This book explores three worlds shared by the humans in their collective experiences. It identifies and explores the world of commonsense, the world of religion, and the world of science as three essential dimensions of human experience. The book helps understand that humans can gain comfort and pleasure in commonsense, achieve meaning and purpose from religion, and attain truth and rationality through science. It actively applies theories to and develops theoretical explanations from different domains or situations of human existence. This (...) book is of interest to theorists, researchers, instructors, and students across major academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within (...) an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought. (shrink)

In 1933, as fourth Carus Lecturer, he expounded the view that the things of value in the history of philosophy are not the reasonings of the philosophers, but their imaginative visions of the universe and man's place in it; and he urged the philosophers of today to give the earth to the scientists, hand over the quest for certainty, and deliberately, "with right good will," undertake to explore the wide ocean of possibility. The present elaboration of those lectures into an (...) appreciative, yet critical, account of Varieties of Speculative Thought in the West from the Greeks to Bergson--so runs the book's subtitle--is first of all a fine presentation of most of the great visions that have been achieved by Occidental thinkers. In the discussion, Montague's own lively vision of man and the universe is brought out. (shrink)

Does Colour really matter to a sympathetic impartialist? In this article, I return a negative response. The article examines certain aspect of Kwasi Wiredu’s moral philosophy in Cul­tural Universals and Particulars, and how that aspect of his moral philosophy is applicable to an issue of global concern such as racism. One of the major ways by which Wiredu es­tablished his version of moral universalism is through the principle of sympathetic impar­tiality (PSI). This principle is central to his moral theory because (...) for him, the principle is not only common to all human practice of morality, but is also essential to the harmoniza­tion of human interests in the society. This article attempts to interrogate how Wiredu’s PSI could be employed to tackle the problem of racial discrimination that bedevilled the whole world. The study employs the method of textual interpretation, argumentative discourses of Wiredu’s principle of sympathetic impartiality and analysis of the concepts of racism. The paper contends that if the principle of sympathetic impartiality is universally embraced, it stands the chance of reducing the global problem of racism. (shrink)

Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way (...) of thinking and thought-individuating cognitive value, outline an account of self-thought that rejects the assumption and keeps intact all of Frege’s chief claims, and respond to a number of worries to the effect that this proposal yields undesirable results from the point of view of the individuation of self-thought at the level of cognitive value. (shrink)

Sometimes Strauss argues as if he thought it possible to understand man without raising questions about his relations to other things, and hence about his place in the whole. But when they are viewed in their broader context, such arguments are seen not to be his final word. Man's humanity cannot be understood in its own terms alone. The human soul differs from everything else in that it is "... open to the whole and therefore more akin to the whole (...) than anything else is." In ordinary usage, "whole" implies completeness and autonomy. But the openness of the soul--i.e., of a part--to the whole can only mean that the whole is open to itself. The whole is, then, not, in the ordinary sense of the term, whole. Nor is the soul which is "open" to it. Stripped of myths, "... the human soul is... more akin to the whole than anything else is" because neither of them is whole. The same conclusion follows when one tries to understand the definition of the philosopher as the man animated by quest for knowledge of the whole. Qua philosopher he knows neither that there is a whole, nor what it might be if there were one. To define the philosopher as the man who knows that he does not know only paraphrases the difficulty. It does not solve it. For "know" is here used equivocally. The same equivocation is at play in the comment "... one cannot know that one does not know without knowing what one does not know". Admittedly "knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance." The philosopher believes and perhaps divines more than he actually knows. All men do. The essential difference between the philosopher and other men may well consist in the fact that the philosopher distinguishes more conscientiously than do others between what he knows and what he believes, and that he strives more single-mindedly than do they to transform as large a share of his beliefs as possible into knowledge. He may conceivably at some point be said to have reached the stage where his aspirations have become reasoned expectations. But that is as far as he can possibly go as long as he remains a philosopher and has not become a wise man or a god. Until and unless the philosopher knows, in the strong sense of the term, he can no more decide whether his aspirations could be fulfilled than he can swim before getting wet. (shrink)

some multicultural reasons of existencialism.

What are the laws of physics? -- The stuff that kicks back -- Point-of-view invariance -- Gauging the laws of physics -- Forces and broken symmetries -- Playing dice -- After the bang -- Out of the void -- The comprehensible cosmos -- Models of reality.

Husserl's two notions of "definiteness" enabled him to clarify the problem of imaginary numbers. The exact meaning of these notions is a topic of much controversy. A "definite" axiom system has been interpreted as a syntactically complete theory, and also as a categorical one. I discuss whether and how far these readings manage to capture Husserl's goal of elucidating the problem of imaginary numbers, raising objections to both positions. Then, I suggest an interpretation of "absolute definiteness" as semantic completeness and (...) argue that this notion does not suffice to explain Husserl's solution to the problem of imaginary numbers. (shrink)

The central challenges for moral fictionalism are twofold: first, to explain how its recommendation that we abandon moral belief and assertion can be reconciled with its rationale of preserving the motivational efficacy of moral thought and discourse; second, to explain what the point is of replacing moral belief and assertion to begin with. This chapter clarifies these challenges and argues that Richard Joyce’s recent “metaphorist” version of fictionalism fares no better with respect to them than his earlier “narrationist” version. Just (...) like its narrationist predecessor, metaphorist fictionalism fails to secure the motivational efficacy of moral thought and talk. The authors also find faults with yet more recent attempts at answering the above challenges for moral fictionalism, leaving the conservationist recommendation a more attractive alternative. This conclusion could be overturned if the conservationist proposal were sufficiently problematic in other respects, but the authors argue that it isn’t. (shrink)

The Higgs particle has been detected a few years ago, that is what newspapers tell us. For many physicists, the Standard Model of particle physics has accomplished all the jobs. Or to put it simply: The game is over. Is it true? Then some physicists began to ask: can go beyond the Standard Model? Because the supersymmetric extension of the Standard Model has failed. If you feel that theoretical physics is becoming boring, you are not alone. Fortunately, there is good (...) news: a new generation of physicists are doing table-top experiments in their basements. Can we expect new results later? If so, what will the future of physics look like? This article discusses this question, starting with a blunt look at the relationship between mathematics and physical reality, written from the perspectives of a mathematician and a cosmologist. (shrink)

Díaz-Rojas, Soto-Andrade and Videla-Reyes advocate an approach to the teaching and learning of mathematics that emphasizes enaction, embodiment and metaphorization. I comment on their analysis of ….

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.