This paper takes a simple, informal suggestion by Broome and another more explicit suggestion by Kamm for how to deal with asymmetric claims and shows how they can be interpreted to be consistent with two different social welfare functions: Sum-of-square-roots of individual utilities, and product of utilities. These functions are then used to analyze more complicated situations but I show that the first yields more intuitive results, and a better compromise of efficiency and justice, than the other. (Published Online July (...) 11 2006). (shrink)

Committee protocols typically involve a deliberation stage in which members try to influence and convince other regarding the “right” decision. Beyond information exchange, such deliberations also aim to affect the preferences and the votes of other members. Using a model of social influence, we demonstrate how deliberation procedures affect the voting outcome and how different protocols of consultation by committees’ chairs may affect their decisions. We then analyze the ability of a “designer” to control the deliberation protocol and to manipulate (...) the deliberation procedure to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected. (shrink)

The American and some other constitutions entrench property rights by requiring super majoritarian voting as a condition for amending or revoking their own provisions. Following Buchanan and Tullock [The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), 1962], this paper analyzes individuals' interests behind a veil of ignorance, and shows that under some standard assumptions, a (simple) majoritarian rule should be adopted. This result changes if one assumes that preferences are consistent with the behavioral (...) phenomenon known as the endowment effect. It then follows that (at least some) property rights are best defended by super majoritarian protection. The paper then shows that its theoretical results are consistent with a number of doctrines underlying American Constitutional Law. (shrink)

We investigate the procedure of "random sampling" where the alternatives are random variables. When comparing any two alternatives, the decision maker samples each of the alternatives once and ranks them according to the comparison between the two realizations. Our main result is that when applied to three alternatives, the procedure yields a cycle with a probability bounded above by 8 27 . Bounds are also obtained for other related procedures.