New mechanistic philosophy has not examined explanations in ecology although they are based extensively on describing mechanisms responsible for phenomena under scrutiny. This chapter uses the example of research on the shrub Lonicera maackii (Amur honeysuckle) to scrutinize individual-level mechanisms that are generally accepted and used in ecology and confronts them with the minimal account of mechanisms. Individual-level mechanisms are for a phenomenon, are hierarchical, and absent entities play a role in their functioning. They are distinguished by the role played (...) by properties in determining activities and organization. The chapter also considers the experimental methods for discovery of individual-level mechanisms, the possibility of group-level mechanisms in ecology, and suggests further research problems. (shrink)

James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfies Woodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of (...) invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469‐1546; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In the following paper, I suggest an interpretation of Petrovici’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, both of them structured in accordance with the concept of unity of existence (the world), itself given in a close relation with the idea about an existential subject. Each philosophy includes a representation of the unity of existence, founded, the first, in a spiritual conviction (noetic belief), and the second, in a perceptual faith. This representation is in the same time a privileged kind by which a subject (...) enters the world. Also, I will suggest arguments in order to legitimate the idea that each representation and its construction let themselves be led by the regulativity of a model of philosophizing: the philosophy of life (in the context of a metaphysics) – Petrovici; the existential philosophy (in a phenomenological context) – Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

In Teoria cunoștinței (Theory of knowledge), the author N. Bagda­sar enunciated the following idea: the metaphysics is conditioned by the theory of knowledge, since the first is a knowledge placed from the beginning under rules. After I will emphasise the Kantian sense of this idea and depict the manner in which the author explains Auguste Comte’s positivism in relation with the meaning of ‘positive’ (given) in that context, I will put into discussion two theories about the unknowability of a “fact” (...) that is in its possibility an object of knowledge. The first, belonging to Mircea Florian, can be deemed as “ontologically negative” and privileges the idea of a suspen­sion of knowledge in the front of the given (an object to be known, in its possibility). The second, belonging to J.-L. Marion, which can be labelled as “cognitively negative”, suggests the idea of negative certitudes – in connection to the recognizing, in some situations, of the unknowability of the given (an object to be known, in its possibility). Both theories condition the “power” of knowledge by the nature of object of knowledge, also assuming that this power, when questions its own possibilities, can produce unknow­ability. In this perspective, the two theories discussed here and Comte’s positive philosophy draw similar conclusions. The references to a possible relation between metaphysics and theory of knowledge will be maintained in the following, but the formal privilege that the last has towards the first in Bagdasar’s view will be relativized. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt to formulate some observations about the limits of a traditional ontology that is in its essence a judicative one. The main goal is to explore the possibility of constructing a pre-judicative ontology; in other words, to describe the cognitive and affective elements that are “under” the main ontological judgments, related naturally to being. The arguments in favor of a pre-judicative ontology offer a new perspective on judicative ontology itself. This pre-judicative ontology is nevertheless a (...) kind of judicative ontology that covers a nonspecific realm of values. The paper has three parts: 1) a description of the main characteristics of traditional ontology from a judicative perspective; 2) the formulation of some logical conditions of possibility for a pre-judicative ontology; and 3) the outline of a pre-judicative ontology as an ontology of values. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of (...) contributions to the mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson (1993), I argue that MacArthur and Wilson use a mechanistic approach to explain the species-area relationship. In light of this examination, I formulate a normative account of mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I argue that it offers a basis for methodological unification of ecology and solves a dispute on the nature of ecology. Lastly, I show that proposals for a new paradigm of biogeography appear to maintain the norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in The Theory of Island Biogeography. (shrink)

Is the Smartphone (SP) an extension of consciousness or just an (other) externalization of the mind and an extension of the social? The concept of externalizing the mind more appropriately describes a series of processes that tend to be considered extensions of the mind. The human mind has evolved concurrently with various externalizations, such as utensils and language, as contributions to the development of the common environment of humanity: culture and civilization. Externalizations indicate the appearance of the human mind while (...) the extensions take into account the possibility of passing to another level (the singularity of consciousness). SP is a handy tool that mediates the personal relationship with the world, benefiting from a level of integration into the global workspace of the mind. Externalization called the SP could be a bridge from the externalization of the mind to its extensions, making the ontological leap from the utensil status to that of "part of the mind". SP is a mediator of an environment: it mediates between the mind and a special social environment called the Internet (mediates access to cognitive support provided by society through the virtual world), which is gradually becoming another reality. SP is part of the extension of human society by introducing tools into the network of personal relationships. Not the mind is expanded, but the social network, increasing the number of entities with which the human can create and maintain relationships. SP may be an extension of the social rather than an extension of the mind because it mediates an increase in the complexity of social relations that can lead to the emergence of "collective minds" (causing a change in the ontological status of society). Changing cognitive demands is a feature of the world's progress. Progress brings along with it cognitive costs of integration, technical solutions like SP, aimed at reducing these costs, generating an evolutionary advantage in the new social context. From an evolutionist perspective, the world means precisely this kind of modification of cognitive demands necessary for survival, SP joining the set of tools that mediate the cognitive progress of the world in which the human is inserted. We propose the use of an evolutionary cognitive economy principle, based on avoiding unnecessary costs, reducing losses and optimizing cognitive gains. (shrink)

A number of ecologists have put forward various proposals that ecology has laws, yet they have not explicated what role laws play in ecological explanations. Marcel Weber (1999), Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan (2004) correct this deficiency and also make their case for laws of ecology: the principle of competitive exclusion and Malthus's law of exponential growth respectively. According to Weber, the principle of competitive exclusion explains phenomena (1) by direct application, or (2) by describing a default state from which (...) observed phenomena deviate and mechanisms are called to account for the discrepancy. Independently of Weber, Ginzburg and Colyvan articulate a role similar to (2) for Malthus's law. I argue that Weber's proposition of explanation by direct application is not consistent with Gause's account of ’bottle experiments’ that he uses to support it and does not do justice to ecologists' explanatory practice. To address these problems, I articulate an alternative account of explanation by direct application—the covering-law model—based on a proposal by Elgin and Sober (2002) and show that even in this proposal mechanisms play a key explanatory role. I also demonstrate how the covering-law model accounts for how Malthus's law can explain by direct application and for its role of descriptor of a default state. Finally, I argue that the views on laws as components in covering-law model explanations or as descriptors of default states do not give sufficient attention to the prominent explanatory role of mechanisms and to the demanding task of identifying and describing them, and ought to be corrected. (shrink)

His philosophical thinking was influenced by his legal knowledge, but when reading carefully his articles and papers we can notice a detachment from the philosophical premises in the development of the concepts of law. Like Del Vecchio, Djuvara makes no difference between law and philosophy and therefore the legal philosophy looks like a completion of law, these two concepts being comprehended only by a general, epistemological and philosophical approach; the issues related to the philosophy of law are not only isolated (...) from the big philosophical issues but there are closely related to them so that the philosophy of lawintegrates completely in the general philosophy. (shrink)

There is a whole discussion around the genuine/non genuine appurtenance of the Fractal Art to the Art (Ken Keller, Tad Boniecki, Noel Huntley a.o.). Fractal Art is a new way to manipulate shapes, colors and light. It is a subclass of the visual digital art that could describe as that art form produced using a computer (PC, Mac), fractal and graphical software and output devices (monitors, plotters, printers etc.) or using fractal rules and traditional painting techniques (example: Pollock) as essential (...) tools in the creative process. It is crucial to understand that the use of a computer is not a sine qua non condition, even most of the fractal artworks were digitally realized. Fractal Art is an experimental art, engaging in a new way the relations between Creator and Work. Fractal Art has a genuine equilibrium between “pragmatic” and “theoretic”. It is rather about “discovering” than “manufacturing”, rather “evocation” than “mimesis”. The conclusion has to be: Fractal Art is a genuine art form. (shrink)

The changing of our way of being, toward homo sapiens digital, is also responsible for the transformation of the learning/teaching in the 21st century. In K12 education we could speak about “Digital Natives/Digital Immigrants” “herding”, “digital multipliers” etc. In Academe, the focus has to be on creativity and digital wisdom.

We are living in the transmodern era. Now we could detect beyond the similarities and the differences between the modernism and the postmodernism the common search for the human integrality. Only this time we are not beginning with the proclaimed human unity, but with the human diversity. The Human Being has a non generic universality. The unity is purpose before being ground.

We are experiencing a new phase of the crisis of the universality in the transmodern era. In the XXIst century there is room for the common search for the human unity starting from the acceptance of our fundamental diversity and the experiencing of an insular, local universality in the Digital Realm of the Net. There are good reasons to consider the Human Being has a ground non generic universality, inviting us to search the human integrality as a process, not as (...) a result and to accept that the digital natives are naturally adapted to the Transmodern Era. (shrink)

By using the general investigation framework offered by the cognitive science of religion (CSR), I analyse religion as a necessary condition for the evolutionary path of knowledge. The main argument is the "paradox of the birth of knowledge": in order to get to the meaning of the part, a sense context is needed; but a sense of the whole presupposes the sense (meaning) of the parts. Religion proposes solutions to escape this paradox, based on the imagination of sense (meaning) contexts, (...) respectively closures of these contexts through meta-senses. What is important is the practical effectiveness of solutions proposed by religion, taking into account the costs of faith and the costs of the absence of religious belief. The hypothesis has the following consequences: religion is a necessary condition for the initial evolution of knowledge and the emergence of religion is determined by the evolution of knowledge. The continuation of the solving of paradox is a Bayesian one, using explorations: a sense of the whole allows cognitive arrangements of the parties, which in turn open the possibility of a rearrangement of the whole. The contribution of religion to the emergence of sense (meaning) could be governed by the rule: any map of the world is more useful than no map; any meaning (of life) is better than no meaning. The human mind fills the perceptual and cognitive gaps, some (religious) filling solutions being true vault keys of the entire cognitive construction called the world. Knowledge is conditioned by the existence of an organized context, as the cosmos created by religion by means of explanatory meta-theories supports knowledge by closing the cognitive context and using meaning networks. The proposed analysis is consistent with a redefinition of rationality from the perspective of evolution: the importance and relevance of knowledge is determined by its practical outcome - survival. In the context of useful fictions, it does not matter what God actually does, but what we have done by believing in God. Existence has provided a pragmatic verification of the cognitive solutions that underlie the survival strategies promoted by religions. (shrink)

El objetivo principal de este trabajo es exponer las características de lo que llamo el (o un) tiempo barroco, tratando de poner de relieve cómo el barroco se vincula con esta categoría en oposición tanto a su percepción actual y «popular» como a sus interpretaciones teóricas más relevantes, permeadas por una especie de lectura espacio-visual del mismo. Por ello, se presentan esquemáticamente tres análisis significativos (de Benjamin, Maravall y Bal) en los que cabe encontrar un intento, más o menos sólido, (...) de establecer un vínculo de este tipo, a contracorriente de la concepción espacio-visual dominante del barroco. Con el objetivo de mostrar la especificidad de la temporalidad del barroco en el seno de la modernidad en su conjunto, se incidirá en que estos análisis no lograron, por diferentes razones, ofrecer un punto de partida positivo para abordar esta cuestión. (shrink)

The lost celebration. To live the sacred, that means to admit its presence in the world and to celebrate this presence; respectively, to affirm the presence of its absolute value, of the Meaning, finally, in the horizon of harmony and joy, and to fill up ourselves by that. In nowadays, do we really know to live the feast, namely the feast of our spirit? Do we still have the wish and the wisdom to institute sacred times and spaces, to offer (...) our soul to the joy and not to the manipulation, to the ritual and not to the rut-ness? Are we able to escape from the tyranny of clamor and of instinct? These are questions to which we are trying to find some answers in our essay. (shrink)

The lost celebration. To live the sacred, that means to admit its presence in the world and to celebrate this presence; respectively, to affirm the presence of its absolute value, of the Meaning, finally, in the horizon of harmony and joy, and to fill up ourselves by that. In nowadays, do we really know to live the feast, namely the feast of our spirit? Do we still have the wish and the wisdom to institute sacred times and spaces, to offer (...) our soul to the joy and not to the manipulation, to the ritual and not to the rut-ness? Are we able to escape from the tyranny of clamor and of instinct? These are questions to which we are trying to find some answers in our essay. (shrink)

In this article, by professional immunity we refer to limitation of liability to the specific pandemic context, respectively to the concrete possibilities of diagnosis, treatment, care and too few degrees of professional freedom still available. The relevance of one or another of the limitation measures of professional liability depends on the specific legal context of each community. Our thesis is that, regardless of the form of transposition into practice, a form of health professionals protection, such as professional immunity is necessary. (...) From the multitude of possible protection measures, each state can select the appropriate ones. The need for specific measures for professional immunity is not identical in each state, depending on the specifics of the legal system, social values, measures characteristics taken to combat the pandemic, the degree of transparency of each healthcare system, the level of bioethical principles influence. However, this need doesn`t start from "no measure", the appropriate minimum level of protection seemingly to constitute a patient compensation no-fault model, plus the characteristics of the professional immunity, designed to adapt liability to specific conditions. The main problem in the absence of professional immunity is the risk of transferring the cost of ignorance, visible, in the inadequate expectations of medical science, on healthcare professionals, the limits of scientific knowledge risking to be reinterpreted as medical fault. The COVID-19 pandemic has somehow forced an additional step towards broadening discussions on universal human rights, being forced to consider ways of putting them into practice in the context of limited resources. Assuming that the increase in social complexity increases the risks of such events, we approach these problems from the perspective of creating rapid mechanisms to adapt to such changes, the lessons learned now being applied in the future to other similar cases. (shrink)

The knowledge in the context of COVID-19 pandemic must be viewed from the perspective of its purpose: the intention to limit the effects and spread of SARS-CoV-2, respectively to cancel them. In order to increase the level of knowledge we identify some of the possible classifications, based on them allowing a first outline of uncertainty. The purpose of the analysis is to contribute to the clearest possible identification of the known and the unknown, thus creating a more stable cognitive field (...) for effective public health decisions. Given that measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic along with its effects is one of humanity's priorities, it is useful to clear up some of the issues that are likely to have improper meanings. The identification of each situation that includes significant doses of unknown and the public recognition of the uncertainty represents the condition for the possibility of robust public policies. Indicating the place that each current aspect occupies in one of the four cognitive quadrants is an important cognitive work. The position we adopt is characteristic for cognitive skepticism, trying to indicate some of the knowledge`s limits of and the risks of pseudo-knowledge. The article is a theoretical approach, based on some epistemological principles of critical thinking, the starting point being the belief that knowing what you do not know is an essential part of the knowledge. (shrink)

Because inappropriate built-in or managed vaccination campaigns, regardless of the causes of vaccine hesitation, can have side effects, the most important being the opposition to vaccination, the understanding of vaccination hesitation can have an influence on specific public policies. In this article we identify a set of possible explanations for vaccine hesitation, which can be used to assess situations, identify problems and adopt appropriate solutions. We highlight the fact that the vaccination hesitation is not just about vaccination, the approach of (...) identifying explanatory hypotheses involves identifying all relevant frames of reference, all social areas that participate in establishing the appropriate interpretation context. The level of compliance with the rules could be an important explanatory hypothesis for the differences between different states in the share of vaccinated citizens. Other explanatory hypotheses: the structure of epistemic communities, community and individual cognitive resources on strategies facing the uncertainty and risk, distrust. We also assess the limits of using the deficit model. We keep in mind two cognitive asymmetries: inaction is perceived as less risky or responsible than action; the indecision is in a similar situation to the decision. Because the values that people adhere reflect their personal beliefs and convictions, and they guide the way they seek, receive, and interpret information, strategies to reduce vaccine hesitation should be based on verifying the compatibility of the intended outcome with individual values and to continue testing the various solutions to change the beliefs that contribute to the determination of vaccine hesitation or refusal. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a contribution to our understanding of the way in which reason appropriated the idea of system at the beginning of the modernity and made from it one of its emblematical forms of expression. I will start with seminal remarks on the topic from Martin Heidegger, and will then move to the idea of the system in the works of René Descartes, the pathfinder of modern philosophy. After commenting on some Cartesian ideas, I (...) will outline six points of support for and development of Heidegger’s conception about the system of philosophy and its roots in modern science. (shrink)

The Global Lives of Things: The Material Culture of Connections in the Early Modern World, edited by Anne Gerritsen and Giorgio Riello, Routledge: London and New York, 2016, xiv + 266 p. The collective research concentrated in this volume is claimed both from theoretical sources, mainly positioned in the last two decades of the past century – such as the innovative contribution made by the volume edited by Arjun Appadurai in 1986 or by the volume of author signed by Daniel (...) Miller in 1987 – and from the attempt of reconfiguring this interpretative tendency after a decade, through what the editors call “the global turn”, pointing to the manner in which globalization inherently affects the discourse of social sciences and humanities. Opening such a hermeneutical path, this book gives us grounds for a research program sui generis, for the globalization that characterizes the early modernity expressed through material culture, a program with multiple development opportunities, some of them quite unexpected and unpredictable. (shrink)

« Lorsque la philosophie peint sa grisaille dans la grisaille, une manifestation de la vie achève de vieillir. On ne peut pas la rajeunir avec du gris sur du gris, mais seulement la connaître. Ce n’est qu’au début du crépuscule que la chouette de Minerve prend son vol. » G. F. W. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit La métaphore de Hegel concernant le retard de la philosophie sur le réel pourrait s’appliquer aussi au cas de l’anthropologie du socialisme (...) réel qui émerge comme champ de t.. (shrink)