Here I explore how the island was transformed into the site of the instrumentalization of evil, allowing Kant to expand its conception as a land of truth concerning its default genealogy in the homeland, lending purposiveness to evil to ensure this land of truth is protected from natural illusion. By contrast, Rousseau proposed the opposite course, which surprisingly bears important links to contemporary predicaments, in line with the idea of modern progress premised on a generalizing moral ecology. By the turn (...) of the 20th century, reason usurped a new title claiming this land as a planetary system, touted as the second Copernican revolution. This new revolution overlaps with the geological acknowledgment of the turn to the Anthropocene in the century that follows. The article concludes with an interpretation of the Anthropocene as an anxious competition for misrepresenting the future, borrowing the Deleuzian sense of the desert island and the power of the false, vis-a-vis Derrida’s no-world spatiality, altogether shaped by a new relational ontology in a time of climate change compounded by post-truth challenges to political democracy. (shrink)

In his earlier work on the System of Transcendental Idealism, which combined Naturphilosophie and transcendental philosophy, Schelling argued that it is only by becoming-art that philosophy can complete itself as a discipline. He proposed this formulation in response to Kant’s critical inventory of reason offering to reclaim philosophy from its entanglement in pre-critical or dogmatic traditions. But Kant avoided to ground reason in the notion of externality, the in-itself, which, owing to its pre-critical derivation, must give way to the a (...) prioris and categories of the understanding. Meanwhile, by renewing the problem of the in-itself via the self-positing ego, Fichte was the first to challenge the Kantian legacy. But the emphasis on subjectivity through its power of self-positing gave way to what in principle negates nature as the true ground of the initself; in Schelling’s description, the equivalent of the annihilation of nature. Comparatively, Schelling proposed to demonstrate the reverse, which is the extinction of the subject that has continued to nourish the reflexive standpoint of reason. To accomplish this end, Schelling invoked in his Philosophy of Art, one of the places in which he extended his discussion of the so-called identity-system, the concept of the ideal type, or rather, the destroyer of known world established by critical reason. (shrink)

In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari saw the difficulty of disentangling the question of Spinoza and, later, of Reich from the very limit of a system of representation by which they mean Oedipus. As A Thousand Plateaus would emphasize later, this limit brings out the question of the desire for democracy (‘democracies are majorities’). It desires Oedipus. In What Is Philosophy?, the limit question (Oedipus) gave way to the concept of a people to come. Fifty years since its publication, Anti-Oedipus remains (...) a relevant text (apropos of its ‘strategic adversary’ identified by Foucault) against the background of the social pathology of neofascism, populist politics, and the rise of the alt-right and neoconservative movements in recent years. The paper tries to locate this inflexion point where the desire for democracy modulates into the bi-univocal plasticity of Oedipal desire whose dangers people already seem to know. They have unmasked Oedipus’ double impasse and have escaped it. They no longer desire fascism; they desire fascists, neocons, and right-leaning mob rousers. Fifty years since its publication, Anti-Oedipus confronts a type of people who have learned to behave like the enemies of capitalism, too careful not to overload desire and destroy its bi-univocality, its great balancing act on the Body without organs. Incidentally, in ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control,’ Deleuze spoke about a people who know how to ‘surf’ replacing the ‘older sports.’ This applies to people who could become either schizoidal or regress to its more familiar inversion, the simulacra of Oedipus. (shrink)

The paper attempts to examine what is by all accounts a self-styled approach to contemporary existence, borrowing from Claire Colebrook’s 2017 essay on Bernard Stiegler’s so-called ‘curious problem of range’. Subsequently, we tackle Yuk Hui's interpretive reading of Stiegler's analysis of retentional digitality. Hui promotes the idea of archival metaphysics to overlay Stiegler’s concept of tertiary retention with tertiary protention. However, Stiegler's reformulation of Kant's aesthetics already addresses these concerns: the problem of range that his works continually provoke and the (...) self-inscriptive conditions of writing that limit the examination of this range to the paradox of différance. Stiegler assigns the task of unraveling this range in question to the amateur, vis-a-vis the critic's typical role in the conduct of critical reason. For Stiegler, the amateur is the full achievement of aesthetic judgment, essential to education and culture formation. (shrink)

True enough, not many of the human lot we know, not least of all thosewe may chance upon in life in an intricate tangle of modern socialformations where individuals get to interface rather unreflectively mostof the time, would be so generous as to bestow a casual interest in philosophy. Two thousand years ago, this kind of antipathy toward philosophy made its point well when a man named Socrates was condemned to death, proof rather of the unchanging isometrics of equivocation in (...) the face of the compelling demands of justice and truth that Socrates exposed to be the skeleton in the cupboard of power, hiding under the façade of indestructibility. This pervasive practice would have by now covered an entire époque of Western intellectualtradition from the death of Socrates to the contemporary, disguised asunwavering love of everything that abounds in beauty and vitality, adetermined search for the fundament that holds everything together under the condition that Man is free and that Life is precious as too rich and valuable for the taking. (shrink)

True to his early Schellingian roots, Slavoj Zizek, in his recent book, Pandemic! Covid-19 Shakes the World describes a virus as “a kind of zero-level life,” invoking Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Perhaps the closest reference, though Zizek did not mention it, is his second major work on the subject, namely, First Outline of A System of the Philosophy of Nature where Schelling originally propounded the theory of nature’s ‘duplicity’. In the following discussions, we will situate Zizek’s timely intervention within the context of (...) his naturalism that politically mediates the differential flows of the present world and the subject itself, against the background of a space of difference between the two, whereby the virus acts as a kind of deferral mechanism in which something like the future is suspended, finally rendering the relation motionless. The discussions will also briefly situate Zizek’s political naturalism within contemporary political discourse involving some of his direct and indirect engagements with Agamben, Latour, Badiou, Berardi, Deleuze, and others. This critical review stakes out a view of Zizek’s recent intervention as a timely polemics, consistent with his global image as one of the most dependable public intellectuals of our troubled time. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger and Immanuel Kant - two important pillars of contemporary philosophy-were proficient critics of traditional metaphysics in their time. They were known to be critical of a sort of metaphysical striving predisposed to grounding or representing an elusive concept of the universal.. Kant had earlier deconstructed a pre-eminent feature of Western metaphysics, namely, the socalled essence of thing, had it consigned to the noumenon evocative of the paradoxical nature of human knowing: it regulates the boundaries according to which any (...) notion of the infinite, the universal or the absolute can be reflexively thematized, or, thus strategically said, problematized. (shrink)