Realities of the formed information society made actual for inclusive education a problem of formation of professionals of the new directions capable to apply information technologies to improvement of interaction between participants of process of distance learning. Until recent time the institute of distance learning had no analogs in our educational system. It has to become one of the most important elements of the organization of remote education. Inclusive education becomes the new strategic direction of modern education in Russia, its (...) program of development to 2020 is designated by the Federal law ‘About the education in the Russian Federation‘ which has come into force on September 1, 2013. Ideas of inclusive training were born from a pressing need of society to help children to be integrated with features of development into society. Without it a creation of a new civilized society, the education system that meets the requirements of the humanistic principles is not possible. In this connection, creation of a substantial and technological basis of the organization of inclusive education of children in the mode of distance learning is an extremely important for today social, moral and pedagogical problem. In its center are the development of the subject, granting equal opportunities to each pupil to build the individual educational trajectory, culturological cultivation of the person capable to take an independent position in relation to external conditions. Distance learning serves as strong and active technology of socialization of such children. However, in the theory and a technique of training, the problem of distance learning of children with disabilities is insufficiently solved that is caused by unavailability of most of teachers to apply these technologies. There is a contradiction between objective practical need of distance learning for children with disabilities and insufficient readiness of a theoretical and technological basis. This is a main problem discussed in the study. In theoretical plan, it is a problem of development of the practical-focused theoretical and technological basis of distance learning of children with disabilities. On the practical level, it is a problem of formation of the subject information and education environment, designing of the contents, definition of methods, pedagogical technologies, the conditions of formation promoting achievement of the planned educational results and development of cognitive independent activity without prejudice to health of children on the basis of the accounting of their individual abilities. Technological effectiveness of the purposes is provided with prediction of educational results, their expression through requirements to actions of pupils. Recent time, children only start studying and mastering remote technologies therefore, first of all, they have to seize rational ways of educational activity and learn to work with information, i.e. priority value has to be allocated for formation of informative and logical and informative and information universal educational actions. (shrink)
We study problems of Clote and Paris, concerning the existence of end extensions of models of Σ n -collection. We continue the study of the notion of ‘Γ-fullness’, begun by Wilkie and Paris (Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII (Moscow, 1987). Stud. Logic Found. Math., vol. 126, pp. 143–161. North- Holland, Amsterdam, 1989) and introduce and study a generalization of it, to be used in connection with the existence of Σ n -elementary end extensions (instead of plain end extensions). (...) We obtain (a) alternative proofs of results (Adamowicz in Fund. Math. 136, 133–145, 1990) and (Wilkie and Paris in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII (Moscow, 1987). Stud. Logic Found. Math., vol. 126, pp. 143–161. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1989) related to the problem of Paris and (b) a partial solution to the problem of Clote. (shrink)
La recherche d’une condition nécessaire et suffisante pour éviter les antinomies de la théorie des ensembles nous amène à formuler deux règles qui défendent l’introduction, dans le système, de certaines définitions non-prédicatives. L’observation de ces règles limite l’application de l’opération cantorienne, de sorte qu’on en arrive à distinguer, parmi les ensembles infinis, ceux dont la puissance fait partie de la série des alephs, et ceux dont la puissance dépasse n’importe lequel des termes de cette série.
RésuméAprès avoir exposé les thèses de la théorie classique de 1'évidence et mis en relief les conséquences philosophiques de celle‐ci, l'auteur s'attaque aux deux présupposés, dont le caractère apparemment indiscutable obligeait ceux qui voulaient echapper au scepticisme à fonder toute preuve sur une intuition évidente; à savoir, qu'une conclusion n'est jamais plus certaine que la plus faible de ses prémises, et qu'une connaissance assuree doit être garantie, en fin de compte, par 1'évidence.Il rnontre qu'une théorie de la preuve qui répudierait (...) la conception classique de 1'évidence peut néanmoins s'élaborer grâce aux éléments que fournit l'analyse de l'argumentation, dont l'étude, contrairement à celle de la demonstration, été negligée depuis des siècles. (shrink)
Let us recapitulate here. A unified learning process is presented here, the principles of which are consistently applied through three distinct periods; the acquisition of knowledge, the analytical examination of it and a third stage where knowledge might be called wisdom. The last stage has been referred to as a synthetic function of memory, the stage where the significance of knowledge is revealed; an understanding of the whole, the capacity for understanding details within the whole, a generative stage of knowledge (...) similar to language, a revelatory knowledge, metaphysical, samadhi, heightened perception, vision.Throughout these stages the passive aspect of mind is emphasized as a practical learning technique in acquisition, analysis and understanding. That is exploited at a physical level in asanas, in the three thinking processes and in metaphysical realization. Quotes illustrate this aspect as a basic principle of the mind, of metaphysics and of the acquisition of knowledge at different levels. This principle is used to explain aesthetic experience and ultimate realization. The reason for its predominance and the metaphysical presuppositions that perhaps cleared the way for systematic training in this technique have been given. It is of interest to note that systematic training in this technique still occurs in India today.This process is a peculiar union of memory and perceptive capacities. Essentially, the haphazard memory fund is eliminated for a form of creative and exact thinking or knowledge. This unification of memory and perception has given this paper its name. This learning process has as its aim not the accumulation of knowledge but guidance in correct thinking. It stems from the realization that our perception is conditioned by our memory, that is, the limitations of our knowledge. That conditioning, like ajñāna, prevents us from knowing what we do not know. The transformation involved requires an instantaneous understanding which, while remaining aware of the objects of perception and the process of perception, really centres in the perceiver himself.An old Lapp song brings out the paradox in memory: And its we too, Our memory, memory of ourselves... Disappears, disappears... We remember and we've forgotten. We are both old.The Chandogya states: smaramupāssva Ch. U 7.13.1, devoted yourself to memory. (shrink)
Photo by Jonathan Ford on Unsplash ABSTRACT Since 2008, an average of twenty million people per year have been displaced by weather events. Climate migration creates a special setting for a duty to rescue. A duty to rescue is a moral rather than legal duty and imposes on a bystander to take an active role in preventing serious harm to someone else. This paper analyzes the idea of expanding a duty to rescue to climate migration. We address who should have (...) the duty and to whom the duty should extend. The paper discusses ways to define and apply the duty to rescue as well as its limitations, arguing that it may take the form of an ethical duty to prepare. INTRODUCTION Climate migration creates a special setting for a duty to rescue. A duty to rescue is a moral rather than legal duty and imposes on a bystander to take an active role in preventing serious harm to someone else. Examples of circumstances range from person-to-person intimate rescue to saving those in poverty, even in distant parts of the world. Since 2008, an average of twenty million people per year have been displaced by weather events. Circumstances like being thrust from homes under the threat of fire, mudslide, and flooding vary greatly from long-term changes like land becoming too arid for crops or temperatures increasing annually gradually pushing up the number of heat-related deaths, with the area slowly becoming uninhabitable. Imminence in fleeing affects resettling and need for rescue with important implications for how the duty to rescue might apply. This paper reevaluates the ethical framing of the duty to rescue and, while it is arguably a stretch, applies it to climate migration. Climate migration has become common and is expected to increase due to rises in sea level, increases in weather events that make areas uninhabitable, and changes to land that preclude farming or other necessary land uses. We argue that a duty to rescue may help highlight who has moral obligations to whom. Because the problem is so large in scope, we suggest a change in the ethical limits to humans' duty to rescue other humans who are in distress. We imagine an expansion or extension of the duty to rescue to meet some of the basic needs created by climate migration. Yet how it should expand, and how much depend on ethical framing and practical limitations. l. Expanding the Geographical Boundaries Two commonly recognized emergencies, Hurricane Katrina in the case of weather events and the current COVID-19 pandemic, provide a historical and current backdrop to evaluate ethical obligations as more disasters displace people. A significant reassessment of the ethical scope of an obligation to rescue in the case of weather events will be limited by the ability to render aid to those in distress in the case of a planet-wide weather catastrophe. The problems may overwhelm the ability to rescue or the reasonableness of attempting rescue. The extent of the moral obligation borne by humans to other humans in the case of a weather event has been largely defined by its locality and limited geographic influence. Whether we are imagining the scope of ethical obligation in the case of hurricane, flood, tornado, drought, or wildfire events, the perceived ethical obligation is significantly defined by the limited impact of these weather events on people outside the zone of the weather event's direct impact, yet close to that zone. A hurricane affecting New Orleans will not have immediate impact on the residents of California or even those on the northeast coast of the United States until a later time. Wildfires in the Pacific Northwest do not impair the ability of those in the rest of the country to come forward with assistance. But as climate migration crosses international borders, and climate events occur simultaneously in many regions, a more expansive duty to rescue may provide the ethical impulse to help those who live afar or migrate long distances. In this respect, the need for help in the event of widespread climate migration due to global warming is more like a pandemic than a weather event. Its broad impact area diminishes the capability of nearly the entire balance of the human population to help due to those populations' awareness that they will, in short order, have the same need for the same resources, from the same cause. Those living near current flood zones may find their historically safe havens are also a flood zone. Those previously best positioned to rescue may find themselves also needing to relocate. Thus, we may observe the need for new rescuers. ll. The Rule of Rescue The Rule of Rescue as defined by Al Jonsen describes the moral impetus or knee jerk reaction to save identifiable people facing death. A duty to rescue has since been expanded beyond imminent death and beyond the near and identifiable. But there are limitations. For example, by most accounts, the ethical duty tends not to require extreme bodily risk or financial depletion. In comparing Good Samaritans to humanitarians, Scott M. James argues the duty to rescue arises from unique dependence, but the ethical obligation to help strangers through humanitarian aid is of a different nature. The wrongness of failing to help is arguably more egregious when one is in a unique position to help. Like in the tragedy of the commons, where there is no unique positioning, when the global community is called upon to help, each individual in it may feel less obliged to do so. Climate migration falls in between—it requires helping strangers, yet it may move forward without anyone seeing themselves as uniquely positioned to help until those strangers become part of communities, at which time, there may be more moral justification to help a community member in need. Generally, arguments about Good Samaritans hinge on extraordinary acts, praiseworthy because they are acts of compassion, not obligation. Now all US states have Good Samaritan laws which protect helpers from liability for help gone wrong or for a failure to succeed once engaged in an act of rescue. Extraordinary help as a moral good is thus somewhat encouraged through legal protection, but not imposed. Conversely, jobs like firefighting, search and rescue, and emergency medical care tend to oblige employees to take on risks that would be extraordinary if undertaken by the average bystander, yet they are rendered ordinary rescue as part of the job. Three states, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have a broad duty to rescue, adding legal considerations to an otherwise moral conundrum. The laws do not require bystanders to take on risk for the sake of rescuing strangers. The moral duty will require looking beyond law, but it is unclear how the moral duty to rescue should be distributed in the case of climate migration. A bare minimum would prevent taking advantage of newcomers, paying sub-minimum wage, and discriminating against them. Yet such a minimum is hardly rescue. lll. An Ethical Rather than Legal Duty The difficulty in defining the duty to rescue as a legal obligation is that it is difficult to determine the extent of risk a rescuer ought to be required to take. The nature of this ethical duty is also arguably tied to the experiences of both the rescuer and the rescued. There are subjective aspects like what someone perceives as a danger that make it difficult to write enforceable laws requiring rescue. It is one thing to expect a rescuer to step into several inches of relatively warm water to lift a person lying face down in a pond and enable them to breathe. It is something altogether different to expect that rescuer to dive into frigid water and attempt to extricate someone trapped in a submerged automobile. As the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart observed, it is always easier to define application of the core intention of any rule, whether law or ethical norm. It is more difficult to create legal certainty about how the law applies to what he described as “penumbra circumstances”. In the case of a hurricane, it is easier to define what surplus resources are available in areas geographically remote from the impact of the storm and demand, as a moral obligation, that those nearby but outside the area provide assistance. It is more difficult to obligate people, organizations, or governments to supply a quantity of medication or some number of ventilators to an adjacent community when they expect to imminently need them for their own community. In the early stages of climate migration, the ethics of extreme weather event assistance, a common application of the duty to rescue, will be useful and appropriate. The rising sea levels first experienced by island nations in the South Pacific will not render those living in other coastal communities, those with greater available “high ground”, unable to supply resources to those in need. But when sea level rise and climate change affect more communities simultaneously, albeit in varying degree, the task of defining what response is ethically obligatory becomes increasingly complicated. Pinpointing the obligations of those communities which are resource rich to those communities which are resource deprived, and of those partly affected to those more severely affected may become necessary. The limitations of the traditional duty to rescue could expand to meet the needs. lV. Contribution to the Problem Many argue that the duty to rescue may depend on any appropriate claim of those needing rescue. One issue is whether preferential claims among those who can identify the source of the harm should call for a greater duty or whether everyone in need should be approached as like candidates for rescue, shaping the duty as equal across those on the receiving end. As climate change does have human-made causes, there are strong arguments to impose a greater ethical duty on any entity that caused the climate-related problems leading to the mass exodus. While the global north is often implicated in pollution that causes migration, industries like energy, transportation, and agriculture are tied to climate change and associated with significant greenhouse gas emissions. Practices like directing agriculture to less sustainable single crop growth generally made land less farmable. Yet it is difficult to place blame and identify specific causal relationships as most migration is due to many factors. A movement toward greater accountability can be reframed as a greater duty to rescue, a duty to engage in the extraordinary. The fossil fuel industry, for example, should have a larger obligation than the average person. Similarly, some may argue anyone unjustly enriching themselves while contributing to climate change or people who over-consume have an elevated duty to rescue. Climate change lawsuits demonstrate an eagerness to hold governments and corporations accountable, despite difficulty proving causation. V. The Most Vulnerable One ethical dimension of climate migration that remains unexplored is how a duty to rescue applies to vulnerable populations who stand to be left behind or unable to migrate without assistance. Researchers from the Global North working across the Global South are increasingly observing the phenomenon of ethics dumping, where the research ethics of some countries are imposed on research subjects in other countries. In that vein, rescuers should be careful not to impose unwelcome cultural standards or exploit people who are in the process of migrating. There is a gap in discussions reflecting voices that have been left out. The duty to rescue is incomplete without an attempt to understand the ethical experiences of those being rescued. The actual people affected by climate migration who are the least likely to have the means to migrate, or to do so without extreme hardship, should have a voice informing the global community including those in a position to carry out rescue. People who have the means and are young and healthy may easily make decisions to avoid the catastrophic consequences that climate migration brings. However, what about those who are left behind? For example, especially recognizing cultural differences, the homeless community, disabled community, refugees, the elderly community, and women and children may suffer differently and call for more attention. In some parts of the world, human rights are severely constrained. An ethical duty to rescue, with many considerations and variables, may be more justified in the case of those most in need. As climate migration continues and increases significantly, it may be reasonable to ask the local and global community to focus on those least well positioned to migrate successfully. In this context, the use of phenomenology to understand the lived experiences of those migrating, sometimes termed “ethical experiences”, may help flesh out how a duty to rescue takes shape. The discussion of duty and obligation requires an articulation of the ethical experiences. Then, the obligation to interpret the duty as ‘one shall not’ or ‘one must’ can be focused on the migrants’ needs rather than the rescuers’ feelings of obligation. A revised theory of the duty to rescue taking into account the asymmetrical experiences of communities involved could ensure that the needs of people whose living situations, gender, ethnicity, age, or race impact their ability to even begin the migration process are considered. In this discussion, the rescuing is directed toward communities /collectives of persons migrating, whether at once or across a period of time. Often, the climate migrant may not be in a state to articulate the nature of this event when it happens, given its subjective proximity. Yet, when communities are given the space and opportunity to articulate their shared values, the ethical action of rescue derives its meaningfulness from the community rather than the rescuers. In other words, allowing climate migrants to explain their feelings can add complexity to what some see as a binary receiver-giver dynamic. This is necessary because the concept of vulnerable populations is fraught with problematic assumptions. There have been various definitions and criteria to determine what would constitute vulnerable populations. For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change identifies and assesses vulnerable populations. These criteria may be helpful. However, they do not provide the full picture. Rather than identifying categorical criteria of vulnerable populations, engaging with people who are experiencing climate migration and listening to their current experiences and concerns helps determine need. Knowing what people need may prevent the kneejerk reaction to label people who are quite resilient yet have appropriate needs “vulnerable”. Proceeding with caution is important because the duty to rescue has hierarchical underpinnings of "us" and "them." Often when people swoop in to save, there are good and bad consequences of the intervention. We should proceed with caution because often the helper misses the actual needs of those in need. The only way to combat this would be to make sure that people are empowered to inform those agencies that are able to help. In addition to more practical approaches, large scale oral histories could allow those who have migrated already to share their experiences. It would be important to capture the lived experiences of people who are already experiencing the consequences of climate migration or of other migration like that due to political or economic extreme events. These experiences could shape our analysis of whether people in fact wish for rescue. If so, further conversations can determine best actions as well as give important insight into what resources might be necessary to empower people now and in the future. Vl. A Duty to Rescue as a Duty to Prepare If we view Good Samaritans as going above and beyond, then a duty to rescue, something ethically compelled, must bring rescue out of the framework of charity and place it in the context of humanity and obligations. Such a view would also support expanding the geographical reach of the otherwise more proximate duty. The duty may be stronger and take shape in a more workable way if it applies to preparing places expecting to see an influx of people due to climate migration and to helping those most in need. The duty may arise out of expectations of what type of community the place welcoming those migrating due to climate should be—does it want to offer good housing, schooling, and medical care as well as economic opportunity to new people? And if so, at what cost, or with which risks? If the newcomers are viewed as community members rather than strangers, a model of acceptance may lead to better preparation. Some considerations like whether the actions will reasonably help the persons in need of rescue will shape the application of a duty to rescue in the context of climate migration. Similarly, ensuring that people have the chance to articulate their values may help communities support the newcomers. New relationships should not be defined as migrant and rescuer. Voluntariness in participation and not forcing any action deemed rescue would help ensure the human rights of those migrating. In the United States, President Biden issued an executive order addressing impending climate migration steeped in a duty to prepare by making plans for resettlement and to address the impact of climate migration. Vll. At What Risk? As we investigate the ethical obligations to meet even basic needs, we must also ask what level of risk is ethically compelled. There is an extraordinary need to integrate newcomers successfully, but it is difficult to stretch an ethical duty to rescue to require all the prerequisites for successful climate migration. Even defining success would create deep ethical arguments. As observed in almost all migrations, extraordinary charitable acts may be the key to success, while an ethical duty to rescue must try to require the important government and community-based basics and ensuring respect for human rights. That is, the migrating people should be rescued from circumstances that contradict basic human rights. Rather than comparing communities to bystanders, mere places where people will arrive and need to hash out how to find housing, jobs, education, and opportunity, a duty of preparation may be the key to rescue those disenfranchised by migration. There are cultural, personal, physical, psycho-social, and geopolitical issues surrounding how to best help those needing to permanently relocate. Ethics arguments will certainly range from “do nothing”, which may fail people, to “do everything”, which could waste taxpayer money in futile over-preparation while failing to actually help. Communities must avoid planning exclusively for one scenario only to have it not take place. Striking the balance, a duty to rescue as it could apply to climate migration should set goals of societal integration, and providing the basics like education, housing, food, health care, and job opportunity, the precursors to flourishing. Recommending the extraordinary, morally preferred but perhaps not compulsory, when charitable actors are participating, or when wrongdoers are compensating, may be more workable than seeing the duty to rescue as compelling people or local governments to take on significant financial and personal risk for newcomers. While humanitarian ethics supports helping everyone, it is likely that people who resettle in advance of a need to flee will find themselves with more choices and opportunities. Help is warranted for those with more dire needs. Preparing for them may do just that. Vlll. Rescue Prior to Migration and Rescue in the Process of Resettlement The duty to enable the migration in the first-place hints to the inadequacy of a duty to prepare. The traditional duty to rescue perhaps steps in if rescue looks like those geographically just out of harm's way rescuing those in danger. That resembles the traditional moral requirement, or duty to rescue according to the Rule of Rescue. Humanitarian aid typically provided by many institutions makes sense and is in place, although financial support for additional humanitarian aid is always needed. Despite having moved to purportedly more capable communities, migrant communities may be able to develop more egalitarian orders of living. Rather than continually being identified as having been rescued, it is important to make sure people keep or make social ties during and after migration. Immigrants often face social isolation. Small shifts in gestural language also have the potential to welcome people and show they are valued. For instance, some migrants may not like questions like “Where are you from?” and “What brings you here?” as they emphasize differences over fitting in. CONCLUSION The ethical duty to rescue should be expanded to better match those in need of relocation with a welcome environment and the resources needed to achieve success and fully integrate socially and culturally. Expanding a dialogue that includes the voices of people who have recently migrated whether due to violence, poverty, or climate, could properly frame the extent of the duty. If we are to apply the duty of rescue to climate migration, rescuers should avoid labeling people vulnerable, dependent, or needy, although there is reason to focus on those whose needs are the most dire. A soft duty to rescue people during the course of climate migration can come in the form of preparation. People will need help finding housing, education, access to food, and employment. Ultimately, to help them help themselves may be the best goal. While the obligations should be borne differently by people, whether due to a special responsibility, or a special relationship that creates a clearer duty, the global community must prepare for its role in rescuing those displaced by climate events. By helping those displaced at the start of the climate migration process according to a more commonly held notion of the duty to rescue, and by preparing to incorporate newcomers successfully according to an expanded duty to rescue, effectively a duty to prepare, countries that take on climate refugees may find themselves rewarded by the cultural diversity and workplace talents that people bring. A duty to those at a distance is a reasonable expansion of the duty to rescue. But what one ought to do in the global community varies somewhat from the traditional Rule of Rescue. -  Singer, P.. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 229-43.  Irfan, U.. Why We Still Don’t Yet Know How Bad Climate Migration Will Get. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2022/3/16/22960468/ipcc-climate-change-migration-migrant-refugee, citing the International Panel on Climate Change. Sixth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2022, Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/  McKie, J., Richardson, J. The Rule of Rescue. Social Science & Medicine, 56: 2407-2419. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-953600244-7.  James, S.M.. Good Samaritans, Good Humanitarians. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24:238-254.  Overview of Good Samaritan laws. https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/good-samaritan-law-states  Fifield, J.. Why It’s Hard to Punish ‘Bad Samaritans’. Stateline Blog, Pew Charitable Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/09/19/why-its-hard-to-punish -bad-samaritans  Cassella, C.. There’s a Climate Threat Facing Pacific Islands That’s More Dire Than Losing Land, Science Alert, https://www.sciencealert.com/pacific-islanders-are-in-a-climate-crisis-as-rising-sea-levels-threaten -water; Hassan, H. R., and Cliff, V.. For Small Island Nations, Climate Change is not a Threat. It’s Already Here, World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/island-nations-maldives-climate-change/  For example, Lyons, K.. Australia Coal use is Existential threat to Pacific Islanders, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/12/australia-coal-use-is-existential-threat-to-pacific-is lands-says-fiji-pm  Cripps, E.. Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Schroeder, D., Chatfield, K., Singh, M., Chennells, R., and Herissone-Kelly, P.. Ethics Dumping and the Need for a Global Code of Conduct. In Cham.. Equitable Research Partnerships. SpringerBriefs in Research and Innovation Governance. Springer. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15745-6_1  Giudice L.C., Llamas-Clark E.F., DeNicola N., Pandipati, S., Zlatnik, M.G., Decena, D.C.D., Woodruff, T.J., Conry, J.A.. Climate Change, Women’s Health, and the Role of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in Leadership, International J Gynecol Obstet, 155, 345-356. 10.1002/ijgo.13958  See Ferrarello, S. and Zapien, N.. Ethical Experience: A Phenomenology, Bloomsbury..  McLeman, R.A., Hunter, L.M.,. Migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Change, 1: 450-461.  Least Developed Countries Expert Group.. Considerations Regarding Vulnerable Groups, Communities and Ecosystems in the Context of the National Adaptation Plans: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  Jecker, N.S. 2013. "The Problem with Rescue Medicine." J Med Philos, 38:64-81.  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Les références à la crémation sont extrêmement rares dans les textes bibliques. L’histoire de Saül et de ses trois fils reste un cas unique d’usage de l’incinération (1 S 31, 12-13). La signification de ce geste inhabituel dans le contexte biblique n’est pas claire. Depuis longtemps, le passage de 1 Samuel 31, 12 pose problème aux exégètes et aux historiens de la religion de l’ancien Israël. Cet article présente les diverses hypothèses qui furent proposées au sujet de la crémation de (...) Saül à partir de sources textuelles et matérielles provenant des fouilles de sépultures. (shrink)
Châteillon a peut-être laissé un plus grand souvenir par son opposition à Calvin dans l'affaire Servet que par sa traduction française de la Bible. Après le rappel à grands traits de la vie de ce “ savoyard ” , J. Roubaud place son œuvre de traducteur sous le signe de cette affaire, de son adhésion à la Réforme et de son souci de s'adresser non seulement aux lettrés, à ceux qui connaissent la latin et le grec, mais surtout aux “ (...) idiots ”, c'est-à-dire à ceux qui ignorent les langues anciennes. Loin de considérer ces derniers comme gens stupides, il les rejoint dans leur créativité verbale, n'hésitant pas à utiliser le langage populaire, voire à créer des mots, de façon à rendre le texte biblique aussi direct que possible dans son expression, ce qui lui fit produire un chef d'œuvre du français du XVIe siècle.Châteillon has perhaps left a greater impression by his opposition to Calvin in the Servet affair than by his French translation of the Bible. After recalling the main lines of the life of this "Savoyard" , J. Roubaud puts his translation under the sign of the above affair, of his adhesion to the Reformation, and of his concern to write not only for the educated, for those who know Latin and Greek, but especially for the "idiots", that is to say for those who ignore ancient languages. Far from conside7ing the latter as stupid, he joins them in their verbal creativity, not hesitating to use popular language, indeed to create words in order to make the biblical text as direct as possible in its expression. This led him to produce a chef-d'oeuvre of French in the 16th century. (shrink)
Cet article met en lumière la réception du Talmud parmi les érudits parisiens chrétiens entre 1140, avec la rédaction du Adversus judaeorum de Pierre le Vénérable, et 1248, la condamnation officielle par Eudes de Châteauroux. Avec la création des universités au XIIe siècle, la curiosité intellectuelle et la soif de savoir dirigent les théologiens chrétiens vers des textes non plus uniquement bibliques, mais aussi rabbiniques. Simultanément, la présence de l’Église et son orthodoxie doctrinale se renforcent, avec un désir encore plus (...) fort d’encadrer ses fidèles. Le XIIIe siècle est l’époque d’une série de condamnations de thèses chrétiennes par l’Église pour prévenir la propagation d’erreurs dogmatiques. Avec Pierre le Vénérable, nous voyons pour la première fois un théologien chrétien s’attarder sur les textes talmudiques. Ce n’est véritablement qu’un siècle plus tard que le Talmud se fait connaître par les savants chrétiens, après que Nicolas Donin, juif converti au christianisme, informe Grégoire IX des erreurs blasphématoires à l’encontre de Dieu et du christianisme contenues dans ce livre. Une fois examiné, le Talmud est condamné 1240, puis solennellement en 1248 par l’autorité parisienne, soutenue par des enregistrements méticuleux, intitulés Extractiones de Talmut. (shrink)
In an almost forgotten passage of the Postenor Analytics (Bk I, ch. III) Aristotle argues against 'another school', according to which it is possible to proof things 'by each other and in a circle'. His logical refutation of this opinion became so dominant in the Western philosophical tradition, that the 'vicious circle' has always deemed a crime since. A scientific demonstration has to be built on firm premisses in order to deduce conclusions from them in a straight, ongoing proces, in (...) which one does not have to return to the premisses for a reconsideration of them on the basis of their implications. Although Aristotle does not mention names, he in fact reacts against Plato and the mainstream of Greek thought, which stresses the essential circularity of human argumentation. In the first, the historical part of the treatise the roots of this circular logic are unearthed in the work of Heraclitus and Parmenides, who both defended a ring structure of their metaphysical explication of nature. Truth is described as well-rounded, because you can follow it in a circle, passing through each of its links in turn, back to your startingpoint. The association of circular motion with thought is fully present in the work of Plato, who speeks many times about the 'periforas tès dianoias' and the essential interdependance of our ideas. Not the theory of an anonymous alternative school but Aristotle's own rectilinear formal logic was the exceptional, untraditional standpoint, which, moreover, was in conflict with his explication of divine thinking as 'noèsis noèseôs'. In modern times Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger were the main representatives of an anti-Aristotelian attitude. All three reject the logical prohibition of the circular argument, because it is inadequate to the life of concrete scientific thinking. The path of science always turns around towards its origins and results in a correction of its fundamental hypotheses on a higher level. Circularity is considered as a hallmark of sound logical procedure, as a characteristic of excellence in human understanding. The famous 'hermeneutic circle' is interpreted as the modern equivalent of the Hegelian 'Kreislauf and the Greek ' to par'allèlôn'. In the second, the more systematic part of the text the circular nature of our cognitive and scientific behaviour is demonstrated along three different lines. Reflection on the natural language with its finite stock of words, whose meanings are structurally connected, leads us to the so called semiotical circularity. Natural language is a complex network in which circular argumentation is not only unavoidable, but even the only means of explication. We have to work with the material contained in our dictionary, in which the items are defined by each other. The second reason is constituted by the system-orientation of science. In science we try to systematize our knowledge by means of formalisations and abstractions. The development of science can be characterised as a succession of systems, in which every element gets its meaning from the whole organisation. If we accept systematicity as the arbiter of truth, our logic is anti-fundamentalistic and the path of our thought is in fact circular (or better : spiralistic). The third adstruction of our theory is afforded by the coupling, that is realised in a rational proof. We draw conclusions from the coherence of our perceptions, from the reciprocal implications of our ideas. Never any of our ideas is without the repercussions of the movements elsewhere in the field. When we proof something, we also disproof and correct our startingpoints at the same time. The tradition of the circular nature of human thinking is very old, but not antiquated. The accusation of committing a fallacy in the case of circularity in normal and in scientific thinking is unfouded. It is now the formal logicians turn to defend his claim. (shrink)
RésuméSi on la compare avec l’habituelle coercition infligée au condamné à mort dans le monde romain, la peine réservée au parricide ne manque pas de surprendre par son originalité. Le coupable est chaussé de sabots de bois, sa tête est ensuite recouverte d’une cagoule en peau de loup et il sera ensuite flagellé à l’aide de verges sanguines. Pour finir, le contrevenant prend place dans un sac de cuir qui sera cousu après l’intromission d’un bestiaire composé d’un chien, d’un coq, (...) d’une vipère et d’un singe d’après la description donnée par Modestin au Digeste 48.9.9 pr., ceci avant que l’ensemble ne soit jeté à l’eau. Même si la symbolique précise de chaque élément est difficile à saisir en raison de leur origine diffuse, car issue de l’imagination populaire mêlée à divers substrats religieux imbriqués, cette procédure punitive forme un tout cohérent qui ne constitue pas un châtiment politisé au sens strict, c’est-à-dire déployé dans le cadre juridique de la cité. La justice humaine se borne surtout à établir la faute gravissime incombant au contrevenant, laquelle remet en cause le socle de l’organisation romaine, ainsi qu’à préparer son rejet total de la communauté humaine et du droit qui y standardise les rapports. En ce sens, l’homme se garde de donner directement la mort au parricide et la procédure d’expulsion n’est pas sans rappeler celle d’autres individus dits «monstrueux» parce que frappés d’anormalité physique, notamment sexuelle, car ceux-ci remettaient en cause le principe même de l’existence sociale. Cette priorité absolue que constitue la sauvegarde du groupe social dans le traitement du crime a pu servir de point d’ancrage à certaines positions contemporaines qui commandent d’extraire le contrevenant de l’ordre légal, afin de traiter efficacement un acte considéré comme abominable dans l’absolu. C’est l’exemple de la théorie du droit pénal de l’ennemi dont les lointaines racines peuvent être repérées dans les procédés d’expulsions socio-juridiques qui trouvaient à se déployer dans l’Antiquité romaine. (shrink)
In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen (2003b) defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the (...) internationalism underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice (e.g., chs. 5 and 6). (shrink)
This chapter considers what type of bioethics is necessary to address contemporary issues in global health. It explores what kind of ethics, or bioethics, is needed to adequately address such concerns, and argues that because the most pressing ethical dilemmas are global, a global framework must be adopted. Moreover, it argues that to adopt a local model of ethics (whether one community, one nation state or one area of jurisdiction) will fail to illuminate key issues of injustice and thus will (...) ultimately fail as an ethical framework. In short, the global nature of current health issues requires that ethics is global. This argument is a practical one, and one which should be uncontroversial given the clear need for this response. Thus this chapter goes on to explore why, if the need for a global ethical approach is so clearly required by the global nature of health concerns, there is still a debate about whether ethics can or should be global. Thus the chapter looks briefly at the arguments against a global approach to ethics and goes on to suggest a global model of ethics which addresses at least some of these concerns. -/- In order to make this argument the chapter begins by outlining why only a global bioethics or ethics is appropriate. It will argue that global bioethics is necessary for both practical and ethical reasons. As a matter of practicality a global approach to bioethics is necessary as health issues are essentially global; and ethically, not to recognize the global implications of health issues is to endorse the significant injustice which occurs in the arena of global health. Given this the chapter will then go on to consider why, given the overwhelming reasons for adopting a global ethical framework, that the debate about whether ethics should be local or global is still ongoing. The chapter will finish with a brief overview of the global ethics model and will suggest that it might address some of the concerns of those who are wary of global approaches. -/- This chapter is available Open Access (http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544582.ch-003). (shrink)
Cet ouvrage vient couronner un ensemble d’études que Ch. Munier a consacrées à l’œuvre apologétique de Justin depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années et dont on rappellera les principaux jalons : une série d’articles dans la présente Revue (60 , p. 34-54 ; 61 , p. 177-186 ; 62 , p. 90-100 & 227-239), une monographie parue en 1994 à Fribourg (Suisse) dans la collection « Paradosis », et une première édition critique avec traduction, dans la même collection, en 1995. L’édition (...) qu. (shrink)
A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded to a problem about luck that Alfred Mele (2005, 2006) posed for incompatibilist believers in free will and moral responsibility. They offer assistance to libertarians - at least on this front. In this paper, we assess their responses and explain why what they offer is inadequate for libertarian purposes.