V celej Heideggerovej tvorbe predstavuje recepcia dejín filozofie dominantný rozmer jeho filozofického u?enia. Autor štúdie sa zamýš?a nad problémom, ?i Heidegger mohol úspešne zav?ši? dokon?enie svojho diela Bytie a ?as ako ho pôvodne ohlásil pri prvom vydaní . Zis?uje, že nenaplnenie pôvodných zámerov k druhej nenapísanej ?asti práce nebolo vôbec náhodným dôsledkom. H?adanie odpovede na otázku bytia v druhej polovici práce Bytie a ?as sústredením sa na filozofické u?enia Kanta, Descarta a Aristotela nemohlo prinies? o?akávané výsledky, preto sa Heidegger po (...) obrate sústredil najmä na recepciu chápania bytia v diele Hegela, Leibniza, Herakleita a Parmenida. V tejto súvislosti autor zis?uje, že ani táto vážna zmena základnej orientácie na dejiny filozofie nemohla by? úspešne zav?šená hlavným problémom Heideggerovej filozofie – premyslie? bytie bez jestvujúcna a tak prejs? od metafyziky jestvujúcna k metafyzike Bytia. (shrink)

In Heidegger’ philosophical science writings the problematic of science occupies an important place. There are several periods in Heidegger’ articulating this problem. Among the most important are the 1930s, especially his lecture Modern Mathematical Science, which is seen by the author as one of the most considerable Heidegger’s works. Divided into two main parts it examines the relationship between the mathematical and metaphysics and Descartes’ relationship to metaphysics. In this lecture Heidegger showed himself as an excellent analytical philosopher, whose focus (...) is not on historical-philosophical reception of modern science , but on an original picture of the rise of modern science and its links with the origins of modern metaphysics as a metaphysics of subjectivity. To understand modern science means for Heidegger also a deep philosophical insight into Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence. And with this we have but to agree. (shrink)

The paper examines the significant relationship between the history of philosophy and the systematic form of philosophizing in the 19th and 20th cenutries as develo_ped in the conceptions of G. W. F. Hegel and M. Heidegger. The first part discusses the essential models of the philosophy of the history of philosophy illustrated by Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy and its relationship to the systematic form of his philosophy. Hegel's philosophy of the history of philosophy as philosophizing about philosophy (...) is a metatheoretical movement inside historical-philosophical thinking, the aim of which is not to describe the process of the history of philosophy from outside, but to understand it and to explain it as an inseparable part of the resolution of the most important philosophical problems. The second part of the contribution focuses mainly on Heidegger's question What it is – philosophy?, as well as on his later writings, which offer a remarkable picture of the unity of philosophy and the history of philosophy. (shrink)