fails to shed much light on the origins of political behavior and gives members of the public less credit than they deserve, for three reasons. First, group politics is not a hollow exercise; it depends on the identification of (...) a collective grievance that has a potential political solution. Second, concerns about group economics, status, and respect are more likely than individual economic considerations to animate political behavior, yet the former concerns are no less rational than the latter. Third, individuals vary in how strongly they identify with politically relevant groups, masking considerable variation in the degree to which group affiliations shape political behavior. Therefore, group identification is not a monolithic, irrational force that affects people regardless of their perceptions of political reality. (shrink)

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

One of the major assumptions of John Zaller's RAS model of public opinion is that people need explicit cues from partisan elites in order to evaluate persuasive messages. This puts the public in the position of a passive audience, unable to scrutinize information or make independent decisions. However, there is evidence that people can, under some circumstances, evaluate and use information independently of elite cues. Thus, patterns of public opinion in the months before the Iraq war are inconsistent with the (...) predictions of Zaller's model. While the RAS model usually accounts for the dynamics of public opinion quite well, the situations in which it fails provide us with critical insights into the limits of elite influence. (shrink)