This paper compares the ways in which revealed theology, natural theology and philosophical theology justify religious belief. Revealed theology does so with an appeal to revelation and natural theology with an appeal to reason and perception. It is argued that both are inadequate. Philosophical theology analyses the meaning rather than proving the truth of religious belief. In doing so it does show how truth claims are entailed by a religious tradition and how the whole heritage of a tradition should be (...) coherent, credible, and intelligible as well as relevant and adequate to the demands of life. (shrink)

Richard Dawkins is one of the most passionate contemporary defenders of atheism. His rejection of religious faith is based on the assumption that religion is an explanatory theory that has been made obsolete by the results of scientific enquiry. The first section of this paper explains how on this view faith is reduced to religious belief which in turn is judged and rejected in the light of the epistemic criteria of science. The second section argues that faith is primarily a (...) hermeneutical rather than an epistemic phenomenon. It is way of understanding life and the world in the light of the heritage of metaphors and narratives handed down in a religious tradition. Dawkins' rejection of religion is therefore based on a misconception of the nature of religious faith. The third section argues that all views of life, both religious and secular, are hermeneutical and in need of an interpretative framework of metaphors and narratives. This also applies to Dawkins himself. The theory of evolution is for him not merely a fruitful explanatory theory, but also a hermeneutical narrative in terms of which he tries to make sense of life and experience. Dawkins' narrative is shown to be inferior to the interpretative narrative of the Christian tradition. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Dirk-Martin Grube’s article elsewhere in this issue. After discussing the points on which I agree with Grube, I explain why his notion of bivalence has not yet received the accuracy it needs.

In this response to Stenmark's critique of my views on rational theology, I concentrate on his distinction between the epistemic and the practical goals of religion and between descriptive and normative rational theology. With regard to the first distinction, I grant that truth claims play an essential role in religious belief and that it is indeed the task of philosophy of religion to decide on the meaning and rationality of such claims. I argue, however, that since such claims are internally (...) related to the practical context of religious belief, their meaning and rationally cannot be determined apart from this context as is done in the kind of rational theology which Stenmark calls 'scientific'. With regard to the second distinction, I reject Stenmark's view that philosophy of religion has a descriptive task with reference to religion, and hence also his claim that I have put forward a false description of 'the religious language game'. (shrink)

Vincent Brümmer distinguishes in this article between three types of theology. While ‘revealed theology’ tends to lead into fideism and isolationism, ‘natural theology’ is in danger of decontextualising religious belief. Trying to steer a middle course Brümmers sets out to demonstrate that a Wittgensteinian ‘philosophical theology’ can be characterised by means of the Anselmian dictum “faith seeking understanding”. Faith is seen as a form of life; religious doctrine as a language game, and “God exists” as a tacit presupposition constitutive of (...) the religious form of life. This is not a fideistic project; neither does it make communication with religious outsiders impossible. Brümmer parts company with D.Z. Phillips when the latter propounds a non-realistic interpretation of the aforementioned tacit presupposition. Philosophical theology should demonstrate the coherence, intelligibility, credibility, relevance and adequacy of religious conceptualisations. Moreover, philosophical theology should fuffill an innovative role. (shrink)

De hoogleraar godsdienstwijsbegeerte behandelt de verhouding tussen taalfilosofie en theologie.

In zijn verhelderende opstel over De eigen aard van het geloof in de wijsgerige theologie van Vincent Brümmer, gaat Henk Geertsema vooral in op ‘de aard van de geloofskennis zoals die in de Utrechtse school [en met name in mijn geschriften] wordt gezien’ . De centrale vraag voor Geertsema is ‘of de wijze waarop Brümmer de kennis die eigen is aan het geloof, opvat recht doet aan het eigen aard van het bijbelse geloof als bepaald door de levende omgang met (...) God’ . Twee gezichtspunten zijn hier vooral van belang:’ de verbinding van geloofskennis met de praktische levenshouding, die kenmerkend wordt geacht voor het “verfijnd theologisch realisme” van de Utrechtse school; de typering van de wijsgerige theologie als “grammatica van het geloof”‘ . In mijn antwoord zal ik vooral ingaan op Geerstema’s bespreking van het ‘verfijnd theologisch realisme’. Ten aanzien van ‘het grammatica van het geloof’ zal ik volstaan met een opmerking over Geertsema’s onderscheiding tussen ‘de taal van de wijsgerige theologie’ en ‘die van het concrete geloven of van de Bijbel’ . Ik kan hier kort zijn omdat Marcel Sarot in zijn bijdrage uitvoerig op dit punt ingaat. (shrink)