Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Kseniia Myroshnyk and Olha Simoroz with Yevhen Bystrytsky.

The article argues that the oral history of philosophy (OHP) will not produce reliable results unless it develops effective methods of counteracting cognitive biases related to human memory. So far, this problem has not even been raised. I highlighted the main cognitive memory biases that affect the validity of the UIF: choice-supportive bias, hindsight bias, fundamental attribution error. Describing the nature of their detrimental effects on the interview, I suggested ways to counteract it: (1) multi-level verification of all actual data; (...) (2) checking of the interview's previous judgment; (3) mandatory data validation for the potential impact of nostalgia; (4) co-creation interviewing; (5) a sequence of questions that will problematize the possible impact of bias during the interview itself. As OHF is still a theoretically unspecified discipline, I have proposed a concept that includes (a) its definition, (b) its place among other historical and philosophical disciplines, (c) its main genres and their specificities; (d) the irreplaceability of its data for the history of philosophy as a science (the ability to engage the interviewer in an active non-self-reflection situation). Interviewer answers often cannot be obtained from traditional sources (articles, books, drafts, letters, margins, etc. ). In the end, I outlined five main arguments in favor of the broad involvement of students of the philosophical faculties in organizing and conducting interviews within the OHF. (shrink)

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma with Professor Tamara Yashchuk within the framework of the research program “Ukrainian Philosophy of the 60s-80s of the 20th Century” of the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Illia Davidenko and Kseniia Myroshnyk with Anatoliy Yermolenko.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Kseniia Myroshnyk and Olha Simoroz with Yevhen Bystrytsky.

Interview with Constantine Sigov, dedicated to the history of the "European Dictionary of Philosophies": from the emergence of an idea in the early 90's in France until the accomplishment of the Ukrainian edition in 2019.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Illia Davidenko and Kseniia Myroshnyk with Anatoliy Yermolenko.

Marxism as a normative position is critical of liberalism. However, the problems of justice and alienation that Marxism draws attention to can be solved by liberalism without the implementation of a Marxist political project. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis that Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (one of the versions of political liberalism) is a more inclusive and rational method of theorizing about the basic principles of justice than Marxism. By analyzing Elizabeth Anderson's theory of liberal egalitarianism (...) "democratic equality", I show that some of Marxist approaches that (1) do not deny the existence of justice and (2) are concerned with the problem of alienation, can apply the arsenal of the moral theory of political liberalism to solve these problems. I also criticize Rawls's and Nussbaum's theories of political liberalism for their procedural vagueness and non-inclusive theory of justice. I present an outline of my position, which I propose to call «extended political liberalism» (hereafter EPL). EPL is currently represented by two arguments: 1) the paideia argument and 2) the argument of the interdependence of the good and the right. The first allows talking about the actual implementation of basic rights and freedoms only when citizens are aware of them and have the opportunity to change their views regarding the personal conception of the good. This is impossible without qualitative basic education. Also, one of the central concepts of EPL is presented within the framework of Paideia's argument - the interpretation of the political conception of justice. Because of this concept, it makes sense to talk about the possibility of citizens' reflection on the reconciliation of the current political conception with the personal conception of the good. This can also be done through the analysis of other conceptions of the good. The second argument is a continuation of the first, appearing as a theoretical mechanism that allows supplementing the existing political conception in case of serious social changes. In conclusion, if we take into account the advantages of the capabilities approach and my criticism of its weaknesses, then a theoretical position will emerge that is quite acceptable to some representatives of Marxism. Moreover, the latter will not have to give up their basic beliefs. The peculiarity of my concept presented in this text is that it is not so much a critique of Marxism as an analysis of the basic normative judgments of political liberalism, with which some Marxists can agree. With this article, I also want to illustrate the strengths of such a concept and point to its prospects for further attempts to interpret the political conception by other normative positions. (shrink)

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma with Professor Tamara Yashchuk within the framework of the research program “Ukrainian Philosophy of the 60s–80s of the 20th Century” of the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy.

First, I love Greek language, a language which allow me to perceive what a language is, and what translation could mean. Then, I think it is because of Heidegger. At the time, we used to study classical antiquity and the pre-socratics through Heidegger and Nietzsche’s work. My own philosophical question was : « Is it possible to be Presocratic in some other way than the Heideggerian one? » The answer determinated my interest and passion for the sophists. I found it (...) extraordinary when I realized that Gorgias and his treatise « On Nature or the Non-Existent » presented a new way of thinking about Parmenides. If you are a Heideggerian, Parmenides is the origin of philosophy, the origin of thought. But very quickly, only fifty years after Parmenides, Gorgias came and said: « Look, what Parmenides says about Being, he could say about Non-being, and I myself can say it about Non-being. So, is Being an origin, an “Es gibt”, "There Is", just needing to be unconcealed? Or is it simply a product of Parmenides’ poem : Being is an effect of saying, and I can show it ». And he did show it, quite critically. This was my first insight. (shrink)

The first part of the interview with Anatoly Akhutin, dedicated to the informal philosophical movement that began in the USSR during the Khrushchev Thaw, the trends of this movement in the 1970s, the phenomenon of soviet «doublethink» and the origins of Eurasianism’s modern versions.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Kseniia Myroshnyk and Olha Simoroz with Yevhen Bystrytsky.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Illia Davidenko and Kseniia Myroshnyk with Anatoliy Yermolenko.

Review of Lipscomb, B. J. B. (2021). The Women Are Up to Something: How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Review of Chiappero-Martinetti, E., Osmani, S., & Qizilbash, M. (Eds.). (2020). The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.