Strategic essentialism Coherence Feminist subjectivity.

I maintain that Hegel’s reading of the Antigone underestimates the power of the negativity to which Antigone’s action is dedicated. I argue that the negativity of death and the sacred cannot, contrary to Hegel, to be sublated and thus incorporated into the progression of Spirit. Bataille’s treatment of the sacred better characterizes the unworldly force and the otherness with which Antigone and Creon are confronted when their actions bring the divine and the human into conflict. Antigone’s obedience to what she (...) understands to be her divine obligation is a devotion to a negativity which exceeds and subverts all dialectical comprehension. Although her action brings the divine and the human political sphere into a moment of identity, allowing for the sublation of the ethical world, Antigone’s action is a transgression in Bataille’s sense of the term, and it points toward the limits of reason. The Antigone narrative thus exceeds Hegel’s use of it and is ultimately more consistent with Bataille’s understanding of the sacred. (shrink)

Hegel thought Sophocles' Antigone was the finest tragedy, and he put drama atop his hierarchy of the arts, precisely at the point where his system transitions from aesthetics to the philosophy of religion. Hegel concluded his Aesthetics by writing, "Of all the masterpieces of the classical and modern world, the Antigone seems to me to be the most magnificent and satisfying work of art."1The Antigone owes its place in Hegel's hierarchy to its focus on Antigone's uncanny self-certainty. Positioned at the (...) juncture between Hegel's aesthetics and his philosophy of religion, it has at its centre a funeral rite, the most ancient and universal of all religious rituals. Antigone's perception of what she is called upon to .. (shrink)

This thesis was a critique of Hegel from a Heideggerian standpoint focusing on the role of action in community. It argues, first, that Heidegger has a more highly developed account of the present of action than does Hegel on account of his theory of temporality. On the basis of a discussion of the nature of action and its site, I examine the way in which action functions in community in both Hegel and Heidegger. For Hegel, action is essential to community; (...) intersubjective relations and mutual recognition depend upon it. For Heidegger, it is precisely the non-acting moment, the moment of vision (Augenblick), which forms the basis for community. Community, for Heidegger, would thus be prior to action, issuing from a place proper to Dasein which precedes all action in the world. I argue that the existence of a moment, the moment of vision, which would initially seem to refuse community in Heidegger actually provides a rich sense of the intersubjective because it allows for the experience of that which is totally Other. On the basis of this experience, Dasein -- the being that each and every one of us is -- would thus be capable of recognizing the essential alienness of the everyday communal world to it. Dasein would thus be able to recognize its difference and thus the difference of others from how their actions are taken up in the communal sphere. Action would thus not be the basis for community. For Hegel, action is essential to mutual recognition, which is the fabric of community. The radical otherness that is found in Heidegger when he articulates the authentic moment would be dismissed by Hegel as an affront to the possibility of community (Hegel’s beautiful soul). For Hegel, we are what we do and we are recognized exclusively on the basis of our actions. Consequently, I argue that Heidegger has a deeper and more radical sense of community than Hegel. This dissertation was inspired by the work of Maurice Blanchot. (shrink)

A lexical unit of meaning, or the concept, involves not just two moments, the rule and the following of the rule, but two reciprocally dependent moments. I argue that this links meaning to value. As a reciprocal relation, truth as normative is constituted by what Hegel calls ethical substance, which exists only between more than one consciousness, or, as Hegel would say, moments of consciousness. I read these two moments as the two shapes of consciousness that Hegel calls the master (...) and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

Is privacy the key ethical issue of the internet age? This coauthored essay argues that even if all of a user’s privacy concerns were met through secure communication and computation, there are still ethical problems with personalized information systems. Our objective is to show how computer-mediated life generates what Ernesto Laclou and Chantal Mouffe call an “atypical form of social struggle”. Laclau and Mouffe develop a politics of contingent identity and transient articulation (or social integration) by means of the notions (...) of absent, symbolic, hegemonic power and antagonistic transitions or relations. In this essay, we introduce a critical approach to one twenty-first-century atypical social struggle that, we claim, has a disproportionate effect on those who experience themselves as powerless. Our aim is to render explicit the forms of social mediation and distortion that result from large-scale machine learning as applied to personal preference information. We thus bracket privacy in order to defend some aspects of the EU GDPR that will give individuals more control over their experience of the internet if they want to use it and, thereby, decrease the unwanted epistemic effects of the internet. Our study is thus a micropolitics in in the Deleuzian micropolitical sense and a preliminary analysis of an atypical social struggle. [Added note: the contract law specialist cited twice in this article (Jonathan R. Bruno) is a graduate of Harvard Law and is presently located at University of Michigan Law School (Ann Arbor) (not identical to the 'data scientist' of the same name that populates the first page of links brought up by a Google-search on this proper name.]. (shrink)

-/- In the prime years of Hegel’s philosophical career, Prussia made progressive reforms to childhood education. Hegel had long supported reform. In his early Stuttgart Gymnasium Valedictory Address (1788), he had advocated for a public interest in widespread public education as a means for developing the children’s potential. Like Wilhelm von Humboldt, Hegel believed in education’s power to promote individual development (Bildung) as a path of freedom, which is achieved largely by expanding the student’s linguistic capacity since language, as Humboldt (...) understands it, is “the formative organ of thought [das bildende Organ des Gedanken]”. By combining Humboldt’s insights on language (especially his discussion of the power of Sanskrit) with themes in Hegel’s Science of Logic, I will demonstrate that the mind’s power to make judgments is a forward movement that can be arrested by epistemic injustice. Humboldt’s reflections on linguistic flowering and the factors that might impede it can help us understand epistemic injustice as an interference in linguistic cognitive mediation. -/- . (shrink)

In this article, I lend support to Miranda Fricker's work in social epistemology from a post-Kantian point of view. In Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing, Fricker writes that, at times, social power, rather than the actual possession of knowledge, determines whether a speaker is believed (Fricker, 2007, 1-2). I will develop Miranda Fricker's project in feminist epistemology by examining the post-Kantian linguistic sign with a view to showing how G.W.F. Hegel and Jacques Derrida transform the Kantian analytic/synthetic (...) contrast in their semiologies. Epistemic injustice arises not only from cultural stereotypes and impoverished categories of identity but, also, from the dynamic way that language generates meaning. (shrink)

Kathleen Dow Magnus' Hegel and the Symbolic Mediation of Spirit is a welcome exposition of the role of the symbol in Hegel's philosophy, and it is an important contribution to scholarship on Hegel's philosophy of language, aesthetics, and theology. Magnus is concerned to provide an alternative to the view that Hegel fails to recognize the value of the symbol in the course of privileging the sign. As Jacques Derrida writes, "The sign, as the unity of the signifying body and the (...) signified ideality, becomes a kind of incarnation". Magnus' accords Derrida's perspective the seriousness it deserves, while considering it within a close reading of Hegel himself. (shrink)

In this article, I will chart the development of G.W.F. Hegel’s ‘concept [Begriff]’ in the Science of Logic. I show that Hegel could not arrive at the concept until the end of Book II, after his treatment of the categories of modality, especially contingency.

The concept of essence is thought by many political theorists to be a residue of the patriarchal onto-theological tradition of metaphysics that needs to be (or has been) overcome by more progressive aims. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of essentialism in light of the treatment of the concept of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, and within the context of recent issues in critical race theory and feminism. I will argue that the role of an (...) essence underlying appearance is a valuable one within a Hegelian framework, and that it is politically important to reassess it. There are reasons that we should want to uphold the distinction between essence and an inessential appearance. We should want to uphold the irreducibility of essence to the Hegelian self-determining concept, and I argue in this paper that there is a basis for doing so in Hegel’s own text. Despite the well established impossibility of claiming that there is a property or set of properties that all women share, to dissolve essence as an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance is both to misunderstand essence, and to relinquish a tool needed in the struggle for justice. Essence cannot be dismissed by claiming that it is an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance because essence and the inessential do not exhibit the characteristic of reciprocity. (shrink)

This collection of writings on aesthetics includes selections from Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Amy Mullin, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Frederich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. This collection may still be available as a print-on-demand title at the Ryerson University bookstore.

This collection for a course in Social Thought and the Critique of Power includes selections from Sandra Bartkey, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello, Juergin Habermas, Margaret Kohn, Saskia Sassen, Margit Mayer, David Ciavatta, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Jeremy Waldron. Selections include material on the city, neoliberalism, computer-mediated life, precarity, cosmopolitanism, and gender. This packet may still be available as a print-on-demand title at the Ryerson University Bookstore.

Using Blanchot’s Heideggerian conception of “negativity,” this paper argues that the Hegelian conception of desire is defined by its pursuit of comprehension of the concept, but, because of the operation of negativity, the comprehension of the concept perpetually reproduces the desire for further comprehension. Desiring self-consciousness thus perpetually recreates its own opacity to itself, and the pursuit of the object of desire destroys its own fulfilment. The Greek mythical figure of Orpheus, whose gaze destroys the beloved for whom he longs, (...) is used to illustrate self-consciousness desire for identity. (shrink)

Hegel’s treatment of Sophocles’s Antigone exposes a tension in our own landscape between religious and civil autonomy. This tension reflects a deeper tension between unreflective, implicit norms and reflective, explicit norms that can be autonomously endorsed. The tension is, as Hegel recognizes, of particular importance to women. Hegel’s characterization of this tension in light of Antigone is, as H.S. Harris argues, both a more developed and a more fundamental moment in the Phenomenology of Spirit than the moment of Enlightenment autonomy (...) (with its powers of reflective self-critique). Indeed, George Steiner has remarked that, for the German idealists, Antigone exemplifies the very “pivot of consciousness,” so fundamental is the tension that it expresses. I argue that, while Hegel demonstrates the necessity of the modern transition to explicit norms that can be autonomously endorsed, explicit norms nevertheless depend on a background of unreflective norms for their force. Moreover, Hegel uses the conflict between Antigone and Creon to illustrate the tension and mutual dependence between these two types of norms. (shrink)

Kathleen Dow Magnus' Hegel and the Symbolic Mediation of Spirit is a welcome exposition of the role of the symbol in Hegel's philosophy, and it is an important contribution to scholarship on Hegel's philosophy of language, aesthetics, and theology. Magnus is concerned to provide an alternative to the view that Hegel fails to recognize the value of the symbol in the course of privileging the sign. As Jacques Derrida writes, "The sign, as the unity of the signifying body and the (...) signified ideality, becomes a kind of incarnation". Magnus' accords Derrida's perspective the seriousness it deserves, while considering it within a close reading of Hegel himself. (shrink)

I shall argue that Hegel’s concept [Begriff] has emancipatory power [Macht]. In the Science of Logic, Hegel rejects both essentialist conceptions of identity and historical necessity, and he shows that conceiving [begreifen] (or ‘grasping’) is an anticipatory self-movement of thought. The relation between ‘essence’ and ‘concept’ in Book II of the Science of Logic is unlike the relation between ‘essence’ and ‘form’ in Plato to Kant. I will defend this claim not by comparing Hegel’s ‘essence [Wesen]’ with similar categories in (...) the texts of Plato or Kant but, rather, by focusing more narrowly on two transitions in the Logic that illustrate Hegel’s break from prior philosophy with respect to his account of essence. The transition in Book I from ‘the ought [das Sollen]’ to infinity, in combination with the transitions in Book II from Existenz (‘concrete existence’) and appearance to actuality [Wirklichkeit] compose the core of Hegel’s rejection of a Platonic/Kantian normative model of essence. The category of actuality is the turning point of the Logic and shows that Hegel rejects all essentialist conceptions of form. For Herbert Marcuse, actuality is the core of thought’s self-movement, its motility (or, referring to Aristotle as Marcuse does, Hegelian thought’s being qua being). I shall extend Marcuse’s interpretation of the Logic to treat the category of actuality in the context of recent feminism and political theory. (shrink)

Extreme Contemporary is a concise intellectual biography of Maurice Blanchot, a figure whose name, Leslie Hill claims, marks the site where the most important ideas of 19th and 20th century European philosophy overlap, intersect, and indeed, come to their fruition. It situates Blanchot as the radical heir to the questions concerning totality, experience, limit, Being, and Other, which G.W.F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger left in their wake, and it distinguishes him from George Bataille and Emmanuel Levinas, his friends and close (...) counterparts. It does justice to the subtlety and elusive quality of Blanchot's writing. (shrink)

This out-of-print collection in the area of European twentieth-century political philosophy includes selections from Adorno, Benjamin, Benhabib, Marcuse, Ciavatta, Comay, Honneth, and Fraser.

This collection in the area of continental philosophy of language, aesthetics, and semiotics includes articles and book selections from Derrida, Ricouer, McCumber, Oliver, Sheshradi-Krooks, Lacan, and Kristeva. This collection is available in the University of Guelph bookstore.

This out-of-print collection on animal rights, applied ethics, and continental philosophy includes readings by Martin Heidegger, Karin De Boer, Martha Nussbaum, David De Grazia, Giorgio Agamben, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, David Morris, Michael Thompson, Stephen Jay Gould, Sue Donaldson, Carolyn Merchant, and Jacques Derrida.

This out-of-print, two-volume, photocopy packet, in the area of "Surrealism and the Politics of the Particular" includes readings on language, meaning, and surrealism from Adorno, Benjamin, McCumber, Breton, Heidegger, Freud, Kristeva, Ricouer, and Bataille.

This out-of-print collection in the area of the history, politics, ethics, and theory of privacy includes selections from Peter Gay, Alan Westin, Walter Benjamin, Catharine MacKinnon, Seyla Benhabib, Anita Allen, Ann Jennings, Charles Taylor, Richard Sennett, Mark Wicclair, Martha Nussbaum, and Robert Nozick.

This thesis is a critique of Hegel from a Heideggerian standpoint focusing on the role of action in community. It argues, first, that Heidegger has a more highly developed account of the present of action than does Hegel on account of his theory of temporality. On the basis of a discussion of the nature of action and it's site, I examine the way in which action functions in community in both Hegel and Heidegger. For Hegel, action is essential to community (...) and intersubjective relations and mutual recognition depends upon it. For Heidegger it is precisely the non-acting moment, the moment of vision, which forms the basis for community. Community, for Heidegger would thus be prior to action, issuing from a place proper to Dasein which precedes all action in the world. I argue that the existence of a moment, the moment of vision, which would initially seem to refuse community in Heidegger actually provides a rich sense of the intersubjective because it allows for the experience of that which is totally Other. On the basis of this experience, Dasein would thus be capable of recognizing the essential alienness of the everyday communal world to it. It would thus be able to recognize its difference and thus the difference of others from how their actions are taken up in the communal sphere. Action would thus not be the basis for community. For Hegel, action is essential to the mutual recognition which is the fabric of community. The radical otherness that is found in Heidegger when he articulates the authentic moment is dismissed as an affront to the possibility of community. For Hegel, we are what we do and we are recognized exclusively on the basis of our actions. Consequently, I argue that Heidegger has a deeper and more radical sense of community than Hegel. (shrink)

In this article, I defend the view that conscience exemption clauses for medical practitioners (doctors, nurses, technicians, pharmacists) should be limited by patient protection clauses. This view was also defended by Mark Wicclair, in his book on conscience exemptions in medicine (Cambridge UP, 2011). In this article, I defend Wicclair’s view by supplementing it with Hegelian ethical theory and feminist critical theory. Conscience exemptions are important to support as a matter of human rights. They support an individual’s right to protect (...) their deepest value-commitments. A true understanding of conscience is dialectical, however, and it requires patient protection clauses because they, too, protect individuals in their deepest value-commitments. In this article, I show that the defense of patient protection clauses is historically supported by the theory of “conscience [Gewissen]” developed by G.W.F. Hegel in the nineteenth century (mostly in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)). (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel focuses his treatment of Sophocles' drama, Antigone , in the Phenomenology of Spirit, on the ideal of mutual recognition. Antigone was punished with death for performing the burial ritual honoring her brother, Polyneices, to whose irreplaceability she attests in her well-known speech of defiance. Hegel argues that Antigone's loss of Polyneices was the irreparable loss of reciprocal recognition. Only in the brother sister relation, Hegel thought, could there be equality in mutual recognition. I argue that this equality cannot (...) be found in a marriage union with a husband or in the public sphere of civil society. Situating Hegel's account of marriage in the Philosophy of Right within the history of marriage and historical literature on the emerging market economy of Hegel's time, I demonstrate that Hegel's perception of equality in the reciprocal recognition of the brother sister relation was a function of both economic realities and his relationship with his sister, Christiane. I show desire in the Phenomenology to be the desire for dominance, and I show the brother sister relation to be free of desire. (shrink)

This volume of essays is both a useful introduction to the work Maurice Blanchot and an advanced and interesting study of this work. Well-known themes of Blanchot's thought are addressed: 'death as non-dialectical other', 'conversation as a (non) meeting place', 'the absence of any present', 'the worklessness of the work' (which rewrites G.W.F. Hegel's 'work as sublation of contradiction', and 'the impossibility of any origin'. The book divides Blanchot's oeuvre into three periods: criticism, fiction, and a more recent period of (...) hard-to-classify works. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum and Seyla Benhabib have raised the question of how the Western subject might engage with the non-Western other in a non-imperialistic fashion. However, both of these feminist thinkers propose a universalist framework, consistent with Donald Davidson’s conclusions regarding the translatability of ”conceptual schemes”. Drawing upon the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and Walter Benjamin, I argue that the historically constituted subject that emerges in the wake of the Enlightenment affords an account of subjectivity that recasts the meaning of rationality (...) and thus the way in which translation should be understood. I shall argue, with Benjamin, that a linguistic conceptual scheme--in short, a world—needs translation in order to remain vital, and that genuine translation not only translates the other but transforms the self who seeks to translate. (shrink)

RésuméCet article concerne le conflit entre le domaine du divin et celui de l'humain dans la lecture hégélienne de l'Antigone de Sophocle. Je soutiens que la lecture de l'Antigone par Hegel sous-estime la négativité du sacré et que, contrairement à ce que pense Hegel, l'action d'Antigone ne peut pas être dépassée, parce que son telos n'est pas l'unité, mais plutôt le rétablissement de ce que Bataille appellerait la continuité, ou l'indifférencié. Le sens du récit de l'Antigone excède ainsi l'usage qu'en (...) fait Hegel et s'accorde davantage avec la compréhension du sacré proposée par Bataille. (shrink)