In the Appendix to the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously recants his position on personal identity. There he confesses: “upon a strict review of the section concurring personal identity I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth that... I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.” By his own admission, then, something has gone wrong in Hume’s account of personal identity, something that, at least to his eyes, did not go wrong in (...) his accounts of body and necessary connection. For those accounts were not grossly inconsistent or patently absurd. The case is different, however, with personal identity. There his philosophical enterprise suffers shipwreck, and it is important to understand why. Unfortunately, however, Hume confesses that he finds his former opinions false as well as inconsistent, but neglects to specify how or why he came to this conclusion. This paper is an attempt to address just that question. (shrink)

By examining the systematic integration of theology, ethics, and teleology in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I address four key interpretational aporiai: the apparently illogicality of the opening lines, the apparent contradiction between practical virtue and contemplation being the highest good, the “dominant” v. “inclusivist” views of eudaimonia, and the immanence v. transcendence of God. I show how proper attention to the link between Aristotle’s conception of the Good as “that at which all things aim” and God as the prime unmoved mover, (...) as well as an appreciation of the overall “aristocratic” context of Aristotelian philosophy, provides a new way of dealing with these aporiai that renders them less perplexing and problematic, while avoiding un-Aristotelian, anachronistic readings. (shrink)